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As regional scholars, statespersons, and critics
know all too well, prison populations have in
recent years risen sharply across Latin America.
The sheer numbers of the incarcerated have more
than doubled since the turn of the century; in the
aggregate, South and Central American prison
populations grew from an estimated 650,000 in
2000 to over 1.3 million by 2014.1 All 20 Latin
American countries now lock away more people
than they did little more than fifteen years ago.2
By contrast, European prison populations fell by
over 20 percent over the same period, and the
unprecedented expansion of the United States
penal sector on a global-historical scale appears to
have leveled off and reached a tense new
plateau.3 As a key matter of global comparison,
almost every Latin American state today
possesses an actively swelling incarceration rate
above the presently recorded world average of
144 per 100,000 national population — a new
problem the social, political, and ethical
implications of which have compelled us to co-
ordinate this special edition of the Prison Service
Journal.4 We believe there is a strong case to be
made that rather than the United States, it is
instead the United States’ southern neighbors
which now comprise a second, even more ad hoc
and disaggregated state experiment in
dramatically expanding the bureaucratic role and
infrastructural space dedicated to the
contemporary prison estate. Latin America in sum
has rather quietly become the new mass carceral
zone. More to the point, however, the new mass
carceral zone has much to teach about the present
and future of global state penality and carceral
(mis)management, and it is to these pressing
matters of life and death that, first and foremost,
any publicly engaged prison ethnography ought
to direct itself.
The view of this wholesale carceral
transformation from inside particular countries and
prisons may appear to be confusingly variegated from
one nation, region, or city to another, but clear-cut
macro-level and micro-level trends are becoming
more discernable. An undeniable development is the
state-driven emergency, or the top-down impetus,
that operates behind such unchecked carceral
growth. Among the national contexts we consider in
this special issue, Brazil’s incarceration rate reached
301 in 2015 (up from 133 in 2000), Honduras’
incarceration rate reached 196 (up from 178),
Nicaragua’s rate reached 171 (up from 128),
Venezuela’s rate reached 168 (up from 58), and
Ecuador’s rate has reached 162 (up from 64).5 At
merely 122 per 100,000, only Bolivia recorded a rate
slightly below the world average. And yet, even the
Bolivarian prison population has grown 30 percent
since 2000. Official explanation for this ‘expanding
power of punishment’6 throughout the region centre
in part on rising levels of violent crime, and in part on
the rhetoric of punitive populism, but mostly on drug
prohibition policies. Depending on the particular
country, up to a third of Latin American prisoners are
being held in remand custody or are serving sentences
related to drug trafficking.7 In much of Latin America
pre-trial detention has remained mandatory for most
drug-related offences. For example, across Brazil the
supply of illicit drugs attracts a minimum five year
prison sentence for repeat adult offenders, whatever
the quantity and whatever the drug. Among other
criminal categories designated ‘heinous’ in late-1990s
legislation, these ‘drug traffickers’ — as most Latin
American countries define anyone who profits from
illegal narcotics — , must also serve a minimum two-
thirds of their sentence before being considered for
parole. In 2014, 27 percent of Brazilian prisoners were
in for selling drugs: a rate of imprisonment three
times higher than in 2005.8
Surviving in the New Mass Carceral Zone
Sacha Darke, University of Westminster and Chris Garces, Cornell University.
1. Postema, Cavallaro and Nagra, this volume.
2. Walmsley, R. (2015) World Prison Population List, 11th edn., London: International Centre for Prison Studies.
3. Walmsley (2015), see note 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Karam, M.L. (2009) Proibições, Riscos, Danos e Enganos: As Drogas Tornadas Ilícitas, Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris.
7. Ibid.
8. Karam, M.L. (2015) 'Mulheres presas', Empório do Direito, http://emporiododireito.com.br/mulheres-presas-por-maria-lucia-karam,
accessed 26 June 2016.
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Not surprisingly, Latin American prisons charged
with housing this over-abundance of indicted or
sentenced bodies have witnessed a slow and
frightening march of deteriorating conditions. Not only
do we refer to the infrastructural decay endemic to the
Latin American drug war prison, but equally important
— and of particular importance to understanding what
it is like to be incarcerated in such overcrowded facilities
— , with staffing levels that fail to keep up with
growing inmate numbers. Among the most extreme
examples of staff shortage highlighted in this volume
are the Garcia Moreno, Penitenciaría del Litoral, and
Nuevo Centro de Rehabilitacón Social Regional —
Guayas prisons located in the country of Ecuador,
where one of our contributors spent time as a foreign
prisoner beginning in 2005, before completing his
sentence in HMP Wandsworth,
London, UK, between 2014 and
2015.9 Despite being very
different prison types (a multi-
purpose prison in a state capital; a
nominal penitentiary that served
more properly as a dumping
grounds for indicted delinquents;
and a so-called community prison
synonymous with 21st Century
Socialist penal code reforms), at
each facility just three or four
guards prison were typically left in
charge of wings containing 350
to 500 inmates. La Peni held
8,000 inmates, five or six per cell,
and many more were left to sleep
in the cellblock corridors.
Similarly, one of the two Brazilian
prison guards interviewed for the volume, currently
working at the infamous Bangu prison complex, Rio de
Janeiro, reports that in his unit a maximum of nine
officers are on duty at any one time.10 Of these, just five
officers will be stationed inside the cellblocks, as
opposed to guarding and patrolling the outer prison
wall. With a population of 1,200 inmates, as in the
remainder of the complex, which in total holds nearly
27,000 prisoners,11 the unit is currently operating at
least 60 percent over official capacity. In Brazil official
capacity is calculated according to the number of beds
designated to individual cells and dormitories, as is the
national norm. Except that in Brazil it is quite normal to
find four bunks squeezed into a ’single’ cell measuring
six or seven square metres.12
Under situations of abject deprivation and acute
staff shortage, the immediate implication is that Latin
American prison officers lack the resources to carry out
the work of supervision, or even to ensure basic flows of
vital goods and services across the wings. Across the
region, officers increasingly rely on inmates to
collaborate in the running of daily prison routines.
Moreover, in many facilities officers rarely enter the cell
blocks except at unlock or lockup. Instead, prisoners are
increasingly left to fend for themselves and, with greater
or lesser degrees of open institutional
acknowledgement, to govern their spaces of enclosure.
By default, prison administrators and their landing staff
also experience diminishing levels
of authority. As Andrés Antillano
demonstrates in the case of
Venezuela,13 this absence of state
in Latin American cellblocks
inevitably undermines both the
direct authority and legitimacy of
state-run prison governance. 
These developments should
not be remarkable to the student
of contemporary Latin America.
Social and legal historians14
remind us that the region’s
prison systems have long been
less concerned with corrections
than with the management of
’offending’ bodies — bodies
considered threateningly anti-
social by mere dint of the fact of
being held in state custody. This narrow focus on
incapacitation has become increasingly prevalent in the
neoliberal, globalised era of rising social disparities and
falling social security. Most curiously, even Latin
American countries that eschew neoliberal policies —
eg. Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua —
wholeheartedly embrace the ’punitive turns’ that
neoliberal practices of preemptive ’threat
neutralisation’ set in motion. The consequences of
such civil divestiture have been devastating both to
everyday civil life and penal institutions alike. To
borrow from Loïc Wacquant’s analysis of ‘the
...in many facilities
officers rarely enter
the cell blocks
except at unlock or
lockup. Instead,
prisoners are
increasingly left to
fend for
themselves...
9. Tritton with Fleetwood, this volume.
10. Karam and Saraiva, this volume.
11. Soares, R. (2016) 'Presídios do Rio nunca estiveram tão superlotados: São 48 mil presos para 27 mil vagas', Extra, 8 May 2016.
12. Darke, S. (forthcoming, 2017) Self-Governing Prison Communities: Coproducing Order, Survival and Desistance in Brazilian Carceral
Spaces, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
13. Antillano, this volume.
14. See, inter alia., Dikötter, F. and Brown, I. (eds.) (2007) Cultures of Confinement: A History of the Prison in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Salvatore, R.D., Aguirre, C. and Joseph, G.M. (eds) (2001) Crime and Punishment in Latin
America, Durham: Duke University Press.
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penalization of poverty’ in Brazil, the region’s prisons
are therefore ‘more akin to concentration camps for
the dispossessed than to judicial institutions serving
any identifiable penological function.’15 As Christopher
Birkbeck has diagnosed the problem, Latin American
prisons have become little more than institutions of
internment.16 In sum, Latin America ironically finds
itself ’ahead of the curve’ in the global drift towards
radically underfunded and precarious prison
environments.
Similar to the region’s under-invested and under-
policed urban peripheries,17 however, the lived
complexity of social and political relations must be
studied ethnographically in Latin American prison
settings to better understand these paradigmatic spaces
of de facto state abandonment.18 Ethnographic,
documentary, and – just as
importantly – autobiographical
accounts (testimonios) bear
witness to a reality in which prison
staff and prison inmates create
and maintain professional and
interpersonal relationships in even
the most desperate of settings.19
As the fieldwork-based
contributions to this volume
show, inmate and staff-inmate interactions are equally
shaped by tacit relations of reciprocity and
accommodation as they are by conflict or resistance.
Much like the impoverished barrios and favelas on the
outside, socio-political relations in Latin American prison
spaces are, at the first instance, grounded in everyday
interpersonal and collective struggles for order and
wellbeing, or ad hoc institutional accommodations
conditioned by state abandonment and the
normalisation of inhumane living conditions: what we
call informal dynamics of survival.20 Throughout the
global South,21 the shared precariousness of everyday
life for prison officers and inmates has led to their
necessary interdependence and institutional
entanglement, as the former quietly become more
reliant on the cooperation of the latter, and as prisoners
step in to occupy the void in state responsibility or
legally sanctioned ecologies of monopolised violence —
a phenomenon one of us has previously referred to as
‘inmate governance.’22
Informal prison dynamics of survival increasingly
and creatively shape the prison environment across
Latin America. As the international trend away from
rehabilitative prison environments currently suggests,
it appears that Latin American prisons are likely to
become even more self-
ordering. The untold or
unintended consequences of
this ‘informalisation of prison
governance’23 are legion; they
may at times appear more
‘cobbled together’24 than
technologically crafted by
penological or justice system
experts, but inmate and staff-
inmate strategies of pursuing survival ought to be
carefully analysed. This special edition of the Prison
Service Journal openly seeks to explore the intricacies
of these informal dynamics actively at work across
Latin American prison estates. The volume as such
has been divided into three sections. 
The first and largest section contains a number
of academic articles focusing on ethnographic
studies in specific countries (namely, Bolivia, Brazil,
...Latin American
prisons are likely to
become even more
self-ordering.
15. Wacquant, L. (2003) 'Towards a dictatorship over the poor: Notes on the penalization of poverty in Brazil', Punishment and Society,
5(2): 197–205, p.200.
16. Birkbeck, C. (2011) 'Imprisonment and internment: Comparing penal institutions North and South', Punishment and Society, 13(3):
307–332.
17. Koonings, K. & Kruijt, D. (eds.) (2007) Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America,
London: Zed Books; Koonings, K. and Kruijt, D. (eds.) (2015) Violence and Resilience in Latin American Cities, London: Zed Books.
18. Darke, S. and Karam, M.L. (2016) 'Latin American prisons', in Jewkes, Y. et al., eds., Handbook on Prisons, 2nd edn., Abingdon:
Routledge. 
19. Ibid.
20. In formulating the term informal dynamics of survival, we draw inspiration from existing anthropological work on individual and group
resistance to state and social abandonment in a variety of social settings, for instance João Biehl's research at a Brazilian asylum (see
Biehl, J., 2005, Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment, Berkley: University of California Press) and Didier Fassin's research on the
effect of the AIDS epidemic on South African townships (see Fassin, D., 2007, When Bodies Remember: Politics and Experiences of
AIDS in South Africa, Berkley: University of California Press; Fassin, D., 2010, 'Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics
of Life', Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 1(1): 81–95). We are also indebted
to our colleagues at the Global Prisons Research Network, principally Mahuya Bandyopadhyay, Andrew Jefferson and Tomas Max
Martin, who in a special journal edition to which the current authors were invited to contribute, identified survival as one of three
central, universal themes (alongside governance and transition) in the study of ‘prison climates’ (see Martin, T.M., Jefferson, A.M. and
Bandyopadhyay. M., 2014, 'Sensing prison climates: Governance, survival, and transition', Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical
Anthropology, 68). 
21. Martin et al. (2014), see note 20.
22. Darke, S. (2013) 'Inmate governance in Brazilian prisons', Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 52(3): 272–284.
23. Garces, C., Martin, T.M. and Darke, S. (2013) 'Informal prison dynamics in Africa and Latin America', Criminal Justice Matters, 91(1):
26–27.
24. Martin et al. (2014), see note 20.
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Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela).
Although contributors were asked to include a brief
overview of a national or local prison system, in each
article a special focus has been given to interrogating
everyday realities of inmate governance and the
informal dynamics of managing to survive spaces of
in-built institutional neglect. 
The second section focuses on firsthand
accounts. It includes (as previously mentioned) a
testimonial given by a former prisoner who spent
nearly a decade in a number of Ecuadorian prisons
from 2005 forward, and interviews with two
university-educated, Brazilian prison guards, along
with a former Brazilian prisoner-turned-rapper on
Latin America’s largest prison gang, São Paulo’s
Primeiro Comando do Capital (First Command of the
Capital: the PCC). 
The final section contains
two articles that explore the
policy implications of the volume.
The first of these concluding
papers focuses on the
implications of self-ordering
prison dynamics for policy makers
in the region. The author makes
the important point that ‘carceral
self rule’ is produced by the acts
and omissions of prison
authorities; a majority of these
authorities seek to rein in the
most negative aspects of carceral
self-rule (its emergence from
struggles to survive dangerously
precarious prison conditions, the omnipresent
vulnerability to be dominated by predatory gangs, and
so on), while supporting its normally more hidden-away
salutary features (inmate inclusion in prison
governance). The final paper in the volume explores the
emergence in recent years of alternative models of
incarceration in Latin America that aim to formalise
inmate and staff-inmate self-ordering practices as an
instrumental part of efforts by prison authorities to
adhere to international human rights norms. The
authors describe how prisoners may be creatively
incorporated as shared managers of prison
environments, and to make even more open and
commonplace the array of inclusionary projects tacitly
governing some of the least torturous or life-
threatening facilities across the region. That members
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
would seek to promote this kind of research may stand
as testament to the relevance and immediate need for
rethinking the prison as a space for ‘the commons’ to
participate more integrally, and not exclusively from the
ground up, but more as a new space of and for
ameliorative exchange, where ‘the carceral top and
bottom’ ought to challenge and to remake the prison
estate from within.
What would it take to more seriously consider
prisoner self-governance? How does prisoner self-
governance already map onto informal practices of
inmate and staff survival, and how might these
practices be incorporated as a means to regulate
prisons more pacifically and, in the final analysis, to
more constructively aid in state decarceration efforts?
Fortunately, blind speculation or proclamations about
these important matters of ‘non-reformist reform’
may no longer be needed as ethnographers from a
variety of national academic traditions, equipped with
different empirical questions and theoretical interests,
have already begun to open new
lines of inquiry into Latin
America’s prisons and to roll
back the curtains on their
backstage, inmate-and-staff
practices. In the remainder of
this introduction we briefly
outline some of the more
important features and
consequences of informal
dynamics of survival in Latin
America. We conclude with a
discussion of the ways in which
self-ordering inmate and staff-
inmate practices in particular
might be utilised by those
interested not just in studying
but also in remaking the commons emerging
simultaneously inside and outside and between
distinct prison contexts, and not only in Central and
South America but elsewhere, across territories of the
global North and global South, wherever new mass
carceral zones are making their appearance. In doing
so, we draw most of our data from the articles and
firsthand accounts that we solicited for this volume.
We thank each of the contributing authors for
providing what we hope the reader will agree to be a
singularly unique set of essay-length interventions
giving equal weight to insider as well as academic
accounts.25
Inmate governance
Latin American prisons, then, are effectively
governed through implicit, informal partnerships
between prison administrators, prison guards and
inmates. This underlying feature of inmate and staff-
inmate relations is highlighted in each of the
Fortunately, blind
speculation or
proclamations
about these
important matters
of ‘non-reformist
reform’ may no
longer be needed...
25. Special thanks goes to Pieter Tritton, for agreeing to share his experiences and understanding with us so soon after leaving prison.
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contributions to this volume, as well as in our own
previous fieldwork in Ecuador and Brazil. In Latin
America two broad forms of inmate governance
arise in response to material deprivations and staff
shortage. First, in many penal institutions
administrators make extensive use of inmates to
work alongside or in the place of prison staff. In
contrast to the better-resourced prisons of modern-
day Northern America and Western Europe, today it
is not unusual to find more inmates on duty than
prison staff.26 In some Latin American prisons
inmates are employed not only in domestic and
administrative positions, but also in security.27 In a
number of Brazilian prisons inmates have been
entrusted with keys to the cellblocks; in Rio de
Janeiro, imprisoned police officers have even been
entrusted with mobile phones
and guns.28
Second, each of the papers
in this volume illustrate how
inmates organise themselves to
take on the functions of prison
staff in the cellblocks
themselves. In some cases
clearly exclusionary and
hierarchical, but in other
instances more inclusive and
customary, ‘inmate collectives’29
and ‘cellblock mafias’30
increasingly provide Latin
American prisoners not only
with self-governing systems of
aid and protection, or
representation in dealings with
prison staff and administrators, but also in the
regulation of informal markets necessary for
collective material well-being. Important to our
analysis, prison markets emerge in response to
shortfalls in paid work,31 and basic necessities such as
cell space, bedding, medicines and food32 as well
drugs, alcohol, mobile phones and other illicit
merchandise. Moreover, they are increasingly
important to prison administrators as well as to prison
inmates.  
The question whether inmate collectives and
mafias provide, or have the potential to provide Latin
American prisoners with more or less legitimate systems
of governance than currently provided by prison officers
is multifaceted and can only be answered case by case.
Unsurprising considering the informal nature of inmate
self-governance, the data provided in this volume is
often contradictory at first glance. In some prison
facilities, inmate leaders are found to be elected among
their corridor and cell mates,33 while in other prisons the
most powerful inevitably rise to positions of authority.34
Meanwhile, self-governance is found to be premised in
crippling levels of exploitation
and backed up by extraordinarily
high levels of violence in some
facilities, but to be virtually
absent in others. To further
complicate matters, blackmail
and other forms of rent-
extracting coercion often co-exist
alongside interpersonal networks
of support, among the inmate
populations,35 and also between
inmates and guards.36
Of particular importance to
our analysis, informal dynamics
of survival continue to pertain to
inmate and staff-inmate relations
in prisons that have in recent
years fallen under the command
of criminal organisations or ‘movements.’37 Major Latin
American street gangs such as the MS13 and Barrio 18
in Honduras, and the PCC in São Paulo and the
Comando Vermelho (Red Command) and Terceiro
Comando (Third Command) in Rio de Janeiro
increasingly traverse the boundaries between prisons
26. See e.g. Karam and Saraiva, this volume.
27. E.g. Birkbeck (2011), see note 16; Garces, C. (2010) 'The cross politics of Ecuador's penal state', Cultural Anthropology, 25(3): 459–
496; Guttiérez Rivera, L. (2010) 'Discipline and punish? Youth gangs' response to ‘zero tolerance’ policies in Honduras', Bulletin of
Latin American Research, 29(4): 492–504. The employing of prisoners in positions of security has historical precedence both in
Southern America (see e.g. Ramos, C., 1953, Memórias do Cárcere, Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio; Aguirre, C., 2005, The Criminals of
Lima and their Worlds: The Prison Experience, 1850–1935, Durham: Duke University Press) and Northern America (see e.g. Marquart, J.
and Roebeck, J., 1985, ‘Prison guards and snitches’, British Journal of Criminology, 25(3): 217–233).
28. Darke (forthcoming, 2017), see note 12.
29. Ibid.
30. Garces (2010), see note 26.
31. In particular, Cerbini, this volume.
32. In particular, Carter, this volume; Núñez and Fleetwood, this volume.
33. In particular, Núñez and Fleetwood, this volume; Tritton with Fleetwood, this volume.
34. In particular, Carter, this volume.
35. As Julienne Weegels writes in the context of her research at a police jail in Nicaragua, ‘against a backdrop of violence and scarcity,
inmates also form alliances and friendships to protect each other and help each other through difficult times (Weegels, this volume,
p.16.)
36. See Darke (forthcoming, 2017), see note 12.
37. Biondi, 'Movement between and beyond walls', this volume.
...self-governance is
found to be
premised in
crippling levels of
exploitation and
backed up by
extraordinarily high
levels of violence in
some facilities...
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and impoverished urban areas, and increasingly
monopolise the networks of inmate authority,
accommodation and reciprocal relations with prison
staff. It might be mistaken to regard these gangs as
merely ‘egalitarian’ or ‘pacifying’ modes of prison
governance, yet there appears to be little doubt that
the rise of major prison gangs has resulted in closer-knit
communities of criminalised subjects on the insides of
Latin America’s jails and penitentiaries. 
Each of the major criminal organisations covered in
this volume gained control over prison territories in the
short term through violence, most often in response to
life-threatening conditions of state incarceration or
internecine struggles within the blocks. Yet, in the
longer term they have served to further facilitate inmate
and staff-inmate systems of mutual support and vitally
necessary protection. This is
certainly the case with the PCC,
which governs the lives of more
than 90 percent of São Paulo’s
220,000 prisoners. As papers and
interviews in this volume by
Camila Dias, Fernando Salla, and
Karina Biondi demonstrate, since
eliminating its rival groups in the
first years of its existence, the
PCC today rules less through
violence and more through
welfare provision, increasingly
tolerant, quasi-legal forms of
dispute resolution, and an
ideology that pits 'outlaws’ against a 'punitive state'. A
key aspect of this ideology is that all PCC members are
equal, an all-encompassing moral code that no-one is
obliged to do anything besides assist one another.38
It would therefore be gravely mistaken to claim all
prisoner-generated networks of power are singularly or
exclusively serving ‘predatory’ interests without taking
into account the fuller carceral picture of scarcity and
everyday life. What remains in dispute is the extent to
which the power wielded by Latin America's
hegemonic ‘prison gangs’ should continue to be
regarded as hierarchical and imposed, as Dias and Salla
suggest in this volume, or as customary,
autochthonous, and emerging from interpersonal
relations formed among ordinary prisoners, more akin
to the position taken by Biondi. In either case informal
dynamics of survival take their place at the fore and aft
of inmate and staff-inmate relations, though prison
staff continue to resort to formal punishments as
backup, usually with the tacit ‘support’ of prisoners. As
Dias and Salla emphasise, state and prison gang
systems of control are not necessarily competitors. This
interpretation is also supported in the interview
conducted for the volume with two prison guards in Rio
de Janeiro. ‘The formation of gangs is a matter of
survival. When prisoners are organised, they become
more powerful, and life behind bars turns out to be less
comfortable’,39 one of the officers responds when asked
for his opinion on the relationship between
deteriorating prison conditions and the rise of criminal
gangs. When further questioned about the relationship
between officers and prisoners, he goes on to describe
how officers have little choice but to respect inmate
codes of conduct to do their jobs, but that at the same
time prisoners respect the need for officers to maintain
security and to punish prisoners that breach prison
rules. ‘We live in a violent
environment, in a permanent
tension’, he concludes. ‘Both
officers and prisoners are victims
of the same precariousness.’40
Formalising the informal?
A major point we have
sought to emphasise in the
foregoing is that inmate self-
governance across the new mass
carceral zones shares deep and
strong roots in Latin American
history. The archival literature on
Latin American prison dynamics attests to the prison’s
longstanding use and abuse as a space of state
abandonment and neglect.41 The functional rationale of
the prison lay in part as an overly idealized mechanism
of deterrence, which caudillo political ‘strong-men’
(abiding by their republican, militaristic, dictatorial, or
even democratic values) seized upon in order to
discipline working classes and to terrorize potential
vagrants, delinquents and enemies of state alike. Latin
American ethno-racial dynamics happened to play a
strong role in the designation of the prison as a space
where the ‘penitentiary ideal’ was rarely if ever expected
to produce the desired ‘soul reformation,’ so
commonplace to penal expectations in the countries of
the North Atlantic. To this day, ethno-racially marked
indigenous, Afro-Latin or Afro-Brazilian, and foreign
nationals comprise a majority of the inmate populations
across the Latin American carceral state, and it should
surprise no one that their ranks have likewise
disproportionately increased during the emergence of
‘We live in a violent
environment, in a
permanent tension’
[...] ‘Both officers
and prisoners are
victims of the same
precariousness.’
38. Biondi, 'It was already in the ghetto', this volume. This development would seem an expansive and curious new addition to literature
on the ‘convict code,’ but we leave this facinating new phenomenon aside to future ethnographic research and critical inquiry.
39. Karam and Saraiva, this volume: p. 49.
40. Ibid., p. 50.
41. See note 14 for the basic introductory texts.
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the drug-war era of heightened narcotics indictment,
prosecution, and imprisonment. The spectacular rise of
the inner-city or peri-urban maras, described in Carter’s
contribution to this volume on Honduras, attests to the
carceral origins and trauma of a heavily persecuted and
incarcerated ‘transnational gang’ community with
historical roots in extreme urban and ethno-racial
marginalization. In fact much of the present work points
in the direction of new scholarship, soon to be
published, about the racial calculus of carceral exclusion
and abandonment, which may lead to thinking more
directly about inmate self-governance as a legacy of the
long Latin American post-colonial history of marronage,
or attempts by systematically impoverished people of
colour to find new political order and delimited kinds of
interpersonal flourishing beyond the reach of the state.42
But here we have sought
primarily to discuss the variety of
ways in which inmate-self
governance has become the tacit
logic of rule on the insides of
contemporary state prisons, and
how Latin American states that
acknowledge the relegation of
the commons to these mass
carceral zones may begin to
develop greater appreciation for
prisoners’ structures of mutual
aid in the face of their over-
incarceration. The informal
dynamics of survival comprise ad
hoc technologies that spring
from the efforts of prisoners and
staff who recognize the ways in
which incipient mass
incarceration has led to the
precariousness of all who live or
work inside prison facilities. By
highlighting these technologies of survival we are
drawing attention to actually existing practices of
alternative prison governance. The state’s definitional
hegemony over the concept of ‘prison security,’
typically understood as ‘inmate threat neutralization,’
has led to a wide variety of experimentation with
prisoner segregation, isolation cells, stand-alone
‘supermax’ prisons, and other high-cost styles of
instituted, dehumanising forms of isolation in response
to breakdowns in official carceral authority. It has also
led to a backlash of new penal state experimentation
with alternative, civil society-led Christian or nominally
‘secularized’ penitentiary models based more on
rehumanising ‘recuperation,’ ‘recovery,’ and
‘reintegration.’43 Whatever the humanistic successes or
failures of these practices or models, in what Salvatore
and Aguirre refer to as the ‘cycle’ of reform, public
criticism, and institutional collapse — evidenced time
and again throughout different national prison
histories44 — we ought to emphasize that ‘informal
dynamics of survival,’ or taking the interests of prisoners
themselves more seriously, has rarely if ever been given
all due consideration as a possible viable source of non-
reformist prison reform. The interest of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to confront
the intransigence of regional over-incarceration has led
the present High Commissioner (himself an ardent
prison reformer and critic) to look
to promote in this volume the
‘controlled devolution of prison
authority’ as a means to save
prisoners’ lives and to engage in
legally viable state decarceration
efforts.45 Each of the
contributions to this volume
provide ethnographic
engagements that shed light on
these informal dynamics as a
response to prisoners’ greater
exposure to premature death. 
The pressing question of
how to ‘formalise’ such informal
dynamics is a broad matter of
pragmatic inquiry more suitable
to future research across multiple
countries’ ethnographic and
critical criminological
communities who are now
working in greater dialogue with
one another. Elsewhere, the editors of this special
edition, for example, have brought together a new
edited volume in preparation that explores how
informal dynamics of survival require the active
participation of prisoners, staff, and a variety of citizens
who live outside the prison complex itself (friends,
family, neighbors, legal advocates, prison researchers,
and former work partners of incarcerated subjects).
Hence the problematisation of informal dynamics of
survival in the new mass carceral zones points our
attention to the spontaneous growth and proliferation
42. C. Garces. Unpublished ms. “Carceral Marronage and its Religious Directions: Latin America’s ‘Church and Parastate’ Dynamic”. 
43. F. Macaulay, Modes of prison administration, control and governmentality in Latin America: adoption, adaptation and hybridity’
Conflict, Security & Development v. 13, 2013 — Issue 4: pp. 361–392.
44. R.D. Salvatore & Aguirre, ‘The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America: Towards an Interpretive Social History of Prisons,’ (pp. 1–43),
in (Salvatore & Aguirre, eds.) The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America: Essays on Criminology, Prison Reform, and Social Control,
1830–1940), Austin: University of Texas Press.
45. Postema et al., this volume.
Each of the
contributions to this
volume provide
ethnographic
engagements that
shed light on these
informal dynamics
as a response to
prisoners’ greater
exposure to
premature death.
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of entire ‘carceral communities.’46 These communities
come together increasingly in the form of ersatz,
legally-minded watchdog groups working in concert
with family members of the incarcerated. Quite often,
such community efforts now keep ‘incarcerated and ex-
carcerated’ members, or those who are bound together
inside and outside the prison complex, up-to-date on
prison dynamics and events taking place on the insides
of carceral facilities vis-à-vis social media technologies.
But most of the informal dynamics of survival are never
publicized, and are more properly handled as ‘public
secrets’ critically important to the well-being of all who
live or work inside carceral facilities.
Each of the articles published in this special edition
of the Prison Service Journal opens a new line of inquiry
that may be considered to normalise and bring informal
dynamics of survival out of the institutional shadows of
the Latin American prison estate. Throughout the
region, liberal and conservative elites have continued to
seek penal solutions to the tragically endemic problems
of contemporary state governance, whether
‘neoliberal’ or ‘neosocialist’ in political economic
orientation. When different national prison populations
swell and begin to approach the numbers more
commonly associated with drug-war era United States,
it is useful to recall the variety of modes of resisting the
penal fate ascribed to indicted or sentenced individuals.
Informal dynamics of survival can take many shapes and
be evidenced by multiple local histories. Whether or not
it is possible to formally regulate them and to
incorporate such ad hoc techniques and technologies
of prisoner well-being, state policymakers in our
opinion ought to begin analysing such survival
strategies for what they can foretell about turning the
region’s ‘prisons of misery,’ ‘islands of internment,’ or
‘spaces of death,’ into a new machinery for the health
and well-being of all who live and work within them.
The very first step towards meaningful practices of state
decarceration ought to begin with taking prisoners’
lives and interests more seriously, and only then to
recruit them into the tasks of sustainable prison
transformation. Each article in the present collection
has struggled to gain hard-won insights into this
complicated procedure. We are frankly proud of this
collective accomplishment, and hope that other
scholars of penal worlds across Latin America and other
world regions can use this inquiry into the new mass
carceral zones as a model for productive critique and
new ideas for non-reformist prison reform.
46. C. Garces, S. Darke,, L. Duno-Gottberg, A. Antillano (eds.) Carceral Community: Troubling Prison Worlds in 21st Century Latin America
(under contract with U. Pennsylvania Press).
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Introduction
In the early 2000s prison directors in Honduras
ordered, for the first time, segregation for inmate
populations according to gang membership. It was
essential to minimising violence between the
MS13 and Barrio 18, the largest gangs in the
country. But it was equally necessary to protecting
gangs themselves, from armed squadrons known
to enter prisons undercover, and target gang
wards in brutal massacres. Prison authorities ceded
entire barracks, minimising official access, so that
gang communities might fortify and secure them
from the inside. At Marco Aurelio Soto (MAS), the
largest national penitentiary, the MS13 gang was
moved to a traditional barracks and the Barrio 18
to the former factory where traditionally inmates
produced bulk fabrics for sale in the capital. By
2005 the gang had renovated the factory with
perimeter walls and a decorative courtyard
painted in bold colors and panoramic murals. The
interior was remodeled. There were tailors,
cobblers, billiards tables, and thundering music.
Meanwhile, outside the factory walls, the prison
struggled with insecurity and disrepair. 
Beginning in 2000, anti-gang policing in
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador initiated the
mass incarceration of suspects and then a crisis in the
Honduran prison system that is now over a decade old.
Without sufficient funding to expand penal facilities,
finance capital and charismatic leadership vital to the
survival of carceral institutions in Honduras have been
provided by organised groups from within the illicit
economy. Converting the old prison factory at MAS into
a communal center of gang life is but one instance of
state austerity and criminal affluence in a mode of
reciprocal sustainability. Beyond renovating deteriorated
infrastructure, revenue from illicit capital also funds
vocational programs, basic provisioning for inmates,
and financial subventions to prison employees.  
For more than a decade now, scholarship attending
to the layered complicity between neoliberal state
policies and diversifying regimes of carcerality across
Latin America, has examined its effects from diverse
angles: urban securitisation;1 Christian prison ministries;2
drug wars and narco-capital;3 inmate protest;4 race and
citizenship;5 architectures and tactics of security;6 co-
governance;7 among others. What I term ‘neoliberal
penality’ aims to highlight complicity between state
austerity and illicit affluence, demonstrating the
flexibility of neoliberal market logic at an extreme. Here
I examine the overhaul of Honduran prisons in 2014 to
suggest that while it has been politically expedient to
frame such efforts as responding to overpopulation and
infrastructural decline, equally it is the robust and
flourishing market economies of prison interiors that
generate renewed interest in regulating and controlling
carceral enclosures.
Overview
The carceral system of Honduras includes 24
institutions, designed for a total capacity of 8,000 inmates
but currently holding over 16,000, with 50 per cent as pre-
trial detainees.8 In 2002 the introduction of Mano Dura
(Strong Hand) policing strategies increased inmate
populations by targeting members of international street
gangs MS13 and Barrio 18. Despite miltarised policing
Neoliberal Penology and Criminal Finance
in Honduras
Jon Horne Carter is Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology at Appalachian
State University.
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gangs continued to attract members seeking an alternative
to a stagnating formal economy or protection from urban
insecurity.9 Free-trade economic policies impacting urban
centers also affected rural economies where illicit
organisations grew coeval with contracting economies and
vanishing trades. Gangs have often overshadowed such
provincial associations though these mafia and bandas
were central to building rural illicit economies
supplementing the formal one. Inside Honduran prisons,
the urban and rural fugitives of neoliberalism intersect.
During the 2000s, prisons struggling to provide basic
security and necessities ceded internal administration to
inmate groups, and while media
reports criticised such arrangements
as ‘criminal finishing schools’, for
thousands of pre-trial detainees and
minor offenders, these processes and
exchanges that had become de facto
and de jure elements of prison
management, would be their first
entry into criminal social worlds.10 In
the sections that follow, I will
examine the stages of this process as
follows: (1) creation of inmate service
economies, (2) takeover of those
economies by criminal organisations,
(3) formation of an autonomous
prison community, and (4) state
annexation of the prison economy.
Neoliberal Penality
In 2006 I was conducting
fieldwork at Marco Aurelio Soto
(MAS), and guards made sure I
knew their jobs were difficult.
Many wore threadbare uniforms,
unable to replace them at
personal expense. As social programs for inmates
were eliminated and prisoners were idle, guards’ jobs
were more hazardous. Escapes were common, and
overflow encampments sheltered inmates in tents
between buildings. At guard wages, employee life
insurance was seldom affordable, and medical
benefits, paid-leave, and retirement had been
reduced. Guards slept in a dormitory that offered
metal bunks with ripped-foam mattresses, and
toilets that regularly overflowed, spilling into a large
pool in the visitor parking lot.11
Meanwhile private capital from unregistered and
unknown donors flowed into particular spaces.
Photographs of tattooed gang members circulated in
the global media of the early 2000s, drawing donations
from humanitarian and evangelical groups that initiated
renovation of their barracks. Their images mediated
across global news channels, these newly decorated
structures became iconic, and quickly expanded,
supplemented through gang earnings in the shadow
economies of extortion and drug sales in and outside
the prison. When I visited the barracks of both the
MS13 and 18 Gang by the mid 2000s, interviews and
personal conversations often
referenced their sense of a literal
ownership of the renovated
dormitory infrastructure.
Expropriation
At the entrance to the
barracks of the MS13, guards
typically sat at a small desk more
than twenty-feet from the actual
entry point. The gang typically
handled their own security and,
when bored or exhausted by the
sun, guards walked to an adjacent
dormitory. Past groomed shrubs
and a decorative arbor, they
entered a circular garden and
reclined in wooden swings by a
pool of tilapia fish. They admired
ornamental fighting cocks, and
then visited a nursery of purebred,
Rottweiler puppies. 
The owner was Carlos, a
mid-level cocaine and marijuana
dealer who had grown up in
Tegucigalpa, the nearby capital city. ‘I got here six
months ago and this area was full of trash. No one
wanted to touch it. A year ago some dudes were
killed right there, just lined up on the wall and shot…I
offered [the administration] money for it and of
course they accepted, so now it’s mine to do what I
want while I’m here.’ Guards ordered tamales and
Cokes from Carlos’ assistants, inmates he gave a
wage and some degree of protection. 
With a leather jacket and gold chain, Carlos carried
himself like a private contractor, shifting capital from
Photographs of
tattooed gang
members
circulated in the
global media of
the early 2000s,
drawing
donations from
humanitarian and
evangelical groups
that initiated
renovation of
their barracks.
9. UN Development Program Honduras. (2008/9) Human Development Report Honduras 2008/9, from Social Exclusion to a Youth
Citizenship. Last accessed May 14, 20126. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_honduras_2008–9_en.pdf
10. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (2013) Informe de la Comisión Interamericana Sobre la Situación de Personas Privdas
de Libertad en Honduras. Last accessed May 14, 2016. http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/ppl/docs/pdf/honduras-ppl-2013esp.pdf
11. These narratives come from my own field research from 2005 to 2016. For additional perspective, see: Centro de Prevención,
Tratamiento y Rehabilitación de las Víctimas de las Torturas y sus Familiares, and Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en
Honduras (2006) Situación del Sistema Penitenciario de Honduras. Teguicigalpa, Honduras.
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narcotrafficking networks in the capital, to prison renewal
projects. From his pigpens Carlos gifted the prison
Director a hog for Christmas and Holy Week, selling
choice cuts of meat to staff and guards at low prices,
assuring everyone was invested in his renovations.
Journalists frequently characterise such exchanges as
corruption or feudal tribute, but Carlos regarded them as
part of rebuilding morale, re-instating year-end bonuses
for administration that had been shorn from official
budgets. ‘If [directors and administrators] are happy, it’s
easier for all of us here,’ he explained.12
Privatisation
Across the prison yard in Module 3, a separate
pavilion widely-known as the ‘mafia barracks’ that
housed members of regional criminal bands, inmates
adjusted to disinvestment differently. Those with
influence in criminal groups across rural Honduras
offered connections that
affordably provisioned residents.
Coordinators bought construction
materials for a new perimeter
wall, to assist the efforts of
guards, and resources not
provided by the prison were
supplied at affordable prices, from
bedding to pharmaceutical drugs,
and foodstuffs that included eggs
and meat, and duck, chicken, and
turtle farms to supplement beans
and rice from the prison kitchen.
In other barracks, inmates of financial means
established niche markets for basic necessities, but
Module 3 was equipped with criminal financiers whose
earnings underwrote a variety of renovation efforts,
necessitating labourers, paying wages and credit, and
kick-starting a diversifying economy.13
Proto-State
Such creative solutions quickly ossified into
predatory rackets. By 2012, inmate leadership
negotiated all logistical matters of internment at
MAS. Guards received new inmates but delivered
them directly to toros, powerful inmates who
determined cell placement, accessibility of food and
hygiene, and all details (including escapes) according
to a rigid price scale.14 Inmates without resources for
an initial ‘registration fee’ as a baseline investment in
their carceral residence entered indentured servitude
to coordinators, commonly as couriers for drug sales.
Inmate hierarchies regulated access to resources and
movement, with authority from prison administration
to enact their own disciplinary measures.15
Similar economies are vital to the survival of
prisons and their detainees across Latin America.
While there are no available figures on MAS in
particular, La Planta prison in Venezuela, close in size
to MAS, generated an internal economy of nearly
$3.4 million per year.16 By the late 2000s internal
markets at MAS were annexed by criminal groups
who monopolised internal prison economies from the
interior of autonomous carceral
wards.17 At MAS, the profits
generated by the movement of
contraband generated power
and influence both inside and
outside the institution that by
2012 the director declared
himself powerless to address.18
Guards and toros could extort
inmate populations as captive
markets.19 
Other Worlds
Such criminal rackets have proven neither
inevitable nor totalising, however. At San Pedro Sula
(SPS) prison, the second largest in the country, built
for 800 inmates and housing 2,700 in 2014, in March
of 2012 inmates violently unseated extortion mafias
that had run the prison for several years with
unlimited power.20 The revolt against them lasted
hours, and prison authorities stood-down as a
transfer of power was negotiated. 
A 27-year-old pre-trial detainee named José
Cardozo, known as El Chepe, assumed command of
Similar economies
are vital to the
survival of prisons
and their detainees
across Latin America.
12. Additional perspective can be found at: Centro de Prevención, Tratamiento y Rehabilitación de las Víctimas de las Torturas y sus
Familiares. (2004). Informe del Sistema Penitenciario de Honduras. http://www.cptrt.org/pdf/informesistemapenitenciarioCIDH.pdf
13. For additional perspective, see: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012) Transnational Organized Crime in Central America
and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment. Accessed May 14, 2016. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf
14. ‘Como esclavos de capos terminan reos en Penitenciaría Nacional’, La Prensa (Honduras) 19th January 2012.
15. Stone, H. (2012) ‘Inmates run Honduras prison as micro-state’. Available at:
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/inmates-run-honduras-prison-as-micro-state 
16. ‘Los ‘negocios’ en La Planta producen Bs 16 millones anuales’, El Universal (Bolivia) 14th May 2012.
17. ‘Cárceles: ingresar un celular vale Q500; traslados cuestan hasta Q150 mil’, La Hora (Guatemala) 3rd February 2014.
18. ‘Jugosos y millonarios negocios en Penitenciaría Nacional’, El Heraldo (Honduras), 18th June 2012.
19. ‘DNSEP: Custodios son culpables de la corrupción en la Penitenciaría’, El Heraldo (Honduras) 20th June 2012.
‘Crimen en Honduras mueve unos 147 millones de dólares desde las cárceles’, Diario La Prensa (Honduras) 6th February 2014.
20. ‘Terror en el centro penal de San Pedro Sula: 13 reos muertos’, El Heraldo (Honduras) 30th March 2012.
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the largest sector of the prison, on part of paisas, or
non-gang members. A year later Chepe remained a
mystery, though having demonstrated himself an
imaginative architect of carceral leadership. After
negotiating equilibrium between gangs, paisas, and
officials, Chepe fashioned a social safety net, based
on a graduated scale of taxation, to provide paisas
and their families with health care. He invested in
prison educational programs, making them obligatory
for paisas and a condition of parole.21 Money raised by
inmates and unnamed Colombian donors generated
new structures, second-floors, windows and terraces,
winding corridors lined with butcher shops, metal
workers, tailors, cafes, gambling tables, jewelers, and
a decorative and lofty church. Chepe’s sector has its
own ‘middle class’ paying $5000–7000 for private, air-
conditioned suites with wifi and
exercise equipment. SPS
directors refer to Chepe’s
influence as ‘autoridad civil’,
which extends even to the
surrounding city, where people
without connection to the prison
visit Chepe seeking assistance,
often financial but including
basic necessities such as even a
meal.22 Even tenuous connection
with Chepe’s social experiment
offers degrees of personal
security inaccessible to the non-
incarcerated poor, not only
through health care access, but
as victims of domestic abuse visit
paisas soliciting domestic
partnerships that ensure them
increased personal safety.23
State Annexation
At the point that the power and influence
cultivated in formerly-neglected carceral wards
approximated what might be perceived as a more ‘just’
social world than that which was outside, the National
Institute of Penitentiaries of Honduras announced an
overhaul to reduce overcrowding and modernise
facilities. Specifically the plan will downsise the penal
archipelago, reducing carceral facilities nationwide from
24 to 12, and reducing inmate populations by 40 per
cent, pardoning petty criminals having served half their
sentence.24 Individuals remaining in state custody will
be transferred to modernised facilities and assigned by
region, to increase family visitation and support.25 
How is investment at this scale feasible within the
same constraints of austerity that disinvested Honduran
prisons to the point of abandonment? Across Central
America practices of co-governance have demonstrated
inmates capable of managing prison interiors, though
in the case of Honduras such conditions also
demonstrate that prison interiors are flexible market
space with captive labour and consumers. The
procedures that will return carceral governance to
prison administration and the evolution of carceral
infrastructure to the state, annexes this informal prison
economy. 
Three new prisons will disarticulate existing
prison economies and open
them to private bidders,
offsetting the required $100
million USD investment.26 The
first is a US-style ‘megacárcel’
built to contain 2500 high-risk
inmates, including founders,
investors, and entrepreneurs of
the informal prison economies.
New facilities are designed to
isolate and prevent
communication between these
individuals and other inmates,
each cell a steel container
surrounded by hydraulic
cement, resistant to puncture
and equipped with video
surveillance. 
While such a high-security
(administrative segregation) facility facilitates the
elimination of criminal finance and entrepreneurship from
the penal enclosure, agro-industrial incarceration is the
model for other facilities nationwide, minimum security
complexes planned in consultation with state agricultural
consultants, in which inmate labour in workshops and
farms renders institutions self-sufficient.27 State and
private appropriation of criminal capital also extends to
properties confiscated from regional narcotrafficking
organisations, on which the construction of new carceral
institutions were initiated.28 Despite assertions that such
new prison facilities will be self-sufficient, private
contracts for prison services industries were granted to
bidders from politically influential families, including that
Individuals
remaining in state
custody will be
transferred to
modernised facilities
and assigned by
region, to increase
family visitation
and support.
21. Sanz, José (2014) ‘El rey justo de la cárcel del infierno’, El Faro (El Salvador) 13th January.
22. Ibid, 6.
23. Ibid, 19.
24. ‘Más de 16,100 reclusos en 24 cárceles’, El Heraldo (Honduras) 22nd October 2014.
25. ‘Así se construye la cárcel de El Porvenir, Francisco Morazan’, El Heraldo (Honduras) 20th October 2014.
26. ‘Gobierno ha invertido 100 milliones de dólares en la construcción de tres centros penales’, HRN: La Voz de Honduras 10th August 2015.
27. ‘Cárcel de El Porvenir será modelo a seguir’, El Heraldo (Honduras) 19th October 2014.
28. ‘Comida en hospitals y centrols penales, otro negocio para la familia del presidente de Honduras’, Cholusat Sur (Honduras) 21 September 2015.
Prison Service Journal14 Issue 229
of the current president, and denounced as cronyism.
Additionally the annexation of inmate labour has been
extended by new legislation requiring each inmate to
provide 1400 hours of physical labour annually (five hours
per weekday), as part of new rehabilitation programs
arguing that steady labour reduces violence in prison
populations.29 Inmates producing food and goods for the
maintenance of their facility also become a reserve labour
army for the state, building desks for public schools,
repairing rural roads, serving in reforestation, and in the
maintenance of state infrastructure by splitting rocks,
digging ditches, and producing and transporting raw
materials such as bricks, cinderblocks, and sand. Their
labour is unpaid, with any financial windfall channeled to
the overall budget for the national prison system.30
Conclusion
Cycling money out of the illicit economy and
into material and managerial necessities of the
prison, across the 2000s dark finance became the
secret sharer of neoliberal penality in Honduras.
Though the institutional integrity of many prisons in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have been
salvaged by co-governance, in Honduras it was off-
the-books financing of criminal groups that
prevented systemic collapse. This relationship
between illicit capital and security-state austerity
turned prison interiors into diverse and lucrative
market spaces that produced substantial returns for
private investors. This article suggests that the
current overhaul of the Honduran prison system,
while addressing conditions of overcrowding and
high rates of pre-trial detention, is equally the
annexation of a sphere of exchange that developed
in response to the impacts of austere economic
policy, clearing the path for ‘official’ privatisation and
monopolistic market practices that are the sine qua
non of neoliberalism. Rather than a renewed
commitment to the rights of the incarcerated, the
new carceral archipelago in Honduras demonstrates
both the ideological rigidity and the economic
flexibility of neoliberal statecraft. If new
rehabilitation programs succeed in transforming the
spirit of the criminalised classes of contemporary
Honduras, it is unlikely to be an effect of state
programs premised on wrenching capital and labour
from captive populations who bankroll their own
incarceration.
29. ‘Congreso sigue debate de ‘ley picapiedra’, País (Honduras) 10th August 2015.
30. ‘Aprueban últimos artículos de la Ley ‘Picapiedra’’ La Tribuna (Honduras) 10th September 2015.
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In line with the regional trend, the Nicaraguan
prison population exceeds the capacity of its
penitentiary system by on average twice its
capacity, with the sharpest increases occurring
over the past five years.1 Considering that those
are the years over which the traditionally
socialist Sandinista government has consolidated
its control of the presidency and institutions of
crime control, this may seem to be a paradox,
especially as the Nicaraguan penitentiary law has
a clearly rehabilitative take on the function of
prison for society.2 Contrary to the regional
punitive trend, ‘re-education’ is advocated
throughout the penitentiary system, sentences
are relatively low, and participation in re-
educational programmes, which range from
schooling to cultural and church activities, is
often rewarded with considerable sentence
reduction. Yet daily life in Nicaraguan prisons is
still very much governed through (the threat of)
violence.3 In this paper, I explore how convicted
prisoners deploy both ‘violent’ and ‘re-
educational’ scripts to survive their prison time. I
draw from an in-depth ethnographic
engagement with a small group of prisoners
from a large city police jail, who are part of a
special ‘rehabilitation programme’.4 For them,
survival entails both aiming for early release
through participation in re-educational activities,
and negotiating a place in the prison hierarchy
from the get-go. Inside the overcrowded cells of
the city police jail, where the surveillance
practices realised by authorities do not provide
the level of security required by the prisoners,
the latter negotiation often overpowers the re-
educational promise.
Overcrowding
The saturation of the Nicaraguan penitentiary
system (in short, the Sistema) is directly reflected in
the overcrowding of police jails in the larger urban
centres. The city police jail where the prisoners that I
worked with were held, currently holds over 400
prisoners in conditions suitable for only 150. Though it
is officially a preventiva (prison for pre-trial detainees),
only one of its cells holds arrestees. The rest of the
population consists of convicted prisoners serving up
to 15-year sentences. These prisoners serve their
sentences in a legal limbo: a jail to which the
Penitentiary Law does not apply, where they are
guarded by police officers rather than prison guards,
and where the infrastructure is not nearly suitable to
serve out a sentence: on average 35 inmates sleep in
each 5x5 meter cell, where they wash up and wash
their clothes over the same hole in the floor as they
defecate. Water shortages are more than common in
the jail, and to complement the chupeta (the staple jail
meal, consisting of a cupful of overcooked rice) family
members queue outside the jail three times a day to
pass food (barcos). In terms of infrastructure, there is
no central courtyard for sol (sun), the visit hall serves
as a dormitory at night, and only two small rooms are
available for conjugal visits — where prisoners are
allowed 20 minutes with their significant others rather
than the full hour customary to the Sistema.
Nonetheless, many prisoners prefer staying in the
police jail rather than being transferred to the Sistema.
They express that it’s ‘not as tough’, ‘easier to receive
visits’, and that ‘the jail is closer to home.’ It is also
commonly believed that being released from the
police jail, even if convicted, is easier than release from
the Sistema.5 
Prisoner Self-Governance and Survival in a
Nicaraguan City Police Jail
Julienne Weegels is a PhD candidate with the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research and Centre
for Latin American Studies.
1. CENIDH. 2013. Informe: Derechos Humanos en Nicaragua. Managua. Specifically pp. 67-73. Retrievable online: 
http://www.cenidh.org/media/documents/docfile/Informe_CENIDH_2013_FinalWEB.pdf 
2. Centeno Mayorga, Darvyn I. 2012. Manual de Derecho Penitenciario Nicaragüense. Managua: SENICSA.
3. See also Weegels, Julienne. 2014. ‘The Prisoner’s Body: Violence, Desire and Masculinities in a Nicaraguan Prison Theatre Group.’ In
Georg Frerks, Annelou Ypeij and Reinhilde König (eds.) Gender and Conflict: Embodiments, Discourses and Symbolic Practices, Farham:
Ashgate.
4. This particular engagement took place between May 2015 and January 2016. I will go into it in more detail in the section ‘Shifting
between violence and reeducation’. This study is part of my doctoral research project about order and agency in the Nicaraguan prison
system, which includes a previous long-term engagement with prisoners of a medium-sized state penitentiary (2009-2013).
5. This has much to do with the prevalence of ‘irregularities’ that are part of the Nicaraguan prison and justice system’s “practical norms,”
much in the same way as De Sardan describes for informal practices common to the African public service sector. De Sardan, J.O.P.
‘Researching the Practical Norms of Real Governance in Africa’, Discussion Paper No. 5, Dec., London: Overseas Development Institute.
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Violent Initiations
With prisoners outnumbering on-duty officers by as
many as 100 to 1 and no electronic surveillance system in
place, inmates in the police jail are left mostly to fend for
themselves.6 In the overcrowded cells initiation into the
prison’s workings is entirely subject to rituals and
regulations (norms) enforced by fellow prisoners. One
former prisoner, nicknamed Joey, explains, 
The start for me was ugly. When I came in [to
the cell] they [other prisoners] made me strip
and beat me. […] They put on music and had
me walk up and down the corridor naked,
whistling at me and smacking me on the butt,
with their slippers or hands, to make me dance.’
I looked at him in disbelief, thinking that he could
have been made to dance ‘la botella’. The ‘baile de la
botella’ (dance of the bottle) is an
event that every city police jail
prisoner will assure exists but no
one will acknowledge to have
suffered, as it clearly exhibits
sexualised traits that feed into the
(re)production of specific,
machista dominant
masculinities.7 Another prisoner
had explained to me before that, 
When a group of guys in the
cell gets together to make another guy dance
la botella they’ll turn up the radio, put a bottle
on the floor, and the guy made to dance has
to get naked and lift this bottle up by inserting
the top of the bottle into his ass […] Then he
has to dance with the other guys, with the
bottle, you know, and they’ll say sexual stuff
and smack him on the butt. If they don’t like
how you dance, like if you don’t do it right, or
if you drop the bottle, they’ll beat you. 
But there are rules to the baile: ‘they won’t make
just anybody dance, but if they don’t like you, or if they
think you might be a perrita (i.e. gay) they’ll make you
dance […] if you refuse, you have to measure your fists
with the guys that want you to dance, which will be the
toughest guys in the cell and they’ll beat you hard.’
With this in mind, I hesitated, but asked Joey if there
was any bottle involved in the episode he recounted. He
directly assured me of the contrary,
No way! Back in the cell they beat me hard
and made me sleep by the side of the toilet…
I spent like two weeks on that spot, I even
thought of killing myself back then. But slowly
I moved further from the toilet, to other spots
on the floor, then to a hammock, and the last
half year I was on a bunk. 
It may seem strange for Joey to move so abruptly
from the harrowing experience of his initiation to
discussing his sleeping space, but he did this to indicate
that he quickly ascended. The hierarchy in a prison cell
is most directly evidenced in the place where a prisoner
sleeps: the most powerful prisoners and those who
have spent the most time there will be on bunks,
followed by those in the hammocks. Resulting from this
rule, Joey explains that eventually, 
I got even with the guys that organised the
beating, haha! All four of
them were released, but
three of them were caught
again and came back. That’s
when I was on top and they
were on bottom [rung], so it
was my turn! I had my little
group of bróderes (brothers,
friends) then, and me la
desquité (I took revenge). 
When I asked him if the
police did anything about these beatings going on in
the cells, he grinned, ‘the police? They don’t do
anything! […] They rather put you in a particular cell to
ensure you get a beating. Like with guys that’ve done
nasty stuff, they’ll put them in the worst cells.’ 
Prisoner Self-Governance
At this point, jail time might seem exceptionally
brutal, but this violence has its particular logic. In the
light of the overcrowding and understaffing of the
prison, the scarcity of space, food stuffs and goods,
what might seem ruthless prisoner-to-prisoner violence
is part and parcel of the governance of the prison on
the inside. It must be underlined, however, that against
a backdrop of violence and scarcity, prisoners also form
alliances and friendships to protect each other and help
each other through difficult times. Food coming in from
the outside is (or must) always be shared, beds and
personal belongings are looked after by bróderes. As
I looked at him in
disbelief, thinking
that he could have
been made to
dance ‘la botella’.
6. The jail is adjacent to the city police commissary, meaning that there are more police officers around, but these do not directly guard
the jail nor engage in its daily routine. 
7. See also Weegels, ‘The Prisoner’s Body’ (see n.3), or Lindegaard, Marie R. and Sasha Gear. 2014. ‘Violence makes safe in South African
prisons: Prison gangs, violent acts, and victimization among inmates’, Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, Vol. 68,
pp. 35-54. 
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time passes, all prisoners acknowledge and most begin
to enforce the perceived fairness of the ‘ley de la
gallada’ (law of the prisoners).8 Joey’s story illustrates
this as he engaged in enforcing these norms once he
got ‘on top’. The ley implies violence and solidarity,
giving and taking: norms by which to order a volatile
context. It has, moreover, become so engrained in the
workings of the jail that police rely (or arguably depend)
on these self-ordering principles among prisoners.9 As
Joey indicated, on occasion, police will even use
‘prisoner law’ to their own ends when they cannot ‘get
theirhands dirty’ themselves.
If, following Martin et al.’s exploration of prison
climates,10 we then understand governance as ‘a set
of interactions (conflict, negotiation, alliance,
compromise, avoidance, etc.) resulting in more or less
stabilised regulations, producing order and/or
disorder (the point is subject to diverging
interpretations between
stakeholders) and defining a
social field, the boundaries and
participants of which are not
predefined,’11 we can
understand prisoner-to-prisoner
violence as a regulatory and
boundary-defining practice of
governance. It establishes a
particular prisoner hierarchy
ordered along principles
established by the prisoners, and
enforced through their
regulations and practices. Even if
the police govern the outer perimeter of the jail, its
visitors, its opening hours and its curfew — life inside
its cells is governed almost in entirely by the prisoners
themselves. 
Shifting between violence and rehabilitation
Seemingly contrasting the prisoner order, is the
institution’s emphasis on what is called re-education to
achieve a prisoner’s cambio de actitud (change of
attitude). There are some important differences
between re-education in the penitentiary system and in
police jails: first and foremost it is much less present (or
completely absent) and largely unavailable inside police
jails as the Penitentiary Law does not apply to the jails
and, as a result, they are under no obligation to
organise re-educational programmes. Yet there were
programmes organised for the re-education of
prisoners of the city police jail, but they were hosted at
three different locations outside the prison: the city
market place, the public hospital, and a neighborhood
community center. My research took place at the latter,
where my husband (a Nicaraguan theater
director/actor) and I set up a theater training
programme, which became part of the police-run
rehabilitation and reinsertion programme that was set
up there three years earlier, and resulted in the
establishment of a prison theatre group. On weekdays,
around 35 short-sentenced12 prisoners were driven out
to the community center to work
and receive classes between
9AM and 5PM; 12 of these
prisoners voluntarily participated
in the theatre training
programme, which ran on
average 3 hours per day.
As the co-facilitator of this
programme I spent about just as
much time at the centre as the
dozen participants, and became
highly aware of the different
empowering and disempowering
experiences the young (wo)men
went through both in prison and at the centre.13 One
force to be reckoned with at all times was the
relentless, be it intentional or unintentional, exposure of
one’s delinquent status, crime and sentence to the
general public by the police — whether or not the
prisoner would want to disclose such information. Yet
the theatre-making and performing, the group itself,
became ‘addictive,’ a former prisoner and participant
explains, ‘it made all the other stuff bearable, you
know, the unequal preferences and permissions of
some guys over others, the police’s mood swings.’ The
Joey’s story
illustrates this as he
engaged in
enforcing these
norms once he got
‘on top’.
8. For many prisoners this law (or code) stands in marked contrast to the institutional ‘rule of law’ which is considered to be volatile and
preferential (and thus inherently unfair). 
9. Much as Darke explains in the context of a Brazilian police lockup, without inmate collaboration and self-ordering it would not be
possible for the jail to operate. Darke, Sacha. 2014. Managing without guards in a Brazilian police lockup. Focaal: Journal of Global
and Historical Anthropology, Vol. 68, pp. 55-67. For an exploration of norms as a way for prisoners to create security in an insecure
environment see Skarbek, David. 2012. Prison gangs, norms, and organizations. Journal of Economic and Behavior & Organization, No.
82, pp. 96-109.
10. Martin, Tomas Max, Andrew M. Jefferson and Mahuya Bandyopadhyay. 2014. Sensing prison climates: Governance, survival, and
transition. Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, Vol. 68, pp. 3-17. 
11. Blundo, Giorgio, and Pierre Yves Le Meur. 2009. An anthropology of everyday governance: Collective service delivery and subject-
making. In Blundo and Le Meur (eds.) The Governance of Daily Life in Africa, pp. 1-32. Leiden: Brill. 
12. Sentenced to serve 2 to 5.5 years. 
13. All participants were aware of my double role as a researcher, and explicitly voiced their consent to participate in my research. On
separate occasions, we would sit together for informal group or private conversations, and I spoke with many at length, both during
their time at the community center and after their release from prison. Almost all participants have by now been released.
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daily effort that the participants in the community
center’s programmes put into behaving towards a life
beyond prison, made it understandable that the
(former) prisoners stressed their own agency in
achieving their so-called change of attitude.14 Though
the police captain emphasised that ‘change always
comes from either love or fear,’ if anything, change did
not appear to come by way of the words from someone
in police uniform. Even if the prisoners were more than
grateful for the opportunity to swap their prison cell for
the community center every day, ‘rehabilitating’ in a
space provided to them by the same police that
arrested them, they all underlined — in different ways
— that ‘change comes from within […] the only one
that knows when you’ve had enough of the street life
is God and you yourself.’ One participant reminded me
that, 
Prison doesn’t scare any of us. Sure, it’s tough
and nobody wants to go back once they’re
out, but it’s not like we can’t deal with it,
we’re used to it [violence]. Changing is harder
than staying the same.
In the introduction I mentioned that prisoners
oscillate between violent and re-educational scripts. In
the case of the city police jail this most clearly occurs
when they literally move between the jail and the
community centre, but the scripts also spill over
between the two spaces. Even if prisoners almost
exclusively govern themselves and each other inside
their cells, the success of the police’s rehabilitation
programme is also shaped by the self-ordering practices
of the participating prisoners. The strong incentive that
the ‘one-day-counts-for-two’ regulation15 provides for
prisoners in re-educational programmes nationwide,
opens windows to sentence reduction that would
otherwise remain shut. As such, at the community
center, prisoners to a certain extent engage in policing
each other. Termination of the programme would
namely signify, in the worst case scenario, an end to the
opportunity of these prisoners to reduce their sentences
by demonstrating their ability and willingness to
‘change attitudes’ through participation. The center is
unfenced, located in the midst of a poor neighborhood,
and visited by prisoner family members and friends on
a near daily basis. Generally only two officers are
present at the center, who can hardly keep an eye on
everyone. Opportunities for score-settling (fights),
escape and engagement in illicit activities (such as
smuggling) are hence omnipresent, yet hardly any
incidents take place. If we do not take into account the
role and principles of prisoner self-governance in this,
we can never fully understand why the community
center programme is able to exist.
Conclusion
For their survival both within and outside of their
cells, prisoners invest in knowing when and how to
deploy what script to be able to navigate the complex
web of tensions between the in-cell prisoner order
and more institutionally defined out-cell, outside
order. Those who excel in both scripts spend their
time on the inside ‘sin acalambrarse’ (without
freaking out) while simultaneously and convincingly
working toward an early release. As one prisoner,
talented in both regards, put it to me: ‘Julia, do you
think I ever slept on the floor? [Clicks his tongue] I
got a camarote (bunk) on the first day because I
made a win [smuggling] that same day. Do you think
I wash my clothes? M-mm: my cellmates wash them.
I don’t clean the cell, I can get up whenever I like […]
I never have to wait to wash up.’ Even as he has been
out of the trade for quite a while, this prisoner
explained that he remained ‘on top’ in his cell,
because ‘one by one les pegué su turqueada a toditos
(I’ve beat all of them up). Pla-pla-plá! But easy, you
know. They respect me. […] I use that leadership to
get them into good stuff now […] [but] I tell you, if I
wouldn’t have been on the other side of things in the
beginning, they wouldn’t listen to me now.’ Whether
this is true or not is not the issue here, what is at
stake is the successful performance — the correct
practice — of prison scripts in order to survive.
Enforcing and living by the ley de la gallada inside the
cell, and by the practice of a cambio de actitud
outside of it. Both constitute stabilised regulations,
producing order and defining a social field, resulting
from sets of established social interactions for the
governance of the prison environment.
14. See also Weegels, Julienne. Forthcoming. Beyond the Cemetery of the Living: An Exploration of Disposal and the Politics of Visibility in
the Nicaraguan Prison System. In Chris Garces, Sacha Darke, Luis Duno-Göttberg and Andrés Antillano (eds.) Carceral Communities:
Troubling 21st Century Prison Regimes in Latin America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
15. Generally, in the application of sentence reduction, the days participated in re-educational or work programs count double. Yet the
application of sentence reduction can be very arbitrary, to the frustration of many participating prisoners.
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Introduction
In the last decades the growth of incarceration in
Brazil deepened the precariousness of prison
conditions and favoured the emergence of internal
organised criminal groups established by inmates.
These groups sought to create new relationship
standards between inmates, prison staff and prison
administrators, and between inmates themselves.
One of the main groups, the First Capital Command
(Primeiro Comando da Capital — PCC), gained
hegemonic power across a large part of the state of
São Paulo’s prison system. This meant great change
in the ways prison order was built and maintained. 
The classical studies of Goffman1 and Sykes,2 for
example, show that, although having the legal resources
to conduct prison routines, custodians deal with internal
rules and actions that allow them to create a negotiated
order, albeit unstable and informal. This paper aims to
present the complexity of prison order in Brazil and in
particular São Paulo with regard to formal and informal
punishments, imposed by prison staff and also by the
inmates themselves. We will analyse three kinds of
punishment: legal/judicial punishments imposed by the
prison staff, grounded in judicial decisions and overseen
by judges; administrative punishment applied solely by
prison staff; and informal punishments applied by the
PCC, which can reach physical and psychological violence.
In short, we will describe and analyse the formal and
informal punishments imposed by prison staff and also by
the PCC. These practices of inmate control and the
production of prison order do not compete among
themselves. Instead, they intertwine and compose a wide
field of controls on the prison population that make
prison conditions even more complicated, challenging
classical interpretations of the nature of prison order.
Between the law and the norm: the punishment
imposed by prison staff
In Brazil, there are two kinds of punishments that can
be imposed by prison staff: those which are supported by
the Sentence Implementation Act (Lei de Execução Penal
— LEP), whose imposition requires intervention and
overview by a judge (e.g. transfer to federal prisons or to
the Differentiated Disciplinary Regime, both of which are
characterised by stricter discipline, similar to the supermax
prison model); and punitive measures (called
adjudications in the UK prison system) that are taken in an
administrative sphere, and because of this are exempt
from judicial monitoring and control (e.g. transfer
between prison units, use of solitary confinement up to
30 days, solitary confinement for indeterminate time for
prisoner self-protection, and extra-days of imprisonment).
In 1984, the Sentence Implementation Act/LEP3
defined, for the first time, the rules for the serving of
sentences. Although LEP effectively placed the
enforcement of sentences within the scope of the
judiciary, many measures adopted and implemented at an
administrative level by prison staff are taken in disregard
to it. For example, LEP states that ‘collective sanctions are
prohibited’,4 however, procedures such as restriction of
movement, deprivation of leisure time, and suspension of
visits, are routinely adopted by prison administration as
punishments imposed in response to an incident on all
inmates in a particular prison irrespective of their personal
involvement in the misconduct. 
LEP ranks breaches of prison rules as light, medium
and severe. Severe acts of misconduct are listed as:
inciting or participating in movement to subvert order or
discipline (riot); escaping; possesing a tool that can serve
to undermine the safety of others; failing to perform
duties prescribed by law; and owning or operating a radio
or telephone for external communication. Sanctions
range from a verbal warning, reprimand, solitary
confinement for up to 30 days or application of the
Differentiated Disciplinary Regime. 
The Differentiated Disciplinary Regime (RDD) was
created in 2003.5 Since then, RDD can be imposed on
prisoners who commit acts of severe misconduct, upon
authorisation and overview of a judge. RDD also can be
imposed on inmates who represent ‘high risk for the
order and security of the penal institution or society’.6 Yet,
it can be imposed on inmates that are suspected of
Formal and informal controls and punishment: 
The production of order in the prisons of São Paulo
Camila Nunes Dias, Federal University of ABC, and Fernando Salla, University of São Paulo.
1. Goffman, Erving. (1961) Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates. New York: Anchor Books.
2. Sykes, Gresham M. (1974) [1958] The society of captives: a study of a maximum security prison, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
3. Act 7.210.
4. Article 45, §3º.
5. Act 10.792.
6. LEP,§ 1º., art. 52.
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involvement or participation in criminal organizations like
the PCC, or other prison gangs.7 RDD consists of isolation
in an individual cell, restricted visits (two people per week
for two hours); no more than two hours banho de sol
(sunbathing; access to exercise yards) a day; prohibition of
TV and radio; and restricted access to books and
magazines. A prisoner can be held under RDD for a
maximum of one year, although this period may be
renewed in the case of further serious misconduct. Most
prisoners held under the regime are not known gang
leaders but ordinary gang members, or otherwise
disruptive inmates. Some are known to be Red Command
(Comando Vermelho — CV) leaders.8 Of the few PCC
leaders in RDD, all are secondary leaders. Paradoxically,
the main imprisoned PCC leaders are not subject to this
regime.
Alongside those measures that require judicial
monitoring, there is a wide
repertoire of punitive
administrative procedures applied
to prisoners that are not backed by
legal provisions. In Brazilian
prisons, operating rules are
applied in a very discretionary way.
The same action from different
prisoners can be interpreted and
punished differently. The internal
disciplinary system (sindicância) is
a formal procedure initiated by
prison staff to investigate any
misconduct (eg. fights, thefts,
assaults, unauthorized materials
use, trafficking and consumption
of drugs). While many of these occurrences are taken to
the further attention of the police and become police
reports and even criminal cases, all administrative
investigations into prison misconduct have important
implications for prison governance and prison order.
Responsibility for charges like owning cell phone and
drugs are frequently assumed by prisoners forced to
falsely confess by organized groups such as the PCC (this
kind of prisoner is referred to as an ‘orange’ — ‘laranja’).
In this sense, prison investigations do not affect prison
gangs, which continue to maintain control of other
prisoners and protect their members from punishment.9
Another control and punishment mechanism widely
used by prison staff is to transfer the prisoner to a prison
in which he will be away from his family, imposing on the
family extra spending in terms of time and material
resources to carry out visits.10 There are no specific rules
towards any specific misconducts that imply the
imposition of prison transfer, thus any prisoner can be
transfer to any prison, and at any time. 
Social Control and Punishment: Inmate rule
In addition to the multiple procedures of punishment
imposed by prison staff, Brazilian inmates are also
subjected to a myriad of informal controls imposed by
prisoners themselves. Inmate behaviour and practices are
subject to microscopic levels of control, reaching intimacy
and privacy, even thoughts and feelings.
The controls that the PCC leadership imposes on
prisoners involves power strategies that combine: (i)
adopting a discourse that calls for identification of
prisoners in terms of the shared
experience of incarceration and, as
such, victims of injustice
committed by an oppressive State
that violates their human rights
and imposes additional
deprivation, pain and suffering; (ii)
providing some basic needs of
prisoners not covered by the State,
such as hygiene materials, support
to families to carry out visits, food
and so on; (iii) the elimination of
rival groups, often through the
overt use of physical and symbolic
violence; (iv) sending documents
(code rules, statutes, letters,
messages, instructions) produced by the PCC leadership
to define behaviours, methods for joining the group,
decision-making dynamics, forms of conflict resolution
and setting punishments to be imposed in the case of
non-compliance with the gang’s codes of prison conduct.
Although informal controls are constitutive in a
prison context, as already pointed out in the classical
literature on the matter,11 such controls have acquired
much greater significance in Brazilian prisons since the
emergence and consolidation of the PCC, especially in
prisons in the State of São Paulo, where the group has
a wide hegemony and exercises control in
approximately 90 per cent of prisons. We do not
address the social and historical process that led to the
broad change in the prisons of São Paulo since the
Another control and
punishment
mechanism widely
used by prison staff is
to transfer the
prisoner to a prison in
which he will be away
from his family...
7. LEP, § 2º., art. 52. Note that we use the term “prison gang” in reference to the PCC with caution. There are enormous differences
between the PCC and Americans prison gangs, with whom the term is usually associated. Such differences will not be covered here,
but, is important to stress that it is the lack of a better word in English that justifies using the term “prison gangs” in this text. 
8. The CV is the major organised crime group/prison gang in the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
9. Dias, Camila (2014) ‘Disciplina Controle Social e Punição: O entrecruzamento das redes de poder no espaço prisional’, Revista Brasileira
de Ciências Sociais, 85: 113-127.
10. See also King, Roy and McDermott, Kathleen (1990) ‘My geranium is subversive: Some notes on the management of trouble in
prisons’, British Journal of Sociology, 41(4): 445-71.
11. Goffman, E. (1974), see n.1; Sykes, G. (1958), see n.2.
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emergence of the PCC.12 However, it is important to
stress that the intensification of informal controls on the
inmates is directly related to changes triggered from the
PCC’s consolidation. That is the subject we want to
discuss.
First of all, it is important to point out that the social
control strategies operated by PCC members are very
dynamic and change according to power structures that
organise social relations in the prison environment. The
strategies of social control we are to discuss should be
understood within the context of their circumscription in
a specific social setting, composed by a network of
interdependence that puts individuals in relation to each
other within certain patterns of
expected (and required) behavior.13
This interdependence network that
produces order inside São Paulo’s
prisons is very flexible, which
means that the expected patterns
of behaviour, control strategies and
punishments imposed by the PCC
continuously evolve. Changes in
strategies of inmate self-
governance occur in response to
developments in prison
administration measures, in public
security policies, or reorganisation
of the hierarchical structure of the
the PCC itself. 
Analysis of a document
produced by the PCC, named
‘Spelling book union and family: for a conscious
generation’ allows us to access some discourses that
are adopted to control the behavior of the prison
population, through strategies of what they call
consciousness. There are some important points on
which to remark regarding the ideological appeal of the
document, and the means by which the PCC leadership
uses it to seek to establish objectives, goals and
guidelines: first, the document outlines the history of
the PCC, highlighting the struggles, the goals and
changes it has made in its 20 years of existence.
Second, the document proposes a re-assessment of
previous actions and their consequences (e.g. the May
2006 Attacks),14 which it evaluates critically and
concludes not to have been good strategies. Third, the
meaning of each word of the PCC’s motto ‘peace,
justice, freedom and equality’15 is explained in detail.
Here the document lists the group’s objectives and
provides guidelines and strategies to achieve them.
Fourth, the document contains a list of institutions and
people that can help achieve these objectives, and a list
of people identified as ‘enemies’ to their cause.
We are not analysing the
whole document in this paper, but
we would like to draw attention
to the meaning of consciousness
for the PCC. This idea — the need
and importance of consciousness
of the prison population —
appears throughout the
document and permeates all the
points listed above. Consciousness
replaces the use of physical
violence as a central strategy of
social control over the behavior of
inmates. Through the idea of
consciousness and practices to
‘raise consciousness’ the PCC
imposes the ‘Discipline of the
Command’,16 broadening and
deepening the scope of controls, extending surveillance
beyond the actions and external behavior of prisoners. As
the term for this strategy indicates, consciousness aims to
gain control over internal non-visible aspects of prisoners’
lives, in the area of their subjectivity. 
To exemplify this strategy we use another
document, a report17 written by prisoners linked to the
PCC describing the ocurrence of a transgression in a São
Paulo prison.
...it is important to
stress that the
intensification of
informal controls on
the inmates is
directly related to
changes triggered
from the PCC’s
consolidation.
12. Dias, Camila and Darke, Sacha. (2015) ‘From dispersed to monopolized violence: expansion and consolidation of the Primeiro
Comando da Capital’s Hegemony in São Paulo’s prisons’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 65(3): 213-215; Dias, Camila and Salla,
Fernando. (2013) ‘Organized crime in Brazilian prisons: the example of the PCC’, International Journal of Criminology and Sociology,
2:397-408; Adorno, Sérgio and Salla, Fernando. (2007) ‘Organized Criminality in prisons and the attacks of the PCC’,
RevistaEstudosAvançados (Instituto de EstudosAvançados), 61(3):7-29.
13. Dias, Camila. (2013) PCC: Hegemonia nas prisões e monopólio da violência, São Paulo: Saraiva.
14. The event known as the May 2006 attacks was the major disruption in public security in post-dictatorship Brazil. In one week
thousands people were killed and more than seventy prisons fell under the control of the PCC in the state of São Paulo. For more
information about the event, see Adorno, Sérgio and Salla, Fernando (2007), see n.12.
15. The PCC has some identification symbols, one of which is the motto. The initial motto was “Peace, Justice and Liberty” and it was created
in 1993. In 2005 the term “equality” was added for support changes in the PCC’s structure, from a pyramidal to a cellular model.
16. ‘Discipline of the Command’ is the term used to describe forms of behavior, acting, feeling and thinking that are imposed on prisoners
submitted to the PCC controls. See Dias (2013) chapter 7, see n.10.
17. The prisoners responsible for the enforcement of discipline in each prison unit produces reports at regular intervals that are referred to
the PCC control instance immediately above, called “Sintonias” (Tunes). About hierarchical and organizational structures of PCC, see
Dias (2013) chapter 7, see n.10. Those reports summarize all questions and problems occurred in each prison and the way which the
responsibility for discipline (a prisoner who is a PCC member) proceeded with the solution in each case. These documents do not
always have a regular interval. It depends on several question, as the context, the prison unit, the facts, and so on. The reports aim to
inform all occurrences to the higher hierarchical instances of PCC and, in the most serious cases which require severe punishments, the
report also aim seeking ‘approval’ for imposing such punishment. That ‘approval’ is called ‘aval’.
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The document reports an offense committed by a
convict: he was seen masturbating on visit day. This act is
portrayed as a serious offense since the visit day is when
prisoners meet their families, especially their wives, is
considered sacred and is surrounded by interdictions (e.g.
do not look toward the wife of another prisoner). In the
report, the PCC leadership at the prison is reported to
have asked the prisoner: ‘Of whom was he thinking while
he masturbated?’. The punishment would depend on the
prisoner’s answer to the question. If he answered that he
was thinking in a wife or a daughter of another inmate,
he would be subject to a severe punishment — perhaps
death. But, of course, the prisoner said he was thinking of
his own wife while masturbating. The PCC ‘trial’ aimed to
establish a more peaceful solution to the problem —
renouncing the use of physical force and at the same time
maintaining a standard of supervision and control that
involves practices, thoughts and feelings of inmates. 
The case expresses the molecular levels achieved by
the strategies of power18 and control exercised over the
prison population by the PCC. It also reveals that the
controls involve not only objective aspects of behavior,
practices and actions of prisoners, but also their
subjectivity, thoughts, feelings. The power strategies aim
to produce certain forms of being and feeling
characterized by self-control, the imposition of
surveillance over the self and others, ultimately shaping a
kind of submission.19 
The PCC regulates such aspects of daily lives of the
prisoners as eradication and interdiction of crack
trafficking and consumption inside prison; the
segregation of homosexual prisoners; and the banning of
religions of african origin. Prisoners who do not follow its
guidelines and procedures may be forced to transfer to
other prisons or may be punished with physical violence,
even death.
In a previously analysis of PCC documents,20 the
authors identified important changes in the ways the
group exercised power and social control since it was
formed in the early 1990s. At first, direct and explicit
physical violence, including murder, had enormous
symbolic power and was an important strategy to
demonstrate the group’s strength. Eventually these means
of the use of violence gave way to more streamlined
forms of punishment in which violence — although
always present — was subsumed in control practices on
the body, on the behavior, on the thinking. In this process
physical violence, especially death, was gradually
established as a possibility and not as a fait accompli. It is
the certainty of the use of violence, inherent to a scenario
of consolidated power, which makes its actual use
unnecessary.
New types of controls conformed and, currently, the
term consciousness — used regularly in documents
produced by the PCC — is the one that best expresses the
content and the form taken by such controls.
Consciousness aims to transform the mind and soul,
through the development of internal controls, by
imposing a change of conduct and behaviour, from inside
out. In other words, it is intended that prisoners develop
their own forms of self-control, ways of acting, thinking
and feeling that are in line with the historical and political
contexts of construction, maintenance and management
of order in prisons controlled by the PCC. 
Conclusion
Foucault21 points out how the autonomy of penal
sentence enforcement extends punitive mechanisms to
molecular levels that can be achieved by micro-penalties
inherent to imprisonment. The extension of further
instances of judgment over criminal proceedings and the
execution of the sentence in which the decision-makers
are multiplied through the enforcerment22 of the
sentence, being the convergence center for this processes
the prison administration. The extension of punishments
beyond the legal sphere constitutes the administrative
field as the locus of the proliferation of multiple penalties
imposed on inmates by the prison administration.
If the prison is, par excellence, the place where a
multiplicity of powers intersect, the dynamics produced
in Brazilian institutions from the growth of organised
groups of prisoners in the construction and maintenance
of prison order, expanded the scope, extent and depth of
social controls imposed on the prison population. Social
controls imposed on the behaviour and practices but also
the feelings, the thoughts, and the intentions of inmates.
Such controls imposed from the outside by external
sources, paradoxically intend to take the form of self-
control, as is clear from the repeated use of the word
awareness in PCC documents. Prison order is based in
controls imposed by prisoners themselves, which
articulate and overlap with the controls exercised by the
prison administration, and extend the overall scope of the
punishment on the inmates.
18. Foucault, Michel. (1995) Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, New York: Vintage Books.
19. Although it is not possible to deepen this discussion here, it is important to register the moral dimension directly relating to these
forms of control. See Dias (2013) chapter 7, see n.10.
20. Alvarez, Marcos César, Salla, Fernando and Dias, Camila Nunes. (2013) ‘Das Comissões de Solidariedade ao Primeiro Comando da
Capital em São Paulo’, Tempo Social, 25(1):61-82.
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In this paper, I write about the first results of my
most recent research, conducted in a prison of
Guarulhos city, in the metropolitan area of São
Paulo, Brazil. Six years after I conduced my first
research on prisons,2 I have once again conducted
research inside prison facilities. I returned to a
penal institution in order to, on the one hand,
observe the changes undergone by the collective
of prisoners that I previously studied and,
secondly, to address the specifics of their local
composition, especially in relation to the
management of the prison unit.
The prison where I conducted my research is a unit
designated for men that were granted the right to
semi-open conditions and has a capacity for 246
inmates, but currently houses a population of 568 men,
divided into two pavilions. Most of them work during
the day, some at the institution and others out of jail. Of
those who work there, one part undertakes unit
maintenance activities (such as cleaning, cooking and
maintenance of outdoor spaces) and another part
works in workshops installed by companies, in
partnership with the prison administration. The
prisoners are related to the First Command of Capital
(PCC), a type of prisoner collective that appeared in the
early 1990s and currently is present in the majority of
penal institutions and urban areas within the State of
São Paulo. 
The PCC has commonly been referred to as ‘the
biggest prison gang’ or as ‘organised crime’, yet I
approach it as a ‘movement’. But as a movement, the
PCC does not fit easily into specific, delimited spaces or
temporal intervals. This is due, in part, to the fact that
it does not have a defined origin or endpoints. As a
result, the PCC-as-movement is never limited to the
trajectories traced out or encouraged by particular
people, not even the ‘brothers’ (PCC members)
themselves. The PCC is instead composed by the
simultaneous crossing of several movements. These
traverse territories, times, and people in a motility that
erases and leaves behind even as it establishes powerful
traces. This is one result of a PCC composed of
disparate entities that do not reveal any definitive,
corresponding identities. Or, put slightly differently,
people and things do not come together — all together
— in order to take up shared, definitive paths in
realizing a common goal or participating in a cohesive
mission. Far from making up a monolithic unit, the
movement called the PCC does not simply behave like
the type of movement I am working to describe here,
but it is also constituted by multiple and varied ‘minor’
movements that promise to provide the Movement
called the PCC with diverse forms, calibers, velocities,
and pathways. So, instead of defining the PCC as a
gang or as organised crime, I would approach it as a
name or as a quality of relations, following the
traditional anthropological attention to human
relations. 
These are the relationships that tension the daily
life of the prison where I conducted my research.
According to the prisoners with whom I spoke, that
semi-open conditions unit was actually semi-open, as
opposed to other prisons of the same type located in
the Greater São Paulo, which they defined as semi-
closed. They highlighted the job opportunities and
training offered by the unit, which they contrasted with
those found in other units. In contrast, they said, there
still existed what they defined as injustices practiced by
the team of prison staff in relation to prisoners.
Moreover, the interaction between the prisoners was
not the best they had ever lived and therefore it was not
the best prison through which they already passed.
Movement between and beyond walls: 
Micropolitics of incitements and variations among São Paulo’s
Prisoners’ Movement the ‘PCC’ and the Prison System1
Karina Biondi Federal University of São Carlos.
1. This paper is a version of my presentation at the session Gangs, Prison Governance, Gender & 'Rehabilitation' in Latin America,
organized by Julienne Weegels (Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation CEDLA), at the 2016 Congress of the Latin
American Studies Association. The research presented in this article was part of post-doctoral activities conducted at the University of
Campinas, Brazil, with a scholarship granted by CAPES (Higher Education Personnel Improvement Coordination) and financial
resources provided by CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development). I am particularly grateful to Juan
Albarracin for dialogues and for help in translation. 
2. Biondi, Karina. 2010. Junto e misturado: uma etnografia do PCC. São Paulo: Editora Terceiro Nome. Published in English as Biondi,
Karina. 2016. Sharing this walk: An Ethnography of Prison Life and the PCC in Brazil. Edited and translated by John F. Collins. North
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
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This was due to three factors. First, as it is a regime
that usually precedes open conditions, many prisoners
feared reacting to these injustices. This could make
them lose the benefit of the semi-open conditions and
would take them back to closed conditions. Second,
the prison population housed in that unit was mostly
formed of first offenders condemned for short
sentences. Many had been sentenced directly to semi-
open conditions. According to the prisoners with whom
I spoke, the vast majority of these inmates ‘were not
from crime’,3 but drug users. It was an effect of the
current law that decriminalises the use of drugs, and
the actions of the police, who arrest the users as if they
were drug dealers, and of the judges who condemn
them. Finally, the interaction between the prisoners was
not the best they had ever lived because the PCC was
very little rigorous, giving room for
many attitudes that did not fit with
their ethics. According to the
prisoners, until 2009, someone
that made a mistake received a
charge (in the form of reprimand,
aggression, expulsion from the
coexistence area or, ultimately, in
the form of his death). From 2009
until now, the PCC had become
‘more tolerant’; its members had
begun to prefer to create
awareness in prisoners rather than
punish them. That was the first
time I had heard about the ‘Rescue
Era’, mentioned in the work of
Dias.4 With that, they say, there is
now no ‘seguro’ (space for
prisoners whose lives are at risk when in contact with
others). Only rapists, whistleblowers and members of
other factions, cases considered very serious, are sent to
prisons controlled by rival gangs.
Penal legislation (that defines the penal regime),
Law of Criminal Executions (that guide the conditions
benefits), prison management (that dispose about
internal punishments), State secretary of prison
administration (that define the profile of prison’s
population), legislation that decriminalized drug use,
along with the police action and action of the Courts of
Justice (which led to the arrest as dealers who before
the decriminalising were considered users), PCC ethics.
All these forces are transformed into movements by the
prisoners in their assessments of the possibilities of
action in the situation in which they find themselves. All
this is transformed into ordinary components of the
PCC that operates in that prison unit. 
An event that occurred during my research served
as an illustration of the problems of coexistence at the
prison unit, as pointed out by the prisoners. During 15
days, an entire pavilion was punished. No prisoner
could go out for work, study or even for association (or
to collaborate on my research). After that, I talked to
some prisoners who explained to me what had
happened. According to them, there was a blitz in
which more than 40 mobile phones were seized. Prison
officials requested that the prisoners responsible for the
phones plead guilty, but none of the prisoners did.
Something similar had happened a few weeks before,
when drugs were seized and also no prisoners
appeared to be responsible for
them. On both occasions, all
prisoners suffered the
punishment of being locked in
the pavilion.
A guard told me that in
such cases, the administration
needs a name to whom it can
attribute the material found,
and usually the prisoners
themselves induce someone to
assume responsibility. Detainees
confirmed that this works, or at
least should work in this way: a
prisoner assumes the
responsibility of the seized
material so that the punishment
does not fall on everyone.
However, they didn't. Nobody assumed responsibility
and everyone was punished. If, on the one hand, it
showed a lack of solidarity among the prisoners or lack
of one among them who had argumentative power to
persuade a prisoner to take responsibility (which
denotes a certain weakness of the ‘brothers’ in the
prison unit or a absence of ‘brothers’ there), on the
other hand it revealed that ‘equality’,5 so valuable to
the ethics of PCC, was there with all its strength. After
all, no prisoner was forced to assume the offense and
none of them tried to force another to do so.
An inmate whose first arrest occurred even in the
early 1990s was discontented with what occurred and
with what happened later. According to him, in the
absence of a prisoner prepared to assume responsibility
3. Different from the legal definition for crime, for prisoners this word concerns a specific form of conduct that can be followed for those
engaged in criminal acts, as well as for those who are not. Thus, there are criminals who are not from crime and workers who never
infringed the law that are from crime.
4. Dias, Camila Caldeira Nunes. 2011. Da pulverização ao monopólio da violência: expansão e consolidação do Primeiro Comando da
Capital (PCC) no sistema carcerário paulista. Tese de doutorado em Sociologia defendida na Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras da
Universidade de São Paulo.
5. Biondi. 2010. See n.2.
From 2009 until
now, the PCC had
become ‘more
tolerant’; its
members had
begun to prefer to
create awareness in
prisoners rather
than punish them.
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for the cell phones, the director of discipline had gone
to the pavilion to lecture to the inmates about how
things work in these cases. ‘It was a slap in the face
brothers’. He continued:
Because it is one thing when the director or a
guard talks about his work, what can, what
cannot be done, what is related to the
operation of the prison, right? But interaction
between inmates is a matter for prisoners. We
have to solve it between us. But then the
director was giving a lecture to talk about
how we have to behave among us. That does
not exist! It is unacceptable! 
According to him, the ‘brothers’ should promote
this conversation with the prison population and
explain to the prisoners how things work in the case of
seizure of forbidden objects. A volunteer to take
responsibility for the object should appear to prevent
300 prisoners from being harmed, and it was the PCC's
responsibility to work to make it happen. At the same
time, the tolerance and the permissiveness of the PCC
had created a problem for the prison administration:
the absence of a name to attribute ownership of the
objects.
We saw how movements incited by this new
attitude of the PCC contribute to the composition of
the prison population of that unit (its more tolerant
stance ceased to expel imprisoned from that prison).
After all, if the PCC had another posture, many
prisoners that fulfilled their sentences in the prison
would be sent to jails controlled by rival gangs. Thus,
the composition of the unit prison, defined by the jail's
management, is incited by movement triggered by the
prisoner policies. Moreover, the reduction of cases of
aggression and deaths within the prison system create
specific conditions for the management of prisons.
Finally, the PCC's stance to be lenient with errors or not
ensure that a prisoner is presented as responsible for
seizures creates impasses for the prison administration
and for the processes that result from these events.
According to the prisoners, the prison was not the
best through which they had passed because of the
penalty compliance regime that is intended, the profile
of prisoners and the new attitude of the PCC. All these
factors congregate elements that do not end on the
outskirts of the prison unit and involve factional
policies, prison policies, prison management, staff,
legislation, policing, decisions of the Justice and the
Court of Criminal Executions.
When I approach the PCC as a Movement
composed by many movements, both ‘inside’ and
‘outside’ are then not so evident. Even if one considers
the penal institutions as the center of the PCC, and if
one considers that one is never more within the state
than when inside a prison (as remembered by Barbosa,6
inspired by Foucault),7 my proposed approach offers a
perspective that neither puts the PCC at the margins of
state8 or as something that arises in the ‘absence’ of
the state, as seen by King and Valensia.9 On the
contrary, this approach enables us to describe how
detainees — PCC members — put in movement
administrative actions and prison policies, and how
their movement in turn is productive of changes both in
the management of prisons and public security.
This allows me to describe how the PCC is co-
produced through the exercise of justice, security
operations, current laws, public policies, and by what is
written about it.10 At the same time, it also allows me to
approach the effects of movements in prison
management, mainly the way they are lived by inmates.
Whereas the policies or prison administrations do not
start from a harmonically constituted State and do not
act on the uniquely classified population — i.e. ‘State’
and ‘prisoners’ cannot be approached as monolithic
units — my intention is to describe the micropolitics of
incitements and variations in those relationships.
6. Barbosa, Antonio Rafael. 2005. Prender e dar fuga: biopolítica, sistema penitenciário e tráfico de drogas no Rio de Janeiro. Tese de
doutorado em Antropologia Social. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Museu Nacional. Rio de Janeiro.
7. Foucault, Michel. 1996 [1975]. Vigiar e punir: história da violência nas prisões. Petrópolis: Vozes.
8. Das, Veena and Poole, Deborah. 2008. ‘El estado e sus márgenes. Etnografías comparadas’. Cuadernos de Antropología Social. No 27,
pp. 19–52.
9. King, Roy D. and Valensia, Bruna. 2014. ‘Power, Control, and Symbiosis in Brazilian Prisons’. The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 113
Issue 3, pp. 503–528. King and Bruna write about the same penitential complex where I conduced my fieldwork. However, they are
not rigorous with the date or theory. They consider things that occurred in early 90s as current, do not make their source of
information clear (from guards, prisoners, newspaper, books), or who is talking about who. They also confuse reciprocity with
symmetry when they criticize the work of Darke (Darke, Sacha. 2013a. ‘Entangled Staff–Inmate Relations.’ Prison Service Journal, no
207, pp. 16–23; 2013b. Darke, Sacha. ‘Inmate Governance in Brazilian Prisons.’ Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 52, no 3, pp. 272–
84), and seem to assume that all Brazilian prisons operate under the same administrative, management and factional conditions.
10. For another conjugations that produce specific prison settings, see Garces, Chris. 2010. ‘The cross politics of Ecuador’s Penal State’.
Cultural Anthropology , Vol. 25, Issue 3, pp. 459–496; Garces, Chris. 2014. ‘Ecuador’s ‘black site’:On prison securitization and its
zones of legal silence’. Focaal — Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, Vol. 68, pp. 18–34.
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An emerging issue in the penitentiary system in
Latin America, one that has not received much
attention by scholars, is the self-rule of prisons in
which control of the carceral order relies on the
informal structures formed by inmates,
contesting the internal government
administration, and through violent coercion,
maintaining internal order. In this paper we
describe and discuss this self-rule based on
ethnographic research in a Venezuelan prison
during a two-year period and several interviews
with inmates and ex-convicts. Carceral self-rule
is defined by the roll back by prison
administrators in the task of maintaining order
and regulating life and the replacement of
informal, inmate-controlled structures and
practices. 
The skyrocketing prison population in Latin America
has contributed to changes in life inside prisons, shifting
both power relations and social organization internally. In
many prisons in the region state power, hitherto
omnipotent and unchallenged, is questioned and even
displaced by groups of prisoners passing de facto rule
over the rest of the prison population.2
We’ve named this phenomena carceral self-rule:
prison practices and structures, usually violent and illegal,
through which prisoners, or a group of them, control,
regulate and govern collective life in prison, or at least
crucial aspects of it, thereby displacing the State from
functions traditionally considered its monopoly. 
This is distinguishable from the informal
organisation of prisoners, as described in the work of
American sociologists during the second half of the
twentieth century,3 because while social relations, cultural
codes and inmates practices in these works are
understood as forms of resistance, rejection or
adaptation to the intervention of the prison
administration, in our case the informal organization has
replaced the role of bureaucratic administration. Neither
can this condition be understood as prison gangs,4 a
category which often is confused, because while prison
gangs control only particular groups of inmates (often
attendant to ethnicity or origin) and dispute power with
the administration and other gangs, carceral self-rule
maintains relatively stable, effective, and often exclusive
control of the people within the prison as a whole.
Frequently, and it is also the case in Venezuela, prison
gangs precede carceral self-rule, which usually results in
struggle between rival factions until one prevails over the
other. Finally, it is necessary to distinguish carceral self-
rule from prison privatization and other forms of prisoner
participation in management, maintenance, treatment
and disciplinary regimes.5 While these prisoners might be
pampered and favoured by the administration, they
function on behalf of that administration; whereas
carceral self-rule is imposed by violent force and is in clear
antagonism with the administration whether it be hidden
or unrecognized by formal powers.6
Drawing from field research over two years in
Venezuelan jails and interviews with inmates and ex-
When prisoners make the prison. Self-rule
in Venezuelan prisons1
Andrés Antillano, Instituto de Ciencias Penales-Universidad Central de Venezuela.
1. This paper is based on field research conducted together with Ivan Pojomvsky, Chelina Sepúlveda y Verónica Zubillaga. I thank Jennifer
Martinez for her translation and suggestions.
2. See for Brazil, Biondi , K. (2010) Junto e misturado, uma etnografia do PCC, Sao Paulo: Terceiro Nome; Darke, S. (2013) Inmates
Governance in Brazilian Prisons , Howard Journal of Criminal Justice. 52, 3: 272–284; Nunes, C. (2011) Estado e PCC em meio às
tramas do poder arbitrário nas prisões , Tempo Social, 23, pp: 213–23. For Bolivia, Cerbini, F. (2012) La casa de jabón. Etnografía de
una cárcel boliviana, Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra. See too Pérez Guadalupe, J.L. (2000) La construcción social de la realidad
carcelaria: Los alcance de la organización informal en cinco cárceles latinoamericana: Perú, Chile, Argentina, Brasil y Bolivia, Lima:
Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú.
3. See Clemmer, D. (1958) The Prison Community, New York: Rinehart; Goffman, E. (2001) Internados, Barcelona: Amorrortu; Morris, T.
and Morris, P. (1963) Pentonville; A Sociological Study of an English Prison. London: Routledge & K. Paul; Sykes, G. (1974) The Society
Of Captives: A Study Of A Maximum Security Prison, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
4. See, inter alia, Lessing, B. (2010) The Dangers of Dungeons: Prison Gangs and Incarcerated Militant Groups , Small Arms Survey 2010:
Gangs, Groups and Guns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Shytierra, G. and Huebner, B. (2015) Gangs in Correctional
Institutions , in Scott, D. and Pyrooz, D. (eds.) The Handbook of Gangs, Sussex: John Wiley and Sons; Skarbek, D. (2011) Governance
and prison Gang , American Political Science Review, 105,4, pp: 702–716.
5. For example, Darke, D (2013) Entangled Staff-Inmate Relations , Prison Service Journal, 207: 16–22.
6. Of course, the relations between staff and the self-rule of the prisoners is quite complicated and variable, far from the false dichotomy
between opposition–cooperation. The situation produces spaces of coexistence and mutual assistance. However, in the arena of
effective power, the administration is severely limited by the power of prisoners, and the exercise of power can only be achieved
through negotiation with the self-rule of prisoners or by exceptionally violent means. See Antillano, A. (2015) Cuando los presos
mandan: Control informal dentro de la cárcel venezolana , Espacio Abierto, 24,4: 16–39.
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convicts, in this article we aim to define carceral self-
rule in Venezuela's Penitentiary system. We describe
carceral self-rule as a cultural code regulating inmate
activities, as political structure leading to internal
government, and as economic order which supplies
material support to prisoners. These three instances,
of course, involve and reinforce each other, and
together they enable the functioning of the carceral
order far from management control.
La rutina: the self-regulation device.
Contrary to what might be expected, the carceral
order administered by prisoners is a hyper-codified
space. There is virtually nothing that is not subject to
unwritten rules and violations carry inexorable,
relentless penalties, including
death or severe physical
punishment,inflicted by prison
bosses. Any gesture, the gaze,
the way they talk, clothing,
relationships with others,
practices that outside the walled
life would be beyond control or
be considered a private matter,
are objects of a precise
specification, distinguishing
between the permitted and
forbidden, and subject to strict
regulations and thorough
scrutiny. This set of rules is what
prisoners call la rutina (the
routine),7 which operates like an
informal mechanism for self-
regulation in response to the stressful life in the
prison.
These norms, which could look bizarre and
senseless, become intelligible in the context and,
moreover, functional to the collective needs of life in
prison. They regulate interactions and prevent events
that may precipitate violence, protect prisoners and
their family members from violence, preserve order
and strengthen group cohesion.
The rules can be distinguished between those
that refer to relationships with other inmates,
relationship with relatives and visitors, links to the
institution and its agents, association with the system
and the core values of group membership. Relations
with the inmates are strongly regulated by rules
oriented to preventing conflicts and
misunderstandings. Anything that can generate
unnecessary tensions or conflicts, any ambiguity,
double-meaning words, a gesture that could be
considered offensive or lead to offenses, practices
affecting the property and honour of others, are
banned and usually punished severely.
Similarly, in terms of relationships with families,
being fully clothed and not showing the torso in front
of women, not looking at the partners of fellow
prisoners, etc., are essential rules to avoid conflicts
over a very sensitive issue for prisoners: relatives,
partners and the precarious link with their previous,
normal life. 
Third, prisoners have a set of obligations to the
collective order: all prisoners are required to work in
order to maintain the informal system, and follow the
orders of the prison chiefs. 
Other rules are those dealing with relations with
the institution and officials. Any
collaboration with the
authorities is refused.
Furthermore, any participation
or activity organised by the State
administration, even if there
would be benefits to the
inmates or improvements in the
conditions of prison life, are
understood as forms of
cooperation and, as such,
condemned.
Last, the rules that are part
of la rutina and are related to
the values of the group. Show
courage, honour or ritual use of
violence are core values that are
continuously deployed internally.
These are associated with an almost baroque
expression of rationality and the negation of all
tactical calculation. This forces violent duels, openly
exposing prisoners to armed clashes, even at the cost
of fatal injuries.
La rutina prescribes guidelines that lead conduct,
regulate interactions and modulate restrictions over
interpersonal conflicts, protect prisoners from
symbolic and material damages, block and neutralise
possible attacks of institutional power, and strengthen
group values. In this regard it is essential for the
reproduction, regulation, preservation and even
intelligibility of the prison social order.
El Carro: the inmates’ self-government.
These prisons are under the control of El Carro
(The Car), a group of armed prisoners who emulate
These norms, which
could look bizarre
and senseless,
become intelligible
in the context and,
moreover,
functional to the
collective needs of
life in prison. 
7. For a more extensive description of ‘la rutina’, see Antillano, A., Pojomovsky, I., Zubillaga, V., Sepúlveda, Ch., and Hanson, R. (2016)
‘The Venezuelan Prison: from neolibealism to Bolivarian revolution’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 65: 192–211; Antillano, A. (2015)
see n.6; Crespo, F. (2009) ‘Cárceles: Subcultura y violencia entre internos’, CENIPEC (28):123–150; Crespo, F. & M. Bolaños (2009)
‘Código del preso: acerca de los efectos de la subcultura del prisionero’, Capítulo Criminológico, 37,2:53–72.
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the State in its functions, structure and in a certain
way, forms and procedures. As such, the Carro is a
clearly distinctive structure, separate from the rest of
the prison population. This is defined by its
professionalism (this is a group that devotes most time
to the tasks of government and control) and the
degree of the division of labour, specialisation and
even bureaucracy. El Carro is run by the principal, the
chief, who is accompanied by a group of companions
and an armed body guard. 
El Carro governs prison life and each of the
prisoners. It decides on the management of resources,
defines justice, imposes penalties, negotiates with the
state, declares war against rival groups or State
administrators, distributes goods, and sponsors
parties. It manages the other prisoners like an army,
like soldiers that feed the war
against rival groups or the
National Guard; a mass of
workers, performing necessary
work to reproduce life within the
prison walls. 
El Carro ensures compliance
to the routine by watching
the prisoners and judging
and punishing infractions,
while it at the same time
guaranteeing the
reproduction of daily life by
collecting and redistributing
taxes and rents.
Under this government, the
población (all the prisoners who
are not part of El Carro, but are subject to it) must
comply with certain mandatory tasks: making garita,
paying taxes, and abiding by the orders of El Carro
without question.
The Carro has a monopoly of firearms inside the
penitentiary. Only their members can possess and
carry them. The monopoly of firearms is a condition
for reigning over the rest of the population, which in
turn ensures the monopoly of violence. Though the
authority of the chiefs rests not only on weapons,
without such power it would be precarious and
questioned.
The Carro accomplishes the same functions of
any state: it maintains internal order and also punishes
those who break the rules, determines justice and
solves conflicts, defends the territory and the
population from external aggressions, and makes war
(by revenge or conquest against other carros, or to
press for certain demands or responses to attacks
from the National Guard). But their activity is not
confined to tasks related to the use of violence. It also
organises daily life, establishing work shifts and
rationing scarce goods (food, use of kitchens, visits); it
provides and distributes cells, beds and spaces,
provides food for those unable obtain it, invests in
improved conditions of life in the jail, manages
different services within the prison (from food
businesses, ballrooms, library, kitchen), regulates visits,
has parties, regulates business and the price of
products within the facility, handles relationships with
administrators, penal systems, and armed guards.
The Carro‘s authority rests not only on its ability
to coerce, but it must also have some legitimacy to
maintain its control over the rest of the prison
population. Its mandate is respected by prisoners not
only because of fear, but because it is considered to be
a good government. It guarantees peace, life and
dignity of prisoners, provides
goods and services, those vital
for survival and those with high
symbolic value: parties, women,
and drugs. This polarity between
coercion and legitimacy stresses
the very existence of a Carro.
The chiefs must be hard but
understanding, authoritative but
kind. An overly weak or overly
severe principal can be deposed.
The balance between violence
and generosity is critical to their
survival. In fact, the principal
must appear wise and
understanding, be the first to
meet the rutina, but always
demonstrate courage and
strength.
La causa: self-sustaining prison economy.
Certain economic conditions make it possible to
sustain this model, as much the functioning of the
rutina as the existence of the carro, while ensuring
collective means of subsistence. This can be
understood as a biopolitical economy, which is based
on the income exaction from a captive population. At
the same time as the biopolitical controls the
population, its management and subjugation permits
enormous gains for those who exercise it. The main
mechanism of levies is paying the causa (the cause) a
sort of personal tax. The causa is the amount each
prisoner must pay for the right to live in the prison. It
is collected on the weekend, ensuring visitors leave
money with their relatives. A default carries penalties,
including expulsion from the dominion of the Carro.
In addition, the Carro has forced workers and
soldiers at their disposal. Some devalued groups are
exploited for physical jobs, cleaning and maintenance
The Carro’s
authority rests not
only on its ability to
coerce, but it must
also have some
legitimacy to
maintain its control
over the rest of the
prison population.
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of common areas, hauling goods or construction,
usually to the benefit of the Carro, while the rest of
the population can be warned to compulsively fulfil
any task instructed by the heads or perform security
work, surveillance or combat in situations of conflict.
Lastly, another source of income is the payment for
prohibited items that are difficult to get in the prison,
such as drugs, phones and household appliances.
The prison economy plays a crucial role in
financing, support and reproducing the social order,
self-regulation and self-government. This is so in at
least three ways: by providing support to the
population, providing goods and services that the
state does not provide, contributing to group
cohesion and self-regulation, and affording the
existence and operation of the apparatus of power
and coercion.
The rise of the new carceral
order
Self-rule rests, therefore, in
cultural codes, political practices
and economic conditions. But
these factors do not explain how
this social order emerges. For us,
three conditions seem
fundamental for the
consolidation of power by the
prisoners: the widespread use of
prison as a mechanism for
exclusion, the availability of
firearms and the erosion of the
state's ability to control the population sent to prison.
The prison population increased in Venezuela
from the 80s, going from 10,000 to more than 20,000
prisoners. The number peaked in the mid-90 with
more than 30,000 detainees. The last years of the
century, the prison population fell below 12,000, but
then it went back up, breaking — for the first time in
history — the barrier of 50,000 inmates.8 The
escalating use of imprisonment coincides with the
dismantling of social policies in the 80s, the
liberalization of the economy, the decline in
government spending and the lowering of
employment and its constituent consequences in
terms of unemployment, poverty and exclusion.
Much scholarship emphasises the relationship
between neoliberal policies and expansion of the
punitive state power.9 Prison does not work anymore
as a device to standardise and discipline the
subordinate classes, which was associated with the
ideology of rehabilitation, but now operates instead
by strengthening and maintaining the exclusion of
those social groups who were expelled from the world
of work and consumption in the new economic order
that neoliberalism installed. Mass incarceration, the
decline of the rehabilitative ideal and a fall in
treatment and monitoring techniques are indicators of
this mutation. 
Though this is consistent with two decades of
neoliberal hegemony in Venezuela during the eighties
and nineties, it does not explain why the prison
population continues to grow in recent years, in the
Bolivarian era, with a post-neoliberal government that
implemented immense redistributive policies and
social inclusion. Indeed, during this time poverty,
unemployment and inequality
decreased significantly, but the
number of people sent to prison
continued to grow. Our
hypothesis is that the social
policies implemented, though
improving living conditions of
the majority, lose universality
and fail to reverse the structural
factors that cause exclusion, so
that a significant group of the
masses remains out of reach and
conditions of exclusion persist.
In this context, punishment
complements redistributive
policies by focusing on the
surplus population.10
The emergence and strengthening of self-rule
prison structures go together with these fluctuations
and peak with the growth of the prison population.
These trends emerged in the mid-90s and
consolidated over the last decade. The population
increase fractured cohesion and internal social
relations, making inoperative previous forms of
regulation. The overcrowding of the prison that we
visited, designed for no more than 300 inmates when
more than 5,000 people are living there, and with less
than 20 prison guards (who cannot enter inside),
explains the rise of armed groups who are able to
control the social order.
On the other hand, it created economic
(extraction of revenues) and political opportunities
(population mobilization) on which rest the Carros
The prison economy
plays a crucial role
in financing,
support and
reproducing the
social order, self-
regulation and self-
government.
8. Ministerio de Justicia (1980–1996) Estadísticas Delictivas. Caracas. Provea (1999–2013) ‘Derecho de los privados de libertad’. In
Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Venezuela. Provea, Caracas.
9. See Cavadino, M. and Dignan, J. (2006) ‘Penal Policy and Political Economy’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 6, 4: 435–456; Müller, M.
(2012) ‘The Rise of Penal State in Latin American’, Contemporary Justice Review, 15, 1: 57–76; Wacquant, L. (2010). Castigar a los
Pobres. Barcelona: Gedisa.
10. Antillano, A. (2014) ‘Crimen y Castigo en la Revolución Bolivariana’. Cuestiones de Sociología Nº 10.
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power. In short, a larger population created more
income, more workers and more soldiers. 
The second factor is the declining ability of state
control over the carceral population. The fiscal crisis of
the 90s affected spending in prisons and state
coercive capacities, resulting in declining resources for
institutions of punishment. Low budgets, reduction in
the number of detention locations, falling investment
in prison infrastructure, reduced prison guards and
professional staff, resulted in failures in the supply of
essential resources for the subsistence and control of
inmates. 
In addition, the state intervention in carceral
space became more and more illegitimate. Numerous
abuses, massacres, massive violations of human rights
are evident from the late-80s. One justification often
found among inmates in preferring the despotic
government of the Carro over formal administration is
their rejection of abuse and what they perceive as
debasement in prisons under state control. The Carro
protects prisoners from abuse of State authority, in
exchange for a different kind of abuse. Weakness,
illegitimacy and loss of state control are part of the
same continuum, or different expressions of a
profound transformation of punishment and the role
of the state.
A third factor is the entry of firearms into jails.
From the mid-90s, handguns are available to those
who control the prisons. The loss of state control and
the levying of huge revenues from the prison
population, make it possible to buy arms and bribe
guards to allow the entry of weaponry and the related
need to fill the role of government in regulating
internal life. This contributes to a particular group
becoming the monopoly owner of firearms to ensure
its supremacy over the rest of the population, allowing
both its coercive control and successfully confronting
the armed power of the state.
In sum, carceral self–rule can be understood as a
consequence of the changes in the nature of prisons
and their relation to society. On one hand, prisons
operate as a device to reinforce and deepen social
exclusion, especially for the surplus population, not
just as a mechanism of discipline and normalization.
On the other hand, the State shows itself to be
incompetent or indifferent in controlling this excluded
population. As a result, the prison appears to
superimpose social exclusion with institutional
exclusion, functioning as an outside, as a space
outside of society and its forms of institutional control
and regulation. 
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The submissive heirs or ‘the disinherited of the
colonial policies’,1 the indigenous people, the
peasants, the labourers, the miners and the small
traders are the part of the population that is most
incarcerated in Bolivia. In the majority of cases,
before committing a crime and before being
detained, they live in precarious conditions,
making clear the link, well demonstrated by other
authors,2 between prison and poverty.
In the prison of San Pedro, a facility designed to
accommodate 300 convicts, now live around 2,300
inmates. More than half of them has a per capita
income that does not surpass the threshold of mere
survival, and can't afford a private lawyer, which puts
them in the hands of public attorneys, whose huge
workload does not allow them the possibility of
offering an effective service.3
According to the data from The Organization of
American States,4 in 2010 Bolivian penitentiaries were the
second most overcrowded in all Latin America while,
according to reports by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights,5 84% of Bolivian penitentiary
population is in jail on pre-trial detention, the highest rate
in all of South America,6 despite Bolivian law establishes
that remand should be an exceptional injunction.
Supported by these data, I carried out an
ethnographic research in the self-governed prison of
San Pedro, shedding light on a number of other
anomalies described in the following paragraphs.7
In the fringe of the law and the Political Constitution
of the state, self government8 and informalities9 of prison
dynamics are quite common in the Latin American penal
state. They indeed mirror a huge divergence between
practice and theory and also a widespread ‘trend’ in Latin
America, where ‘penal statecraft differs significantly with
respect to related experience of the first world’.10 This
‘difference’ encourages a new theoretical approach to
Latin American prison11 that implies a change in our view
point. Under such perspective and along with the data
presented at the beginning of this article, I propose to
understand self-government, the absence of surveillance,
classification, schedules, work and all the experiences of
the modern disciplinary apparatus, not so much as the
loss of control of official authorities and state loss but as
a demonstration of their power. A gov-ernmental
strategy that shifts the focus from the concept of
‘panopticon’ to the concept of ‘anti-panopticon’ in order
to represent an active, organised way of managing the
inner space of the prison of San Pedro.
From The Panopticon To The Anti-Panopticon: 
The ‘Art Of Government’ In The Prison Of San Pedro
(La Paz, Bolivia)
Francesca Cerbini, Universidade Estadual do Ceará-UECE, Brazil.
1. Segato, R. (2007, p.145) El color de la cárcel en América Latina. Apuntes sobre la colonialidad de la justicia en un continente en
desconstrucción. Nueva Sociedad, 208:142–161; Aguirre, C. (2009) ‘Cárcel y sociedad en América Lati-na:1800–1940’, in E. Kingman
Garcés (ed.) Historia social urbana. Espacios y flujos. Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) pp. 209–252.
2. Bourgois, P. (2003) In search of respect. Selling crack in El Barrio. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Wac-quant, L. (1999) Les
prisons de la misère. París: Éditions Raisons d’agir.
3. Giacoman Aramayo, D. (2010, pp. 27–28) ‘Política de drogas y situación carcelaria en Bolivia’, in P. Metaal & C. Youngers (eds.)
Sistemas sobrecargados — Leyes de drogas y cárceles en América Latina. Amsterdam/Washington: Washington Office on Latin
America — Transnational Institute (WOLA-TNI), pp. 21–29.
4. OEA (Organización de los Estados Americanos) (2012, p.122) Informe sobre seguridad ciudadana en las Américas, 2012: Estadísticas
oficiales de seguridad ciudadana producidas por los Estados Miembros de la OEA. Alertamerica.org. Washington DC: Observatorio
Hemisférico deSeguridad de la OEA, OAS Official Records Series.
5. CIDH (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos) (2012, p.10) Informe presentado en el 146° periodo de sesio-nes de la
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Washington, DC: OEA.
6. FUNDACIÓN CONSTRUIR (2012, pp.127–147) Reforma Procesal Penal y Detención Preventiva en Bolivia. On line document
http://www.fundacionconstruir.org/index.php/documento/online/id/62
7. To gain a deeper knowledge of the circumstances, objectives and methodology of the investigation, see Cerbini, F. (2012) La casa de
jabón. Etnografía de una cárcel boliviana. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra. The descriptions of the context presented in this article are a
very brief reworking of the material published by Cerbini (ibidem, pp. 35–92).
8. Biondi, K. (2010) Junto e mixturado. Uma etnografia do PCC. Editora terceiro Nome, São Paulo; Antillano, A. (2015) Cuando los presos
mandan. Control informal dentro de la cárcel venezolana. Espacio Abierto.Cuaderno Venezolano de Sociología, 24 (4):16–39; Darke, S.
(2013) Inmate governance in Brazilian prisons. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 52(3):272-284.
9. Garcés, C. Martin, T. and Darke, S. (2013) Informal prison dynamics in Africa and Latin America. Criminal Justice Matters, 91(1):26–27.
10. Müller, M-M. (2012:58), The rise of the penal state in Latin America. Contemporary Justice Review: Issues in Criminal, Social, and
Restorative Justice, 15(1): 57–76.
11. Darke, S. and Karam M.L. (2016:469) Latin American prisons, in Y. Jewkes, J. Bennett and B. Crewe (eds.) Handbook on prisons,
Routledge, pp. 460–474.
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The jail space
Paying for ‘admission’ into the prison of San Pedro
reveals to the inmates the difference against the prison
system they could have imagined from the outside. The
income from those ‘admissions’ is passed on to the
consejo de delegados (council of delegates), formed of
eight inmates, elected inside the penitentiary community
to be in charge of the eight sections that constitute the
jailhouse. These sections have a main gate, common
areas, and cells where people live and perform their daily
activities.
Cells are a property constituting some kind of real
estate inmates may rent, build or reform, therefore they
are not assigned automatically. The best cells, which have
more room and are better
equipped, have been bought by
drug dealers who want to live
with all the luxuries, while most of
the prisoners need to use their
scarce economic resources to
handle legal issues. They must
rent a cell or be hosted by
someone who may employ the
deprived guests for their daily
chores; treating them as servants
in exchange for the opportunity to
live in his ‘home’.
Many of those who enter
the prison with no money and
no relatives to pay for their stay
at the peni-tentiary are forced to
be saloneros for three months.
This consists of being helpful to
the section’s needs, keeping the common areas clean,
washing the bathrooms, taking care of the garbage
and waking up earlier to have everything ready before
the rest of the inmates get up. 
The sections
Inmates can move around the whole facility with
some exception: those sectors supposedly dedicated to
drug abusers’ rehabilitation and to punishment; the
Álamos and Pinos, sections where inmates are locked in
at night; and lastly, Posta, an elite sector structurally
isolated from the rest of the penitentiary and interdicted
to other inmates. Admission to this section is much more
expensive than other cell blocks and may go up to
10,000 dollars. Within this area, many cells are like small
apartments of one or two floors, with a view to a newly
painted yard with chairs, tables and umbrellas sponsored
by the Coca-Cola company in exchange for the
monopoly of its products. 
The underlying idea of this privileged segregation is
that of offering a more comfortable, luxurious, safe and
calm imprisonment experience to wealthy people who
can pay to live in Posta. Usually, the ‘inhabitants’ of this
special area are politicians, drug dealers, executives and
members of powerful families. They justify this treatment
arguing that their lives would probably be at risk in any
other section, otherwise dirty and chaotic, where they
would be continuously extorted for their notorious and
evident social backgrounds and economic resources.
Drugs, alcohol and other illicit trades
Drugs can be consumed, with discretion, anywhere
in the penitentiary, even in Posta. The high command of
the prison get rich and their subordinates complement
their miserable salaries with allowing drug trafficking and
controlling the sale of alcohol and
everything licit or illicit entering
the penitentiary through the main
gate. For example, the price of
cocaine is ridiculous when
compared to the numbers
handled in the international
market, and a huge amount of
90° alcohol is consumed, being
much cheaper and easier to get
than mainstream alcoholic
beverages and that it can be
swallowed when mixed with soft
drinks.
If we consider the huge profit
these merchandises generate, the
bribe money for police officers,
judges, prosecutors and lawyers,
the illicit trafficking of organised
crime, we may get an estimate of the illegal profit that
thrives within the penal institution. Actually, it seems that
the purpose of watching the main access is less
concerned with the security of the penitentiary and the
prevention of break out. The main goal is to assure none
of the businesses established inside the jail escape the
control of the police and the consejo de delegados, who
always demand their commissions. 
Exceptions, irregularities and omissions of the law
promote extremely profitable business between some
of the inmates, the authorities and the police officers
who grant unwritten permissions to break the official
regulations in exchange of bribes, shares of the profits
and direct or indirect control of the inmate
population.
Family and women in prison
It's widely known that survival in San Pedro relies
first of all on the generosity of relatives who, in the first
period of imprisonment, visit the inmates and look after
their material needs and the endless bureaucratic
Many of those who
enter the prison
with no money and
no relatives to pay
for their stay at the
penitentiary are
forced to be
saloneros for
three months. 
Prison Service JournalIssue 229 33
paperwork needed for the trial. Some women even
choose to live in captivity, moving with their children to
their husband's cell. This is an illegal practice,12 but like
other ‘exceptions’ it constitutes an important source of
income for both authorities and police as well as for
those prisoners in charge of collecting the fees
requested to live inside the jail. 
Family cohabitation also brings certain economic
advantages to the inmates: husband and wife can save
money and start some kind of business inside the facility.
Also the women, as free citizens, be-come a bridge with
the outside world and can bring in all allowed products.
Like so, many couples make a living selling processed
foods, setting up fast food kiosks or real restaurants
where the woman is the cook and supplier.
Actually, most of the inmates live by themselves.
Generally, prisoners who must pay
too much jail time become an
unbearable economic burden and
many women form a new family
with another man. 
Work: owners and employees
We must distinguish four big
categories between the inmates:
those who get money from their
rela-tives, who are usually wealthy
(residents of the Posta or Pinos
sections) and don't need to
generate any income inside the prison, simply waiting for
handouts from their families; those who, keeping in
touch with their families, get some intermittent help
from the outside and aren't ‘rich’ but enjoy some
comfort; and, in the other side of the spectrum, inmates
who live with their families and represent a minority, and
those who have no contact with their families, who are
the majority. The last category desperately need money
to live, but due to structural and logistic deficiencies, San
Pedro is not equipped to give inmates jobs. Available paid
activities are the result of entrepreneurship and private
capitals which, in turn, only generate profit for the
investors. Therefore, in this jail there are few owners and
many employees, who are willing to work under any
circumstances just to cover the expenses of living in jail.
The interviewed inmates agree that the best
investment in jail, within the limits of the legality, is the
production of autitos, faithful miniature tin reproductions
of familiar cars, taxis, wagons, buses and trucks that can
be sold in many street markets in Bolivia and Peru. The
owners of the autitos workshops enjoy the advantages of
extremely low wages and the availability of free water and
electricity for their business. They normally set their shops
in the poorer and most crowded areas because cells there
are cheaper making the cost of installing their shops
lower. Also, most of the more deprived individuals, the
best candidates for the job, live in these sections. The
hired workers don't earn a salary until they have
completed the ‘test period’ when they learn the job.
During this training period, between three and six
months, they only get to live in the cells of the owner,
where they also work. In principle, the inmates regard this
occupation as a task like any other within the limited
possibilities of making a living inside the penitentiary.
Besides, being very hard to get into the group of the
auteros, the ones who get the job end up feeling very
lucky. But behind the privilege, await harmful work
conditions. Most of the auxiliaries weld the parts of the
automobiles with tin and muriatic acid which, once mixed
to put together the pieces of
tinfoil, emanate dense fumes that
the workers inhale continuously
since they don't wear any
protection and work inside the
closed environment of the cell.
Even when they understand that
such substances may damage
their health in the long run, many
keep welding because they must
use their earnings to pay their rent
and the eventual debts they may
contract when they enter the
jailhouse, buy some extra food,
and afford the expenses of legal procedures.
Just like any other sensitive issues like violence or the
presence of women and children inside the penal facility,
the business of the autitos constitutes a taboo that most
of the inmates hardly mention because they fear being
critisiced and losing their jobs.
Inside the San Pedro penitentiary there's no attempt
at rehabilitating and forming ‘productive’ citizens. The
role of the inmate is to peacefully occupy his place in the
intricate gear of powers that, in a more or less coercive
fashion, administrate the jail space. Profiting of the
indigent and deprived majority, that constitutes the
engine of an informal economy, such system enriches the
administrative staff, penitentiary authorities and inmates
placed in the helm, reproducing hence the same
dynamics of solidarity and submission lived and accepted
in the outside society.
Conclusions: from the panopticon to the
anti-panopticon
The presence of many women and children and
the absence of prison staff are probably the most
Some women
even choose to live
in captivity,
moving with their
children to their
husband's cell.
12. During my ethnographic fieldwork the presence of families living in prison was a sort of taboo. The inmates were worried their women
and children could be expelled, so none of them wanted to talk about their permanence to outsiders. For this reason, it has not been
possible to find available data on the starting date and existence of such practice in San Pedro, as in other Bolivian penitentiaries.
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shocking and surprising element during a visit to the
San Pedro penitentiary, in particular if we keep in mind
the prisons in the northern hemisphere. In the XIX
century these penitentiaries were the architectonic
models which embodied the theories and ideologies
that gave place to the construction of San Pedro, called
the ‘National Panopticon’.13 But looking at this reality
nowadays, a central question may arise. Did illuminist
ideals of the prison, conceived as a system of devices
‘reforming’ the human spirit,14 really reach Latin
America in Postcolonial times? Probably there was no
space for such ideals. For this reason, the most
influential sociological and criminological theories,15
oriented towards the profound critic of the ideologies
and mechanisms of the penitentiary institution, can
now hardly explain the functioning of many Latin
American prisons. One example above all: the
foucaultian ‘regard’ on the use of time, space and body
of the inmates describes a ‘panoptism’ which is not
reflected in the prison of San Pedro. Here, on the
contrary, official authorities rely on their power to
apparently ignore what happens inside the facility, a
space into which they prefer not to look,16 as if San
Pedro were a sort of non-panopticon, or anti-
panopticon.17 It does not mean that the authorities ‘lack
attention’ or are not in control, but that an alternative
governmentality acts in the prison space and shapes: 
An art of governing as least as possible, such
art of governing between a maximum and a
minimum, and the better when its closer to
the minimum than the maximum, must be
considered a kind of […] internal refinement of
the reason of State; is a principle for its upkeep,
for its most comprehensive development, for
its perfection.18
In many Latin American prisons, this ‘art’ takes the
form of the pre-trial imprisonment, of massive
incarceration, of overcrowding and, ultimately, of self-
government as an extreme and paradigmatic example of
the least possible government by the official authorities.
Bolivia presents one of the highest rates of
overcrowding and pre-trial detention. In such conditions
— shown by the internal scenario of the prison of San
Pedro — despair, indigence and the preponderant feeling
of injustice become constitutive elements of ‘the art of
governing the least’; structuring as devices of internal
coercion;19 basic instruments of the power that, from the
inside, allow the functioning of the prison, creating some
kind of ‘grey zone’20 which fosters specific ‘tactics and
strategies’ of resistance and subjugation.21
Overcrowding, a phenomenon that in recent years
has become typical in northern and southern prisons,
represents, on the one side, a means to unload the
responsibilities of state ‘criminal’ policies which produce
it, and, on the other, a way to delegate power to the
high ranked inmates, provoking, as a result, disorders,
discomfort and human drama. The advantage of an
informal management of the inner space consists in
keeping everything as an internal phenomenon not
reaching the outer world, getting the best result with the
least effort, from the point of view of the ‘reason of the
state’.22 Therefore, while we are accustomed to
perceiving ‘abandonment’ as a lack of action, San Pedro
proves that abandonment plays an active and
constitutive part in this state’s ‘art of government’.
In the end, the case presented shows how ‘not
seeing’ more than ‘seeing’ is a fundamental feature of
the concrete and real workings of the prison. A special
‘attitude’ of the government in the management of San
Pedro and probably many other jails in Latin America.
Considering many of them as anti-panopticons
contributes to the rescue of local peculiarities, derived of
specific historical, political and social configurations that
restore a non-homologue, mutant image of prison.
Furthermore, it helps to unmask, once again, the merely
rhetorical discourse of the humanisation of the prison
institution and its pretended objectives of rehabilitation
in Latin America.
13. Ydiaguez, E. (1889) Cárcel de La Paz. Refutación al folleto del señor Bernal titulado «Cárcel de La Paz». La Paz.
14. Foucault M. (1975) Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison. Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
15. Goffman, E. (1961) Asylums. Essays on the Social situation of mental patients and others Inmates. New York: Doubleday; Melossi, D. &
Pavarini, M. (1977) Carcere e fabbrica. Alle origini del sistema penitenziario (XIV–XIX secolo). Bologna: IlMulino.
16. Ibidem.
17. Alford, F. (2000, p.131) What would it matter if everything Foucault said about prison were wrong? Discipline and punish after twenty
years. Theory and Society, 29 (1):125–146.
18. Foucault, M. (2007) [2004], p.44 — Nacimiento de la biopolítica: Curso en el Collège de France 1978–1979. Buenos Aires: Fondo de
Cultura Económica.
19. Cerbini, F. (2012) La casa de jabón. Etnografía de una cárcel boliviana. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra.
20. Levi, P. (2003) [1986] I sommersi e i salvati. Torino: Einaudi.
21. De Certeau, M. (1990) [1980] L’Invention du quotidien, 1: Arts de faire. Paris: Gallimard.
22. See footnote 18, pp. 32–34.
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Introduction 
In August 2014 a film crew stumbled across a
century-old bureaucratic archive in the main men’s
prison in Quito, Ecuador.1 Roof-high stacks of
paperwork crammed into a nineteenth-century
vault. This decaying archive recorded the daily life
of Ecuador’s oldest penitentiary, Centro de
Rehabilitación de Varones, Numero Uno Quito
(CRSVQ1); originally titled Penal Garcia Moreno
after the President who oversaw its construction.
Whilst not an exact rendering of Bentham’s
original Panopticon, Garcia Moreno Prison was an
attempt to enact its notions of surveillance,
discipline, and control. Five pavilions radiate out
from a central hallway and observation tower; its
star shape allowing a guard to see each cell door
from this central point. This prison was
decommissioned in 2014 and replaced by a US
style maximum-security prison complex several
kilometres from Quito (see Tritton, this edition). 
This article draws on extensive archival
research conducted for the documentary Blind
Panopticon tasked by Ecuador’s Ministry of Justice
shortly after the prison’s closure,2 and in depth
ethnographic fieldwork undertaken by both authors
while the prison functioned, between 2005–2007. In
addition to an extensive array of official records
hoarded during 139 years of prison functioning,
countless everyday items left behind by prisoners
transferred without notice also became part of this
archive. In addition, the prison itself, its very
materiality, is itself an archive of events inscribed on
its walls: its paintings, its smells, and its silences.
Here we describe how prisoners subverted the
Panopticon of Quito during its existence. Bentham’s
utilitarian spirit lived on in the Panopticon till the end,
not through surveillance mechanisms but rather
through prisoners’ economic survival. In doing so, we
challenge the notion of the self-governing prisoner as
the product of neoliberalism. 
The Panopticon of Quito
Jeremy Bentham described the Panopticon, his
idea of a perfect prison, as a circular building of cells
surrounding a watchtower with windows covered by
blinds.3 From this viewpoint, a single guard could
oversee the prisoners’ daily life without being seen,
making it impossible for inmates to know whether
someone was observing them or not. Here, it was not
so much surveillance but the feeling of being under
surveillance that was important. As Michel Foucault
explains, panoptic architecture projects its surveillance
model onto society so as to discipline its population
through observation, self-control, and isolation.4 The
Panopticon is therefore much more than a type of
architecture; it is a power relationship through which
the omnipresent gaze of the watcher modifies
behaviours, corrects habits, and reconditions instincts.
No true Panopticon was ever built, but several
Panopticon-type buildings can be found in Latin
America. In Cuba the now defunct Presidio Modelo
(built in the 1920s) is the closest to a true Panopticon.
In Colombia a cruciform: ‘Panoptico’ was begun in
1874 (now the National Museum), the same year the
Panopticon of Quito was completed after a five-year
construction period, coinciding with Conservative
Catholic president Gabriel Garcia Moreno’s second term
in office. The Quito Panopticon therefore reflects the
global spread of 19th century European ideas about
modernity and discipline, and for Ecuador it represents
the very first attempt at modernising a nation
profoundly shaped by Spanish colonialism. 
The Blind Panopticon: Prisoners’
subversion of the prison in Ecuador,
1875–2014 
Jorge Núñez, University of California, Davis, and Jennifer Fleetwood, University of Leicester.
1. Jorge Núñez, who is a co-author in this paper, was the film crew’s research coordinator and documentary scriptwriter. The other
research team members were Lorena Cisneros, Boris Idrovo, and Juan Andrés Suarez. 
2. Herrera, M. (Director) (2014) Blind Panopticon (Talandro Films). 
3. Bentham, J. (1995/1791) ‘The Panopticon, or the Inspection House’, in Miran Bozovic (ed) The Panopticon Writings, London: Verso, p.
29-95. 
4. Foucault, M. (1975) Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, NY: Vintage Books.
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The panoptic societal model corresponds to the
mentality of an epoch — the European society of
industrialisation. It was these ideas of ‘progress’ that
President Garcia Moreno had in mind for Ecuador. His
penitentiary embodied his views about the Ecuadorian
nation state with cruel clairvoyance: combining
rationality and brutality in the service of a modernity
that was Catholic, obsessed with Europe, imposed with
whips and bullets, discipline, and blood. The
construction of the Panopticon was the final stage of
his personal and political project, blending
enlightenment philosophy and despotism. Even after its
name was changed to a ‘social rehabilitation centre’,
Quiteños continued calling it Garcia Moreno prison,
reflecting the perpetuation of the ex-president’s values
and fantasies, long after he was assassinated.
‘Blinding’ the Panopticon 
It is absolutely true that
prisoners stubbornly resisted the
new disciplinary mechanism in
the prison; it is absolutely correct
that the actual functioning of the
prisons… was a witches’ brew
compared to the beautiful,
Benthamite machine. (Foucault,
Power)5
The Panopticon of Quito
never fulfilled Bentham’s notions
of an impeccable control machine. It was inaugurated
in 1875 with only 71 inmates. Because the capital city
did not have enough prisoners at the time, authorities
of neighbouring prisons were summoned to hand over
inmates in order to occupy its 270 cells. In stark
contrast, at its closure in 2014 the prison was operating
at five times its capacity making a mockery of the
notion of solitary contemplation and order. Four to five
men regularly shared a cell built for one (approx. 2m by
2.5m), but sometimes as many as eight were crammed
in. Daily life in such close quarters constituted an
entirely different type of punishment than the
reformatory isolation envisaged by Bentham. 
The prison population steadily rose throughout the
2000s. In 2002, the ‘two-for-one’ rule of early release
was repealed, effectively doubling sentences. The
second cause of overcrowding was the so-called war
on drugs, which, like the Panopticon, reflects politics
and priorities forged in an entirely different national
context; politics fundamentally underpinned by
neoliberal doxa, in which crime and punishment can be
understood as a matter of supply and demand.6 In
2003, Ecuador signed a bilateral agreement with the
United States of America committing to drug war
policies. Performance indicators included an increase in
the number of persons detained for drug trafficking.7 A
similar agreement was signed in 2005 making clear
Ecuador’s commitment to increasing arrests of drug
offenders.8 By the end of the 2000’s, the prison
population had nearly doubled; by 2007, one in three
prisoners was incarcerated for drugs offences.9
Overcrowding put tremendous strain on the aging
Panopticon. In contrast to Bentham’s orderly vision, by
2014 the sewers had collapsed; water stoppages and
electric cuts were regular events. When the
Panopticon’s archive was
discovered in the dome of its
watchtower, ironically, its
windows were boarded up from
the inside. No longer a site of
surveillance and discipline, the
watchtower was instead used as
a store-cupboard, holding
decades upon decades worth of
bureaucratic paperwork: the
Panopticon was, quite literally,
blind. 
Physical reconstruction: Inmates as Rebuilders
During 139 years of functioning the Panopticon of
Quito was reconstructed, adapted and remodelled
many times. The archive contains hundreds of requests
by inmates asking to bring in construction materials.
Each physical intervention responded to systemic
failings, from not having enough beds due to
overcrowding, to installing kitchens in cells to deal with
food shortages, to adapting facilities to offer medical
care. From the early 1900s the prison record shows that
high-ranking government authorities were deeply
invested in running and refurbishing the Panopticon.
Yet, from the 1970s onwards, the archive reveals that
inmates became responsible for most repairs and
renovations. The image below is a prison diary entry
from April 19th 1905 recording a request from
The Panopticon of
Quito never fulfilled
Bentham’s notions
of an impeccable
control machine.
5. Foucault, M. (2000) ‘Questions of Method’, in Power: Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984, J. D. Faubion (ed.), New York: The New
Press. 
6. Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, Duke University Press.
7. Edwards, S. (2011) ‘A short history of Ecuador’s drug legislation and the impact on its prison population’, in Metaal, P., & Youngers, C.
(2011) Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America, Transnational Institute/Washington Office on Latin America.
8. Pontón, J., & Torres, A. (2007) Cárceles del Ecuador: Los Efectos de la Criminalización por Drogas, URVIO: Revista Latinoamericana de
Seguridad Cuidana, 1: 55-73, p. 63.
9. Edwards (2011) (see n.6), p. 55.
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Ecuador’s former Vice-president to convert an occupied
cell into a make-shift treatment office for alcoholics and
homeless. The entry begins as follow: ‘Sir Province
Governor: In response to the order given by the
Republic Vice-president, who is currently in charge of
Executive Power by fiat No. 333, the Department for
the treatment of chronic alcoholics and homeless is
ready.’ 
Garcia Moreno Archive, 2014 (photo by Núñez) 
Inmate-led prison reconstruction reflects a
particular relationship between the building and its
inhabitants. Rather than being spaces of surveillance,
cells were literally privatised. By the 2000s, cells were
privately owned — bought and sold in a commercial
market administrated by inmates democratically elected
by their peers.10 This property market (and in fact, the
widespread commercialisation of space in prison) was
run with the consent of prison authorities. Rather than
disciplinary classifications according to offence, status
(remand versus convicted), time served, or age, inmates
organised themselves into pavilions depending on how
much they could afford to pay. Inmates’ regular
contributions to their pavilions paid for extensive
communal repairs and renovation of the wing, ranging
from repainting, and plastering, to the construction of
a gym, TV watching space, a toilet block, basketball
hoops in the yard, and so on. 
Cells were remodelled and redesigned, limited
only by inmates’ finances and imaginations. Some were
richly decorated, especially those belonging to
international drug traffickers. One had a mirrored wall to
give an increased sense of space and was tiled
throughout. A water heater had been installed; the
kitchen was well equipped with a microwave and blender.
A television and games station were suspended in a
corner above the bunks. All in a 2m by 2.5 metre space!
Few cells were so richly decorated but all had been subtly
remodelled, depending on the owners’ style, with
everything from photos of nude women, religious
iconography, paintings, graffiti, photographs of loved
ones, national flags and more. There was not a cell
without a secret hiding place. Even after
decommissioning, they continued to keep their secrets:
hosting drugs, weapons, photos, mobile phones and
chargers. 
The physical reconstruction of Garcia Moreno’s
prison by inmates converted the Panopticon of Quito
into a social model far from surveillance, self-discipline,
and control. It moved Ecuador’s imprisonment’s centre
of gravity from bureaucracy towards a growing
informal economy that expanded well beyond the
carceral system. During its 139 years the Panopticon of
Quito went from the European surveillance society to
precarious neoliberalism, from an institution meant to
discipline an emerging labour force, to one in charge
with imprisoning the impoverished and unemployed
under the war on drugs. And yet, all this painstaking
renovation and collective effort carried out by prisoners
gave them back a sense of purpose in life and the vital
illusion of a meaningful existence. 
Subverting work as rehabilitation 
No man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting
freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered,
which a view to his advantage, from making such
bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks
fit: not (what is necessary consequence) anybody
hindered from supplying him, upon any terms he
thinks proper to accede to. (Bentham 1843: Letter
1)11
Bentham envisioned the Panopticon’s prisoners in
stark contrast to functioning members or society. While a
free citizen must not ‘be hindered… in the way of
obtaining money, as he thinks fit’ (see the Bentham’s
quote above about credit), a prisoner in the panoptical
must work for the sake of discipline rather than profit.
And yet, Bentham’s imagining of the Panopticon is still
underpinned by a utilitarian approach to prisoner’s work.12
Bentham proposes that inmates not be given any work,
but rather those most likely to be ‘most for his
10. Núñez, J. (2006) Cacería de Brujos: Drogas “Illegales” y Sistema de Cárceles en el Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador: FLACSO, Ecuador;
Abyayala.
11. Gregory, C. (2012) ‘On money debt and morality: Some reflection on the contribution of economic anthropology’, European
Association of Social Anthropologists, 30, 4: 380-296. 
12. Bentham, J. (1995/1791) (see n.3) Letter IX. 
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advantage’, and yet ‘Nor do I see why labour should be
the less reforming for being profitable’.13 In the 19th
century European model of the Panopticon work was
compulsory. Like Bentham’s model, work was meant to
reintroduce prisoners into the discipline of industry.
Nonetheless, prisoners often worked without actual salary
or employment benefits. Even in contemporary prisons,
payment may be paltry in comparison to the real
economy. In that system, refusing to work may be a
strategy of resistance for inmates.14 
In Garcia Moreno prison the exact opposite
occurred. Larco notes that, unlike panoptical prisons in
France, United Kingdom, and the United States, Quito’s
Panopticon lacked work-based rehabilitation policies. In
her view this was understandable due to the
agricultural focus of Ecuador’s economy; Quito had no
urban industry in which to train
inmates.15 In fact, for most of its
history, work was neither
compulsory, nor available in
Quito’s Panopticon. Very few
prisoners had access to
workshops, training, or formal
paid labour. During the second
half of the 20th century, prison
work became an entrepreneurial
response to extreme
precariousness, a refusal to starve
to death rather than an initiative
to set up shop. However, in an
ironic twist, work was, for
inmates, a choice in utilitarian terms. Avoiding work
was possible, but only in the sense that destitution can
be considered a choice. During the 2000s, the prison
estate provided for only a bare life: a space to sleep was
provided, but no mattress, covers, or pillows. Basic food
was available twice a day, but without owning a
container, inmates could not collect it. Medical care was
available, but most inmates had to pay for treatment
and medications. Inevitably, some died from lack of
medical treatment. 
By the 2000s, almost all inmates were involved in
some sort of business, supporting himself, and in many
cases, also his family. Work was not a strictly
bureaucratic relationship; its aim was not discipline, but
survival. Echoing the marketisation of cells, Garcia
Moreno Prison housed a number of small businesses,
owned and run by inmates. Some cells were converted
into small shops, selling everything from tobacco to
eggs, hot chocolate to batteries. When Quito’s
Panopticon was decommissioned in 2014, its corridors
were filled with fizzy drinks machines, and telephone
cabins (the archive records that inmates sought and
were granted special permission to sell phone cards), as
well as small food stalls, selling coffee, tea, hamburgers
and soda. Some larger food stalls sold three-course
lunches. In addition, many were micro entrepreneurs.
Documents in the archive, from the early 70s to its
closure in 2014, tell of a long list of jobs and businesses:
Grocer, laundryman, pool table owner, messenger to
the street and office, food seller, picture painter,
electrical technician, seafood salesman, artisan and
craftsman, cook, deliveryman, secretary of the
evangelical church, librarian,
vendor of phone cards, cigarette
seller, shopkeeper, hairdresser,
language teacher, gym instructor,
cell painter, kebab seller, event
organiser, sports coordinator,
confectioner, incense salesman,
porter, toilet manager,
watermelon segment seller,
elementary school teacher, herbal
tea seller, restaurant owner,
etcetera, etcetera. Although the
hurly burly of industry has little in
common with the quiet notion of
solitude and discipline that
Bentham intended, he might have approved of the
sheer scale of industry. 
Holding all this economic activity together, the
Panopticon of Quito evolved into a financial
laboratory of everyday debts and tax credits.
Everything became a monetary exchange; everything
was bought and sold on credit. There was no barter:
debt was king.16 Over the course of 139 years the
inmates converted their prison into an inverted stock
exchange. Like any other financial market-like
assemblage, the Panopticon gave the illusion of an
endless cash flow, but it was inverted because the
illusion depended on slowing down monetary
circulation instead of speeding it up.17 Money passed
from hand-to-hand in slow motion as though
mimicking prison time, and in doing so, the
Echoing the
marketisation of
cells, Garcia Moreno
Prison housed a
number of small
businesses, owned
and run by inmates.
13. Ibid. Letter X. 
14. De Vito, C. G. & Lichtenstein, A. (2013) ‘Writing a global history of convict labour’, International Review of Social History, 58: 285-325.
15. Larco, C. (2011) Visiones Penales y Regímenes en el Estado Liberal de 1912 a 1925, Tesis doctoral Programa de Historia, Universidad
Andina Simon Bolivar, p. 39. 
16. Both archival and ethnographic data suggest that even the most mundane material exchanges in Garcia Moreno prison were highly
mediated by a complex credit/debt system known as ‘refile.’ See: Núñez, J. (2005) Cacería de Brujos: Drogas Ilegales y Sistema de
Cárceles en Ecuador, Maestría ABYA-YALA Publicaciones and FLACSO sede Ecuador, Quito.
17. The slowness of Garcia Moreno prison’s financial flow functioned like a hire-purchase system (rent-to-buy), in which a prisoner could
enjoy the use of a commodity that paid in regular instalments, but during the repayment period ownership remained with the seller.
This credit system created a multiplicity of debt tallies that outlived the actual exchange of items. 
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Panopticon allowed its inhabitants to extract value
from the neoliberal model of mass incarceration.18
In its archive, the Panopticon of Quito synthetises
the dialectics of penal bureaucracy and the free-market.
The image below is an official request by a prisoner to
bring in sticks to sell ‘pinchos’ (meat skewers). The
application reassures the prison warden that the
requestor takes full responsibility for the everyday use
of long pieces of wood assuring him that they ‘will not
constitute in any manner a weapon that may endanger
others.’ Similar requests abound in the prison archives: 
Garcia Moreno Archive, 2014 (photo by Núñez)
Paperwork trails reveal the long, convoluted
institutional process of starting a business. Firstly,
prisoners needed authorisation from the committee of
inmates. Next, an official request was made to prison
administrators in which inmates had to declare their will
to rehabilitate through self-employment and
demonstrate the need to support their family by it. This
entrepreneurial rhetoric was accompanied by a series
of protocol phrases aimed to show remorse for the
crime committed. Then the request entered the
bureaucratic labyrinth of the prison, and was judged by
prison authorities on the basis of institutional prejudice:
a request to open a laundry is denied because the
institution considers that this right is reserved for
homosexuals!; an orange seller is denied access to a
pavilion to avoid fights with his enemies. 
This market-prison did not produce workers, at least
not in the sense given in Europe or North America, but a
precariat of entrepreneurs. Inmates’ work was risky —
people set up a business in the hope to get paid (but debt
was equally likely). The logic was not completely
cutthroat. Inmate entrepreneurs committed to a monthly
payment to the medical emergency fund for the homeless
in prison. The medical fund functioned as a charity run by
inmates and prison bureaucrats who allocated money on
a first-come, first-served basis. Like the physical
remodelling of this prison, this adaption responded to
institutional failings. 
Conclusion
The Panopticon works through surveillance: being
potentially overseen at any moment, inmates were
supposed to self-discipline. Whilst the Garcia Moreno
Prison imported European enlightenment ideas about the
prison system to Ecuador, these notions were never fully
realised. In Quito, inmates ‘blinded’ the Panopticon from
within. They not only rebuilt Garcia Moreno’s
infrastructure, but also subverted its logic. Our
ethnographic and archival research has just begun to
explore the historical depth of this prison archive and its
postcolonial overlaps and divergences with Bentham’s
enlightenment philosophy.19 Bentham’s utilitarianism was
echoed in Quito’s Panopticon, not because of his
surveillance model but because of his stance regarding
interest rates and debt.20
Garcia Moreno’s prison archive constitutes a rich
field site to historicise and critically study the self-
governing prisoner and its alternative modern
realisations. The Panopticon of Quito never succeeded
in breeding a disciplined labour force. The inmates
won that battle the very moment they blinded the
Panopticon and shifted the centre of gravity from
surveillance to survival. Our analysis illustrates that the
prison was shaped by the ideology of the time: first by
utilitarianism, and later by neoliberalism. The notion
of the self-governing, entrepreneurial prisoner is far
from contemporary but arguably has historical roots in
Bentham’s utilitarianism. Here we find more continuity
than change. While Bentham imagined the prison
through the lens of industrialisation; in Ecuador it took
on quite a different character. The resulting prison
model became a cultural machine of precariousness
that forced inmates to work, struggle, and survive or
face destitution. Prison entrepreneurship can neither
be considered clearly a form of resistance to the prison
regime (there being none), nor as compliance with it.
As the archive shows, prisoners had to re-frame
survival as rehabilitation, presenting themselves as
willing participants in the corruption of Ecuador’s
prison system. At the same time as entrepreneurship
bowed to the prison authorities, it subverted prison
discipline. 
18. Núñez, J. (2007) ‘Las cárceles en la época del narcotráfico: Una mirada etnográfica, Nueva Sociedad, 208. 
19. Currently the Ecuadorian Ministry of Justice has custody of the archive rescued from Garcia Moreno prison. Government authorities
have said repeatedly the archive will be made available to the public, but, in our knowledge, nothing has been done on this regard yet. 
20. Gregory, C. (2012) ‘On money debt and morality: Some reflection on the contribution of economic anthropology’, European
Association of Social Anthropologists, 30, 4: 380-296. 
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Introduction
This article offers an insider view of the
Ecuadorian prison system which I experienced
first-hand after having been sentenced to twelve
years for drug trafficking following my arrest on
the 16th August 2005 in a hotel in the capital
Quito in possession of nearly 8 kilos of cocaine. I
spent just over 9 years in three different prisons in
Ecuador starting with Garcia Moreno prison in
Quito followed by six years in the Penitentiary
Litoral in Guayaquil, the largest port city on the
coast, and the last year in the newly constructed
Nuevo Centro de Rehabilitación Social Regional
Guayas (informally known as the Regional), also
in Guayaquil, the first of the new style prisons
introduced under Rafael Correa’s organic codigo
penal neo-socialist regime. I was transferred to
the UK at the end of 2014 and spent nearly a year
in HMP Wandsworth, London prior to my release
in August 2015. This is an account of my
experiences in that time and the changing face of
the Ecuadorian penal system. There is much that
could be said, but here I focus especially on
prisoners’ self-rule and its impact on security,
safety and order in the prison. 
Garcia Moreno Prison, Quito
This is the main prison in the capital city, and the
oldest, having been constructed in 1879. It is similar in
layout and design to a typical Victorian Prison in
England: four wings radiate from the centre, as well as
a smaller wing housing maximum-security prisoners.
Due to massive overcrowding most wings housed 350
to 500 men, in total around 1,500 (similar to London’s
HMP Wandsworth). The prison housed men over 18,
convicted or charged with crimes ranging from petty
theft through to drug trafficking and a small number of
serial killers, assassins and rapists. Sentences ranged
from a few months up to 25 years, and exceptionally 35
years. No differentiation was made between remand,
short-term, or long term prisoners. Police and guards
patrolled the perimeter; guards maintained internal
security.2 On average 3 to 4 guards were present per
wing. Insecurity was endemic with an average of one or
two murders a week, an inevitable result of the many
knife fights, fistfights and even occasional gunfights
between prisoners. 
This, and other factors resulted in a form of
internal self-governance by prisoners. The ‘Internal
Committee’ was democratically elected by their peers
to represent them in negotiations with guards, the
Director and even the Government. This committee
arguably arose in response to a chronically over-
stretched and under-resourced prison system in which
inmates had to organise and advocate for themselves.
In 2001, parole and early release were suspended
pending the formation of a new penal code (finally
introduced in 2014). Some spent up to 5 years awaiting
trial, sometimes only to be acquitted. This resulted in
over-crowding and animosity between the prisoners
and authorities, leading to ‘strikes’, usually entailing
chaining and blocking the entrances to the wings,
denying access to the authorities. Strikes were highly
co-ordinated: prisons acted in unison, the heads of the
internal committees in the different prisons maintaining
contact with illegal mobile phones. These co-ordinated
strikes caused major disruption. 
Garcia Moreno was in a state of disrepair, and it fell
to inmates to maintain it and carry out nearly all works,
covering the costs themselves. The Committee included
an elected representative on each wing called a caporal
(foreman). He acted as an intermediary between
prisoners and the director or social worker, facilitating the
entry of goods (legal or illegal), the purchase of cells,
arranging permissions for visits and the like. Caporals also
maintained order on the wing, overseeing maintenance
(including building works, plumbing, electrics, painting
and cleaning), providing security from gangs and
arranging for food to be brought and served on time.
The caporal also included managing the wing’s finances,
including collecting two forms of tax: the guardia
(regular bribes for the guards) and ingreso (a one-off
An Insider’s View of Prison Reform
in Ecuador
Pieter Tritton, with Jennifer Fleetwood, University of Leicester1 
1. Pieter wishes to thank Laurie for all her help and support. 
2. Special operations or raids involved police too, sometimes accompanied by military or special tactical groups, and always heavily
armed. Guns, (including Glock16’s) were prevalent as well as kitchen knives, machetes and even hand grenades.
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admission fee to the wing). He also charged shops or
restaurants a business tax and took commission on the
sale of every cell. These commissions and the guardia
were used to bribe the guards to turn a blind eye to
illegal activities on the wing. 
As the boss of the wing, the caporal kept order
amongst groups as far as possible. Within each wing,
small groups formed based on nationality that is
Ecuadorians, Colombians, Brits, Russians, Arabs and
Africans. Some gangs and groups were also present,
including the Latin Kings, FARC (The Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (The National
Liberation Army), as well as large groups of drug
traffickers. Such groups often contained extremely
powerful individuals who had been capos (heads) in
cartels or guerrillas. Some became caporals within the
prison, or else were well respected by the caporals.
Typically they were well educated, and had large
financial resources, and back up
in the street. Not only were they
respected by fellow prisoners,
but also by guards and
governors. Nonetheless, these
groups mostly participated in
and supported the elected
systems of inmate governance. 
This seemingly organised
system completely broke down
during strikes. Prisoners didn’t
destroy their cells or the interior
of the prison, mainly because
they would have to repair all
damage. With the absence of
guards, all control, even by the caporals would
evaporate until disputes between the prisoners and
authorities were resolved and order returned. From
the moment the gates were locked, everyone would
be armed with at least a kitchen knife. Some small
cliques embarked on robbery sprees stripping
valuables from cells, and murdered people with
whom they had serious grievances. 
After several years of these strikes, and following
the election of Rafael Correa as President, parole and
early release laws were reinstated in 2007. This meant
release after 50 per cent of sentence completed and
automatic release on bail if not sentenced within one
year. During a temporary amnesty, the prison
population was more than halved with a mass exodus
under the various laws re-enacted in 2009.3 During
this period of transformation and the shift from neo-
liberalism to neo-socialism under Correa, I was
transferred suddenly to the most feared, out of
control and corrupt prison in Ecuador, the infamous
penitentiary of Guayaquil. 
‘La Peni’, The Penitentiary Literal, Guayaquil
This prison is the largest in Ecuador, housing, at its
most over-crowded, around 8,000 inmates. Most
served sentences for similar crimes as in Quito, but
more involved gang-related crimes. Peni is situated on
the outskirts of the large port city of Guayaquil, built in
the 1960s to replace a 17th century equivalent to
Garcia Moreno. 26 wings, two storeys high, were laid
out along either side of a central passage-way linking
the wings to a separate building housing the Director’s
office and departments. Each floor of each wing was
designed to hold around a hundred people in
approximately 50 cells. However, due to over-crowding,
5 or 6 shared a cell designed for 2, and some inmates
slept in communal areas. The buildings were very
dilapidated. As in Quito, maintenance of cells and the
interior of the wings fell to inmates.
Each wing had its own
exercise yard enclosed by a 15
foot wall surrounded by a no-
man’s-land (patrolled by guards
and armed police) and a
perimeter wall and watch towers.
As in Quito, guards were in
charge of the security inside the
prison but called upon police and
military for reinforcements and
searches. The most dramatic
difference between Garcia
Moreno and Peni was the very
apparent lack of control the
authorities had within the walls of
the prison due to the level of gang activity. From my
perspective, the prison functioned as a holding
structure. As long as there were no escapes and things
didn’t get out of hand, the authorities let the gangs
maintain order and discipline and quietly cooperated
with them. Two large gangs (the Rusos and the
Cubanos) controlled the prison. Despite their foreign
sounding names, they originated from Guayaquil,
where they controlled the drug trade, prostitution,
illegal alcohol, murders, extortion, robbery and so on.
These skills were soon put to use within the walls of the
prison. In collusion with the guards, they controlled
everything that entered the prison and much of what
happened on the wings. 
This was evident in management of security on the
wing. Unlike in Garcia Moreno where inmates were
locked in their cells every evening, cells were open 24
hours a day (within the wing). At 8am and 4pm guards
opened and closed the wing, taking a head count.
During the daytime inmates could go to other wings
but only those controlled by the gang whose domain
3. This included an indulto (pardon) for low-level drug offences. 
This prison is the
largest in Ecuador,
housing, at its most
over-crowded,
around 8,000
inmates.
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they resided in. This was strictly enforced by the gangs,
who placed inmates armed with guns on the gates of
every wing, as well on the roof, and the main entrance.
Thus, they controlled movement on their wings, and
could get advance warning of approaching gang
members or the entrance of the police, who generally
did not receive bribes from the gangs. 
Gangs took a cut of whatever came onto their
wings, from alcohol, (whether smuggled or produced in
home-made stills) to soft drinks and foodstuffs, for
example adding 20-30 US cents to the price of each
bottle of Coca-Cola (an entire lorry load was consumed
weekly). Inmate-run businesses paid a weekly ‘protection’
fee (or were closed down). Gangs also controlled the sale
of cells and who lived where. Like in Quito, everyone paid
US$5-10 weekly guardia (guard bribes) and US$5-10 for
the pleasure (or not) of the prison food, which should
have been free. They also charged inmates a further $10
each week for spurious repairs.
Failing to pay (up to US$30 weekly)
could result in being robbed or
transferred to a worse wing. The
director and guards appeared to
sanction these charges, and
probably received their cut too. At
this time, guards were paid around
US$500 a month, but could make
10 times more bringing in illegal
goods, and receiving bribes. These
bribes ensured that guards did little
to keep formal order but rather
facilitated, and in some cases,
actively supported the gangs’ rule of the prison. 
The caporals collected payments, as in Quito, but
here they weren’t elected but installed by the gangs as
the civilised face of their business. The result was a
strictly controlled prison run by the gangs, which would
mete out brutal punishment for any infringements. The
gangs’ most lucrative trade was the sale of cocaine,
crack cocaine and heroin. Drugs were smuggled in by
guards, visitors or sometimes hidden amongst food for
the kitchen or in produce for the shops. The trade was
heavily protected; gangs used unique packaging so
they would know if someone else was selling drugs. All
of this was done with the knowledge and permission of
the head guards, who even helped enforce the gangs’
control by removing rogue dealers or selling confiscated
drugs to the gangs. The sums of money involved were
huge: of 8,000 inmates, around 80 per cent used
drugs. Inevitably the greatest number of problems arose
due to drugs. 
In addition to the control of legal and illegal
business, gangs also controlled the sale of weapons,
including handguns, machine guns, hand grenades,
and even explosives. Daily life was on a knife-edge —
inmates had little choice but to cooperate with gang
control. Life was especially difficult for foreigners, who
were assumed to be rich and were targeted for
extortion. Not knowing when or where violence would
erupt was nerve racking as a gunfight could literally
begin in seconds, even on visit days when visitors were
present on the wings. After a spate of tit-for-tat killings
between the gangs, and a couple of large gun fights in
which 3-6 people were killed, media attention forced
the authorities to act. 
Pressure came from the government, forcing the
Director to try to regain control. However, by this point
corruption permeated every aspect of the institution.
When previous directors or guards had challenged the
gangs, brutal retaliations followed. Two directors and
numerous guards were killed during my six-year stay at
Peni. The police were brought in to regain control. They
raided the prison to remove weapons and items gangs
had brought in, such as large paddling pools, disco
equipment, large T.V.s, dogs the
gangs used for security and
fighting cockerels — upon which
vast sums of money were bet at
weekends. They also prohibited
the entrance of foodstuffs with
visits and the many inmate-run
shops without special
permission. Inmates relied on
these heavily; inmates’ health
suffered and many lost weight. 
The police transferred gang
leaders and caporals to prisons in
other parts of the country to split
them up. Initially, this had little effect as they were
readily replaced, however after several months
replacements became harder to find. To some extent
this weakened the grip of the gangs, but the strict
control by the authorities had a negative effect on
those who weren’t gang members: food shortages,
shorter visits and little access to phones made daily life
harder to bear. The prison became unstable in the
absence of gang control, leading to an increase in
violence overall as smaller groups fought for control of
drug territories. Robbery and extortion increased, as did
violence: between 4-6 inmates were murdered a week.
The situation became dire. 
The newly elected President Rafael Correa
instigated a programme of prison modernisation,
overhauling the whole system. The new prisons were
more or less complete by mid-2013 and the situation in
the prison in Guayaquil was now critical. Rumours were
rife of a mass transfer, which finally took place the same
day the President himself gave the order. In December
2013 mass transfers of some 6,000 prisoners began in
a huge police operation. Inmates were stripped of
everything, carrying nothing from Peni. On arrival
everyone was issued with a prison uniform, a pair of
The police
transferred gang
leaders and caporals
to prisons in other
parts of the country
to split them up.
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flip-flops and a pair of shorts. This stripping of inmates’
property and clothes signified the end to inmates’
control of prison. 
Nuevo Centro de Rehabilitación Social Regional
Guayas, Guayaquil: a new system 
Even though the ‘Regional’ wasn’t fully completed
(in fact it was estimated to be a year away from
completion), this was to be the flagship of the Rafael
Correa’s reformed penal system. These new prisons are
all of the same prefabricated design, resembling a
modern, western prison. Each prison is designed to
house approximately 6,000 inmates in wings with a
capacity of 350, in five- person cells on three floors.
Each cell has 5 concrete bunks, a toilet and sink, with
cold water only. One built in strip light comes on
automatically at 6pm and off again at 10pm. There are
no electrical points in the cell: there are no TVs, radios,
fridges, air conditioners, cookers,
hifis, computers or phones.
CCTV, controlled by the police,
covers almost all areas. Each wing
is an L shape, enclosing a small
covered exercise yard with
outdoor showers! Wings
surround a central outdoor
exercise area where there are
football pitches and volleyball
courts. 
Upon being transferred,
inmates were subject to a full strip search, body scanner,
metal detector, and hot seat: the first time many had ever
been searched this extensively. For the first time, inmates
were allocated by security category depending on their
sentence length, time served, crime and behavioural
record. There was no paying to be allocated with your
mates, no buying cells! For those used to running the
prison this was a huge shock! The level of security in these
new style prisons was far higher and far stricter. The police
controlled all external security: manning the watch
towers, monitored CCTV feeds, and searched everyone
entering and leaving the prison — including guards and
officials such as the education staff, doctors, nurses, social
workers, kitchen staff, and of course visitors, and even
embassy staff. 
Security was initially very tight. Although there
were usually just 2 to 3 guards per wing of 350
inmates, the police arrived quickly when they viewed
anything suspicious on CCTV. Police also carried out all
searches and were armed at all times, unlike guards. As
well as watch towers, the prison was surrounded by
several perimeter fences (including one that was
electrified) topped with razor wire.4 Initially there were
few weapons due to police surveillance. Nonetheless, it
was only a matter of weeks before inmates began
crafting knives and machetes from pieces of the
structure of the prison such as the doors or fixtures and
fittings. This in turn led to serious knife fights breaking
out as gangs sought to reaffirm their territory. 
In the initial months, inmates were not even allowed
to possess pens and paper. Visitors, who had previously
brought in things like food, newspapers, magazines,
letters, books or clothes, could take in nothing. The
authorities did this to completely break the power of the
gangs by removing all potential sources of income and
holding everyone incommunicado (recall that the
Committee of inmates in Quito maintained a national
network through mobile phones). Whereas previously
visitors had entered the prison, here visits took place in
purpose built rooms, lasting just one hour per week
seated at a table, monitored by cameras, with guards and
police patrolling, followed by a
search, sometimes a strip search,
again by the police, on exit. Unlike
the UK, inmates were entitled to a
two-hour conjugal visit once a
month in a private room with a
bed, provided proof of marriage or
a long relationship could be
established. Nonetheless, it was at
least a month before anyone was
permitted visits at all. After the
initial phase, the authorities turned
their attention to rehabilitation and began to implement
education courses, exercise regimes and workshops.
Participation translated into up to 50 per cent off one’s
sentence for good behaviour (replacing previous early
release schemes). The apparent rationale echoed western
notions of rehabilitation through purposeful activity. 
The role of the ‘Internal committee’ of prisoners was
non-existent at first, but slowly became encouraged by
the prison authorities, presumably realising the value of a
mediator. It wasn’t long before the system of caporals re-
emerged, this time relatively independent from organised
crime. The caporals now had to be approved by the
authorities and have a good prison record. Their
responsibilities were to maintain order on the wing,
arrange ordered distribution of meals, cleaning and
generally liaising with the authorities to resolve problems
or look at complaints and ease the work-load of the
guards who were now thinly stretched. 
Many of these changes came as a great relief. The
gangs were disbanded, debts generally written off,
reasonable health care was finally available, the prison
was free of drugs and alcohol; everyone had a bed to
In the initial
months, inmates
were not even
allowed to possess
pens and paper.
4. Yet, some inmates attempted escapes in the first few months when they discovered a security defect in the cell doors. One escape
attempt succeeded when an inmate impersonated an official and walked out of the main gates. The defect in the doors was quickly
rectified and no further attempts succeeded.
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sleep on and a roof over their heads. Everyone was reliant
on prison rations, which in the first 4-6 months were
meagre: nearly everyone lost weight. Transfer to the
‘Regional’ was not without problems. Due to the ill
preparedness of the prison, many people suffered
detoxing from heroin. Several died or committed suicide
due to the severity of withdrawal. Opposing gang
members were accidentally placed together on the same
wing and even, sometimes, in the same cell, with fatal
consequences. These problems were soon rectified and
after a few months things settled down. Initial enthusiasm
for the new regime quickly flagged. Staff running courses
weren’t paid, courses weren’t funded, certificates weren’t
awarded for good work and behaviour, and no time was
given off sentences. The realisation that sentences would
not be reduced for completing courses, and the loss of
autonomy within the system, was a heavy blow for
inmates. Most now faced completing the entirety of their
sentences in prisin and had no motivation to behave.
Police control of the prison was generally successful
in tackling guard corruption and breaking the gangs’
control of the prison. However, many guards were friendly
with police officers and even some police officers with
inmates so, after a few months learning the system,
smuggling recommenced: basic goods such as razor
blades, cigarettes and food items started to appear, as
well as drugs and mobile phones. Ironically, the increase in
security fuelled corruption. Whereas previously a guard
would have smuggled in a mobile phone for US$20-100,
they were now asking for US$1,500-2,000. Furthermore,
by withholding the chargers, they could demand up to
$50 just to charge the battery. A gram of cocaine,
previously costing US$5, now cost around US$100.5
Most enthusiastically welcomed Correa’s neo-
socialist regime. Unfortunately it suffered from teething
problems, creating opportunities for corruption to re-
establish. As my experience in all three prisons shows,
corruption was very deeply rooted. Great inroads
towards change have been made, and the new prisons
are a huge improvement in general living standards and
security. 
Conclusion 
During nearly a decade in the Ecuadorian prison
system I witnessed first hand it’s reform and
modernisation; from dilapidated Victorian style buildings
to new modern structures with high tech security. New
buildings are matched with a new regime with properly
paid guards, teaching staff, properly qualified healthcare
staff, inmates in uniforms, decent food provided free to all
in an ordered fashion, education programmes, exercise
groups for all abilities. Education courses replace work in
inmate-owned businesses such as shops, cleaning,
laundry, building maintenance and of course illegal
activities, which probably provided the greatest number of
jobs! The drug trade undoubtedly fuelled high levels of
corruption amongst the guards and officials. This has
diminished a lot with the new system, which is far safer
for guards. In short, an actual sense of rehabilitation and
interest in inmates is shown by the state, in stark contrast
to previously, when inmates were left to fend for
themselves. 
The new ‘Regional’ prison offered a fresh start:
gangs were stripped of their powers of influence over
guards and officials overnight, restoring power to the
prison authorities and police. The police play a far
greater role in the security of the prison and this had a
dramatic effect in stemming the flow of narcotics, guns
and other contraband. Although guards undergo
stringent security procedures, corruption is still present,
although better controlled. Rafael Correa’s prison
reform is, without doubt, a progressive step, vastly
improving the living conditions, in every way, for
thousands of inmates who now stand at least a chance
of moving away from involvement in gangs.
Nonetheless, its long-term success is by no means
guaranteed. 
My experience in three distinct regimes suggests
that prisoner representatives can effectively assist in
maintaining relations between inmates and officials. In
part this depends on capable individuals participating in
the ‘internal committee’. As a transit point in the
international cocaine trade, prisons often housed
individuals who were experienced organisers (usually in
the world of crime). Indeed, such individuals often
commanded respect from their peers that lent them
legitimacy. Inmates were more receptive to instruction
from their elected peers as opposed to instruction by
prison officials, who arguably lacked legitimacy due to
widespread corruption. At the same time, money and
violence connected to the drug trade undermined
official control of the prison. This was taken to its
extreme in Guayaquil resulting in a very volatile and
dangerous situation. Since returning to the UK, I found
that prisons in England have introduced prison councils,
with the aim of giving prisoners more of a voice and also
to assist in easing the work load of an already
underfunded system facing yet more cut backs. The role
of the ‘number one’ on the wings in England fulfils a
similar role as the caporal. As prisoner autonomy has
decreased in Ecuadorian prisons, so it is increasing in
English ones. Nonetheless, as my experiences show,
much can be learned from Ecuador as an example of
how prisoners can usefully contribute to the daily
running of prisons. 
5. Although heroin had been widely available, gang leaders were, in general, heavily against its reintroduction to the prison.
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On 22/08/2015 I met Djalma Oliveira Rios, also known
as Cascão, member of the rap group Trilha Sonora do Gueto
(Ghetto Soundtrack). It was in a club, in Osasco city, where
the group would play a show. In between the sound check
and other arrangements, we got to talk about many
subjects. Cascão introduced me to Eliezer and Fininho, two
other ex prisoners who also took part in the interview. As we
can see below, what excels the most in their speeches is
what I believe to be most valuable thing among prisoners
and ex prisoners whom I talk to: their reflections. 
Karina: I would like you to tell me a bit of your
experience. When were you arrested? When did rap
come into your life?
Cascão: I’m son to a north-eastern mother and I grew
up in Capão Redondo (São Paulo suburbs) of the 80s. When
I turned 14 I began to work as an office-boy. As we did
payments in the banks, we started to analyze the entrances
with the idea of committing robberies, so we formed a
gang. In 1988 I was sent to FEBEM (institution destined to
detain underage lawbreakers) for the first time. When I
turned 18, I was already a bit known and I kept on robbing
banks. After six months I went to prison for two years and
ten months, then I went on parole and after six months I got
caught again. Those were 8 years in prison, it was when I
started writing my poetry. I shared a cell with a guy who
used to write lots of lyrics (rap lyrics), and one day I asked
him: ‘Do you think that if I wanted I could write like you’? He
made fun of me, so that day, I didn’t go out for association,
I stood in the cell and wrote poetry which is my success
nowadays. It was when I found out my gift, just like that,
because he made fun of me, but only when I got out of
prison, in 1999, could I put it in practice.
Karina: So you discovered your gift in there. Were
you already religiously converted at the time?
Cascão: No, I got converted out on the streets, but I
learned God’s word in there. For us, who hail from the
ghetto, the criminals (by criminals, I don’t mean those who
commit the crime, but philosophers and strategists), we first
do the time to be converted afterwards. While you are in jail
you are part of what’s in there, so, if there’s a rebellion, you
must be on the side of crime. So that’s the deal, when I was
in, I was a scoundrel, when I got out I’ve stopped, to put my
music in practice, to work and build a stable life…then I
went to church.
Karina: What was the reaction from your old
mates when you left crime, headed towards rap music
and also got religiously converted?
Cascão: That’s an illusion some people have. For
example: me and Eliezer were partners in crime, so I say-
‘I’m done with the crime thing’, and he answers — ’So
you’re gonna die’. It’s not like that, it’s about respect.
Fininho: But respect must be earned. Everybody
already knew Cascão’s history. 
Karina: There is a phrase I’ve always listened
during my research, that is: “‘nobody is obliged to do
anything, but everything has consequences”’…
Cascão: But that’s it. The consequence is the law of
life. Nobody has obligations to nobody, but for example,
if someone gets caught with me, gets arrested and I
manage to escape, then I am in debt to him, I must
support him, with lawyer’s expenses, support his family,
providing cigarettes, hygiene stuff, etc, for we are
partners. It’s not a mandatory obligation, it’s a sentimental
and moral obligation!
Karina: You talk about the assistance between
partners, but there’s also the assistance which comes
from the PCC…
Fininho: The assistance from the PCC is the assistance
from the prison population itself. So, the comrades support
who is in maximum-security prisons, because in the future I
can be the one in there. It’s not like we are paying taxes, it’s
a moral obligation too. Sentimental and moral! Some
people thinks that the PCC gives with one hand and takes
away with other hand, but the Command doesn’t extort
people or force them to admit crimes they did not commit,
the fact is, nobody is forced to do anything. 
Karina: But some people think that the PCC has
laws and punishes the ones who disobey them.
Fininho: I am not a brother (PCC member), but I do
what’s right. Those who are born in the ghetto already know
how it works, and it’s not a PCC thing. If you do what’s
wrong, you’ll be labelled wrong.
Karina: But the prisoners aren’t induced, for
example, to admit to a crime they haven’t committed
in exchange for money?
Fininho: No way! There’s a kind of prisoner who does
it, and he does it because he wants to, not because he is
forced to. It’s not something seen with good eyes. It’s a part
of crime but it’s not ‘the crime’.
‘It was already in the ghetto’: 
Rap, religion and crime in the prison
Interview with Djalma Oliveira Rios, aka ‘Cascão’
Karina Biondi Federal University of São Carlos.
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Karina: Cascão, you waited to get out of prison
get religiously converted but a lot of people get
converted in there.
Cascão: Yes, many people.
Karina: Is it viewed badly by other prisoners?
Cascão: No, on the contrary. If there’s a class which is
respected by the scoundrels, these are the believers. They
represent the balance in the world, without them, the world
would be dominated by evil. In jail it’s the same, the
scoundrels want to escape, they want to talk on the phone,
they want to make deals to get money, but they also know
that on that corner are the church brothers, praying and
holding on, got it?
Fininho: I can add that in many prisons nothing can be
done in the morning before the call. If someone from crime
dies, there’s a collective prayer and the evangelical guys are
the ones in charge of it. Only after the prayer can the
inmates start their daily activities.
Karina: But when a prisoner gets religiously
converted, sometimes he may be suspected of ‘hiding’
behind the bible, so he won’t face punishment for
some mistake. Recently, some prisoners told me that
God must be respected and that’s why they can’t
accept those who use Him to cover up their faults. I
was wondering if, what some may see as prejudice
can be seen also as an opportunity, because otherwise
he would be punished.
Cascão: That’s it, opportunity. There’s no such thing as
prejudice.
Fininho: What’s more interesting for us? A little
brother praying or a potential member of a rival gang?
Eliezer: You used the right word: opportunity. Your
daily behaviour will show your choices, if you really opted
from the heart or by mistake. If it’s by mistake it’s a repeated
mistake, because someone that falters doesn’t falter just
once. God means transformation, it’s not an illusion, God is
a miracle, is a providence. Changes happen to those who
believe and follow His word. So the day-to-day will prove if
the choice is from the heart or if it’s a trick to deceive people.
A lie can’t live forever, you know.
Karina: Now changing the subject a bit. You went
to college after leaving prison, right?
Cascão: Yes. I graduated in law and studied theology
too.
Karina: You’ve been through prison, went to
college, and have been successful with Trilha Sonora
do Gueto. And at the same time you also maintain
your commitment to life in suburbs and prisons, you
give voice to them. No success or graduation could
make you lose your humility…
Cascão: Listen, I was once debating with a guy about
realities. He argued using theories from books, you know,
from law school, and I replied: ’Man, I agree with you.
Everything you’ve just said I had to swallow in college, I ate
it and drank it like food or water, but your words are a load
of crap, let’s discuss reality!’
Karina: Are you saying that the realities of life
aren’t compatible with theories from books?
Cascão: That’s right. And if you’re not humble your
conceptions will change, you will get away from the truth.
Eliezer: Cascão lives in truth and stood humble. He
knows it deeply. 
Cascão: It’s because I’ve lived it.
Fininho: Only who lived it can talk about it.
Karina: I’ve been following your interviews,
speeches, videos, posts and I identify a lot what I say
and write with the things you say, but you know, I see
a lot of the PCC in your words…
Eliezer: Cascão has the authority to say everything he
says, because he lived it, so do I, I’ve been in prison for
eighteen years and I’m back on the streets for one, so I can
speak, we live it nowadays. Just like in the book you brought
(he was holding a copy of a book written by me),1 ’We live
it — while pointing his finger to the abbreviation PCC on the
cover, — It’s not a fashion to be followed, it’s a fact!
Cascão: It’s a fact!
Eliezer: Born and raised against the oppression that
has always existed! Tell me, who kills the most in Brazil? It’s
the military police! Last week the cops killed 18 around here.
The PCC did what no government, anthropologist or even
the pope could do, it humanised the crime.
Cascão: Humanised crime! Let’s not say ‘crime’
because the ‘lawists’2 will say that crime means the ones
who commit the transgressions, let’s say it humanised the
ghetto. 
Fininho: But it all began in prison. Before the
Commando, the prisoners used to rape visitors, abuse them,
they extorted the comrades, after the birth of the PCC these
things don’t happen anymore. Nowadays you can’t even
slap a guy in prison, so killing is unthinkable, in prison or in
ghetto.
Eliezer: They value life. Nowadays life is valuable in the
ghetto.
Cascão:Won’t die.
Eliezer: There are two sides of the coin, because dead
can’t speak, so, before the attitude, both sides must be
listened to. It was vital to turn things into what they are
today, to raise this banner. Life is priority, always.
Karina: You posted a video on facebook about
tickets for a concert. You said something like: ‘You’d
better buy in advance, because if you leave it for the
last moment and the tickets are sold out, you won’t be
able to enter, no matter who you are, because
everybody is equal’. When you mentioned ‘equal’ I
1. Biondi, Karina. Junto e Misturado: uma etnografia do PCC. São Paulo: Terceiro Nome; Running Side by Side: an ethnography of prison
life in Brazil (forthcoming). North Carolina University Press.
2. In Portuguese language the words ‘lawist’ and ‘rightist’ are the same: ‘direitista’”, so there is a double meaning for the Cascão’s
speech, referring not only to those who embrace the right wing politics but also those who state their thoughts in the terms of law.
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thought how many times I’d heard this in the prison
system. I’d like to know if this idea of equality has
reached prisons and ghettos after being used by the
PCC in their slogan.
Cascão: No, it was already in the ghetto, it’s kid street
slang. I’ll give you an example… We’re playing football and
Eliezer says, ‘If you play against me I’ll kick you down’, then
I say, ‘I shall get payback, ‘cause we’re equal’. So, it’s an old
thing that became bigger after, like Eliezer said, crime got
humanised. It began to be said: ‘If you wanna kill someone,
your equal, if you kill with no explanation, with no reason,
you’re gonna die too’.
Eliezer: In fact, it began back in 2002: Peace, Justice,
Freedom and Equality.3 
Karina: Things have changed since then, right?
Eliezer: Correct: Because, unfortunately, in the
beginning it was like that: ‘I’m part of the team, so I’m the
man!’ But now, if someone comes up with that attitude, he
will hear: ‘What? So you’re the man? No dude, Equality!
Because you’ve got to listen to the other side, there’s no
democracy without participation. The government speaks
and you keep your mouth shut? No, you must have your
voice listened to, that’s why ‘i’ stands for Igualdade
(equality). There’s no more of the old ways saying that only
the big ones have their say, everyone has rights, everyone
has a say, a voice and a point of view.
Cascão: That’s right.
Karina: The governor accredits to his police force
the reduced number of homicides in São Paulo…
Fininho: Even parrots can speak. The reality is
different.
Cascão: It’s the Command… everyone knows it.
Society is hypocritical.
Eliezer: There’s no way of hiding, only liars do. And
this reduction in death did not take a decade, it was
quicker, there was a general call saying: ‘It’s equality, life
gets paid with life, let’s listen to both sides’, and the
deaths stopped.
Karina: To close our interview, do you think your
views about the PCC may cause you to be accused of
apologising for crime?
Cascão: I have the following opinion, if you have
something to say, say it. It doesn’t matter what others think.
But if you want to be a conventional person, you don’t have
to say anything, you just sit and wait for everyone around to
speak for you. So, who was born to speak has to speak,
without fear of being labelled apologist. No matter what
the others think. They can think whatever they want.
3. The PCC’s motto.
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L: I have a BA in Social Communication, and I’m currently
attending a special program on public safety in a private
university. I’ve been working in a pre-trial detention TC
prison (a prison for detainees of the Terceiro Comando
[Third Command]) in a mid-sized city since 2008. 
W: I’m currently attending the Public Safety Course of
the Fluminense Federal University. I work in a unit of the
Bangu prison complex in the capital of the state. It’s a CV
prison (a prison for inmates of the Comando Vermelho
[Red Command]). I work directly with the inmates as a
guarda de miolo [core guard].
HRS: When I worked in police stations, there
was an orientation to classify people under arrest
as members of CV, TC or ADA [Amigos dos Amigos
[Friends of the Friends]) before sending them to a
prison, even if they weren’t actually affiliated to
these gangs. In this case, we should consider the
place where they lived: favela X, gang X; favela Y,
gang Y.
L: It still works like that. Even if they aren’t
affiliated to a gang, they’ll say they are.
W: In addition, when we receive an inmate, even if
he just lives in a neighborhood under the influence of a
gang, we ask if he had any problem in the streets, in
order to avoid conflicts in the interior of the cells. When
the new inmate mentions any unsolved issue, we
separate him from the coletivo [prisoner community],
putting him in the cell called seguro [insurance], where
he’ll serve his sentence.
HRS: Before we formally started our
interview, you mentioned that some internal
procedures may vary depending on who is the
prison (or jail) superintendent. 
W: It’s true, but anyway a CV unit is quite different
from other units. In CV units everything must be
negotiated. They have an inmates’ council, with
legitimacy to create a consensus in order to avoid
disagreements. 
L: There are also chairs of the cell, the block, and
the unit. You have to hear the council in order to deal
with any relevant issue that will affect the coletivo. 
W: Think about the recent law about visitors. A
change came from the outside: according to the new
law, visitors cannot be strip-searched any more. This
fact implied a change in the way prisoners are searched
after they come back from the courtyard where they
received their families. The search must be more
rigorous. How to do it? We had to negotiate in order to
avoid any alteração [disturbance].
L: In a TC unit, you ask the prisoner, who is naked,
to crouch down, facing you and turning his back on
you. He crouches down both ways, and then he can
go. In a CV unit it is completely unacceptable to have a
prisoner turning his back on an officer. If a new
superintendent ignores this ‘rule’, there will be
problems; it will probably cause an alteração. After the
first rebellion, the superintendent will negotiate.
L: Prisoners have their own morals. You may pay
with your life if this moral is disrespected. There is no
delay in the enforcement of the ‘law’ behind bars. It
may happen that a rebellion occurs in the day you are
on duty; you may be sacrificed as an example, even if
you were not the agent who broke the ‘law.’ 
L: The TC’s discipline is not the same as the CV’s.
The CV’s conception of coletivo is much stronger. It’s
almost a military organisation. They have watchmen;
they organise day/night shifts — there’s a watchman in
charge of each ‘work’ period. I wouldn’t say that their
discipline is stronger than the discipline of the officers,
but it is surely much stronger than other gangs’
organisation. The officers on duty are at a high risk of
losing their lives. This fact encourages the whole group
to be responsible for the safety of each other. In my unit
we take this very seriously; I would say with
professionalism. However, the point that I’d like to
make is that the prisoners also have a discipline: if
somebody is in charge of watching in a certain cell, he
will do it. If the council asks: ‘Which officer is on duty
now?’ — He will know the answer. They have
Hearing the voices of Brazilian
correction officers1
Maria Lucia Karam is from the Carioca Institute of Criminology, and Hildebrando Ribeiro Saraiva Jr.
is from the Public Safety Council of the State of Rio de Janeiro.
1. The following interview was held with two correction officers currently working in the state of Rio de Janeiro. They do not want their
names to be published; therefore they are identified just as L and W.
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information about the whole unit. They know which
team is on duty each day. They know if an officer
changed his period of work. They know who is
commanding the team on duty. They know which
officer snoozes in his turn, as well as they know who
the ‘armored’ officers (those who never sleep) are. It’s
interesting to notice this particular language. It’s
something used by all gangs — slang as a defence
strategy. A new officer may stay the whole day listening
to the conversation among the inmates, and he won’t
understand a word. Naturally, as time passes, officers
start learning their language, but it’s not so simple.
MLK: How many prisoners and officers are
there in your units?
L: In my unit there are seven guards to watch
about 500 detainees. The maximum capacity is 300.
Besides these seven guards in the
miolo, there are three more
officers in the lookout towers. If
an external attack occurs, they are
expected to stop it. We don’t
have those cells where
overcrowding is so bad that
prisoners can’t sleep at the same
time. But it’s amazing that we’re
relieved because there are places
to sleep.
W: We used to have seven
guards. The prison’s maximum
capacity is 750, but we have 1200
inmates. Recently, the
administration put one additional guard during the day
and two at night. So, at best, we have nine officers to
take care of 1200 convicts. Inside, in the miolo, there
are usually only five guards. 
HRS: In São Paulo, the PCC (Primeiro Comando
da Capital [First Command of the Capital] was
created after the Carandiru massacre.2 In some
way, we could ironically say that the state is an
ally of the gangs, as it offers the horrible
conditions of prisons as a fuel for their
strengthening and expansion.
L: Surely, the formation of gangs is a matter of
survival. When prisoners are organised, they become
more powerful, and life behind bars turns out to be less
uncomfortable. However, the history of CV is older: it
dates back to the 1970s, when bank robbers were kept
together with political prisoners in the Ilha Grande
prison. It’s amazing how this organisation didn’t lose its
strength as time went by. 
W: It should be said that most people have a
wrong idea of such organisation. They overthrow each
other all the time. I’ve been working in my current unit
for a little more than one year, and I’ve already seen five
different CV leaders.
L: I don’t disagree with you. The point I wanted to
make is that the person is substituted, but the structure
remains. The Command as an ‘institution’ is not
overthrown by the coup d’état.
W: However, many things change. I can see the
changes daily. For instance, now, any move that I make
in the visitors’ courtyard is watched by an inmate. This
didn’t happen under past ‘administrations’.
W: The unit where I’m currently working can be
considered the second most dangerous prison in the
Bangu complex, but everything inmates do there must
be authorised by Bangu III, where drug trafficking
leaders are incarcerated. They don’t talk to the chief
officer or to the prison superintendent. They negotiate
directly with the superintendent
of the whole Bangu complex: he
is the one who intermediates the
negotiations between the
inmates and the SEAP (the state
department that manages the
prison system). An agreement
reached in Bangu III will be
followed in the other units. 
HRS: Do the prisoners
work in your units?
L: Presently, there are only
ten faxinas (prisoners who have
a formal job). There used to be
courses of computer, craftwork,
but only a few detainees attended. The administration
says that work is a way to change people — it’s a joke.
Many prisoners attach a stigma to those who formally
work helping the administration. The faxina in a TC unit
or the ligação in a CV unit knows that he will not be
accepted by his comrades: one should be either an
outlaw or a worker; you can’t be both. 
W: In a CV unit there is only janitorial work. Except
for this, the prisoners’ labor force is not used. I’ve
already worked in units where officers and prisoners
could sit and talk just as we’re doing now. In a CV unit
you can’t do that. A prisoner is a prisoner, and an
officer is an officer. Anyway, as a formal job may reduce
the time to serve, the inmates that get these jobs are
the most important ones for the CV activities in the
outside. The CV tries to do everything to reduce their
time in prison so that they can go back to their
businesses. 
L:When prisoners don’t work they stay the whole
day doing nothing. The lack of work strengthens the
outlaw culture. It may happen that a prisoner insults
another, by calling him a worker. And he’ll answer: ‘I’m
When prisoners
don’t work they
stay the whole day
doing nothing. The
lack of work
strengthens the
outlaw culture.
2. In 1992, 111 inmates were killed in the prison called Carandiru, in the state of São Paulo, when military police used lethal force in
response to a fight between two groups of prisoners.
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not a worker; I’m an outlaw!’ And the administration
does nothing to try to change this culture. After being
behind bars for a few years, somebody, who was a
worker before being arrested, will probably have
adhered to this ‘being proud to be a criminal’ culture.
People are deprived from their liberty, and nothing is
done to qualify or rehabilitate them. The lack of
dialogue and educational programs attests that prisons
are just a depository of people. 
MLK: Are there differences between a pre-
trial detention unit and a unit for sentenced
inmates?
L: The pre-trial detainees don’t like disturbances.
They just want to have their day in court. It’s completely
different to be behind bars for the first time, or to know
that you will remain in prison for 20 years. The convict’s
anguish is different. 
HRS: How about the relationship between
officers and prisoners?
W: I always try to be respected by the inmates.
Respect cannot be achieved by force. It’s rather
achieved by the rectitude of my behavior there. Nobody
disturbs me, because they see that I’m doing my job in
the right way.
L: The officer must learn the ethics developed
behind bars. It’s not a matter of being corrupted by this
ethics, but to know where you are. Prisoners can’t stand
a dishonest officer. If you are dishonest in the outside,
people will just despise you; in prison, you can be
severely hurt. If you act according to the law —
according to their ‘law’; according to that ethics that
we mentioned before — there will be no problems.
Prisoners know when one of them is wrong: if you
admonish him, the other prisoners won’t be against
you. A mere admonishment may imply more time to
serve, for instance impeding a parole. If you maliciously
admonish a prisoner, they’ll see it. But, if he was wrong,
the other prisoners also see it. You can admonish him
with no concerns, also because you cannot be seen as
a milksop. There’s a routine which neither the officers
nor the prisoners want to be broken. The most
important thing is to keep this routine.
W: And they often suggest that the balance of
power may occasionally change. Every day we have the
confere [cell check]. Only one officer will be with 90
prisoners inside the cell. This is one reason why respect
among people that are together in the same institution
is so important.
MLK: How about the relationships between
prisoners and the drug trafficking in the favelas?
W: The Bangu III leaders receive orders from the
drug dealers of the favelas. Then, they transmit the
orders to the blocks, the cells, the most remote jails in
the interior of the state.
L: Many drug dealers in the favelas are former
prisoners. They have experience; they’ve already proved
that they can stand living in prison. Moreover, as they
leave prison, where are they going to work? Where will
they make R$2000 [about £500] a week? Among
former prisoners there are those who can become
‘operational soldiers,’ who like the adrenalin flowing of
holding a machine gun and shooting at the police.
After spending time in prison, what will these guys do?
Play jiu-jitsu? No, they will handle guns again.
W: Moreover, prisons end up establishing
connections that wouldn’t be made outside. A guy
from a certain favela can be side by side with a guy
from another very distant favela. Internal connections
help the external connections. Not all drug dealers of
the favelas are ‘shareholders of nothing,’ as Zaccone
says.3 Some of them, even behind bars, can make
R$700,000 a week. How can you deal with somebody
who handles such amounts of money?
L: This huge amount of money is a product of drug
prohibition. Prohibition gives the market to drug
dealers: it creates a criminal monopoly over a quite
profitable activity, which offers jobs for lots of former
prisoners. We know all the drug dealers, from the CV
founders to the boss who was arrested last week.
However, we don’t know the names of anybody who
handles this trade in a superior level, far from the
favelas. I’m not saying that the drug dealers who are in
prison are poor or nice people. If you cross the way of
one of these guys who is making R$700,000 a week,
your life is worth nothing. 
L: In effect, the lives of prison officers are quite
fragile. Comparing to other states, the situation in Rio
isn’t so bad. Our salary is reasonable; we work 24
hours on, 72 off. However, in the 24 hours in which
we are on duty, we live in a violent environment, in a
permanent tension. Even if you can rest for four hours
during this work period, you won’t be able to sleep
inside a powder keg with 1200 inmates. This tension
impacts on your body and obviously affects your
mental health. The guarda de miolo remains 24 hours
behind the bars. There are no psychologists, no social
workers, no further educational programs. Both
officers and prisoners are victims of the same
precariousness.
3. Zaccone, Orlando (2007). Acionistas do nada: quem são os traficantes de drogas. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan.
Prison Service JournalIssue 229 51
Introduction
Informal prisoner governance in Latin American
penal institutions raises a number of dilemmas for
policy. The responses must encompass
decarceration and diversion policies, and an
approach to prison security that emphasises co-
production and co-governance rather than
coercive control.
Survival and rent, monopoly and competition
The roots of both survival-oriented informal
prisoner governance and violent, rent-oriented
prisoner groups lie in the policies of mass
incarceration adopted in the region from the 1980s,
and consequent state omission and institutional
violence. However, these policies produced quite
distinct experiences for prisoners and problems for
the state. The articles in this special edition
demonstrate a spectrum, differentiated by a
combination of variables. These include: (1) the level
of autonomy of the prisoners, collectively, from the
prison authorities; (2) who exercises coercive control
and violence, even lethal force, within the prison
walls; (3) the degree of structure, hierarchical
organisation and reach of prisoner organisations
(whether they are monopolistic or competitive within
a single facility, networked across several facilities in
the prison system, or operational outside the prisons
as well as within); and, finally, (4) the material
resources (goods brought into the prison, or
necessities inherent to imprisonment) that can be
traded or used to extract rents and encourage loyalty,
and immaterial resources (legitimacy, trust or fear)
available to such prisoner syndicates, enabling them
to maintain dominance in relation both to the
prisoners and to the prison authorities. 
All but the most draconian prison regimes require
some degree of collaboration and communication
between staff and inmates to maintain routines,
predictability and the safety of both.1 However, a
tipping point occurred in the early 1990s in Latin
America as rising prisoner populations outstripped the
authorities’ capacity to provide even the most minimal
living standards, resulting in the state retreating to the
perimeter of many prisons, and leaving inmates to fend
for themselves. The self-governing prisoner
communities that emerged for the purposes of day-to-
day survival saw individuals and groups trading in the
supply and distribution of desperately needed goods,
with the rules of this prison society upheld through
constant reciprocity, trade and contract-like
arrangements, and by prisoner disciplinary committees.2
Whilst a response to state neglect, the informal
monetisation of everything produced by internal
markets also tended to stimulate the creation of social
hierarchies on the basis of income, with the community
imposing segregation on stigmatised groups such as sex
offenders.3
More commonly, however, the supply of survival
goods within an overcrowded prison was regulated not
by monetary exchange, but by violence exerted by a
dominant group or groups functioning as a rent-
seeking protection racket, extracting taxes from the
prisoners, and monopolising force.4 This monopoly was
often unstable, and periodically rival groups or ‘strong
men’ attempted to capture the commanding positions.
This competition led to a volatile and terrifying
environment for ordinary inmates. Mass incarceration
policies also caused an influx of younger prisoners,
often held for short periods on remand, with no
The Policy Challenges of Informal
Prisoner Governance
Fiona Macaulay is Senior Lecturer in the Division of Peace Studies and International Development, University of
Bradford.
1. This becomes even more necessary in conditions of scarcity of staff and of basic amenities as Postema et al describe in Lurigancho
prison in Peru (this volume) and Darke shows in his study of a police lock-up in Rio de Janeiro. Darke, S. (2013) ‘Inmate governance in
Brazilian prisons’ Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 52 (3): 272-284.
2. San Pedro prison in Bolivia lies at the decentralised end of the informal self-governance spectrum, with relations between prisoners
generally non-violent, with complex, decentred economic exchanges, functioning property rights, and internal markets for all kinds of
goods (legal, illegal, survival and luxury). Additionally, there is no evident monopolistic prisoner group, or violent intra-group power
struggles. Skarbek, D. (2010) ‘Self-governance in San Pedro prison’ The Independent Review 14 (2): 569-85.
3. Those accused of sex offences in San Pedro are forced to work in the kitchens. Cerbini, F. (2012) ‘Comer y olvidar: los peligros del
rancho en la cárcel de San Pedro (La Paz, Bolivia)’ Dimensión Antropológica 56: 133-165.
4. Antillano, this volume.
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knowledge of the ‘convict code’, which upset the
previous equilibrium between guards and inmates, and
caused a surge in interpersonal violence. The number of
riots and murders rose steadily from 1990 to 2000 in
Brazil’s prisons.5 The state’s response was brutal,
epitomised by the police killing of 111 prisoners during
a disturbance in the House of Detention in Carandiru.
This, and other mass prison deaths in the region,
signalled to prisoners that they had no option but to
organise to protect themselves from the violence both
of the state and of their fellow inmates. The Carandiru
massacre prompted, and legitimised, the emergence in
1993 of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), a
prisoner syndicate that came to control over 90 per cent
of the prisons and prisoners in São Paulo state through
its deployment first of violence then of a form of diffuse
and collective responsibility. 
The PCC lies at the
centralised end of the prisoner
self-governance spectrum. Born
within the prison system, it
metamorphosed into a
hegemonic and bureaucratic
organisation, with a codified
ethos, stratified membership and
a pseudo-legal disciplinary
system,6 that was able to extend
its activities and power beyond
the prison walls, acquiring a
dominant presence as an
organised crime cartel in many
low-income urban communities.
By providing survival goods to the
mass of inmates, it assured its
own survival as an organised crime syndicate,
racketeering both inside and outside the prison, for
which their governance of the carceral space was key.
Unlike territories (carceral or non-carceral) where there
are two or more gangs engaged in violent turf-warfare,
the PCC imposed a ‘pax monopolista’,7 regulating the
use of violence by its members and those under its
purview precisely because of the regular traffic between
neighbourhoods and prisons where it operated, and
thus allegedly reducing the homicide rates in both.
Other structured criminal groups, such as the comandos
in Rio de Janeiro and the MS13 and the Barrio 18 gangs
in El Salvador and Honduras.8 moved in the opposite
direction, from the streets into the prisons through
widespread arrest and incarceration. They may exert
monopolies inside individual prisons that the authorities
have segregated by gang, but are not hegemonic
throughout the system. These distinct dynamics require
appropriate policy responses.
Policy responses
Carceral self-rule, in its different stages and
dynamics, has been produced by the state, either
through commission, in its penal policies, or omission,
in its poor governance. Mass incarceration has provided
a ready constituency of prisoners desperate for their
basic survival and personal security needs to be met,
and from whom rents can be extracted by dominant
inmate groups. Specific penal
policies, such as those targeting
‘gang members’ or drug
dealers/users, ended up
strengthening originally rather
weak collective identities or
affiliation through incarceration
and group segregation, giving
organised crime groups a
territorial base. Prisoner
syndicates may operate as a
parallel power in the physical
absence of the state authorities
inside the jails but they are also
engaged in a ‘deadly symbiosis’
with legal/coercive actors reliant
on them to control violence
inside and outside the prisons, and thus shore up state
legitimacy.9 The São Paulo authorities have claimed
credit for the drop in prison violence and homicides in
PCC-influenced areas.10 Similarly, the 2012 gang truce
between the government and the maras in El Salvador
was brokered from behind prison walls and resulted in
a dramatic, albeit temporary, fall in murders.11 Yet, the
government’s credit-claiming was ambivalent for it was
simultaneously an admission of the state’s inability to
provide law and order. Overall, the state’s ceding of the
prisons and other areas is toxic to its legitimacy and
ability to hold a monopoly on force as a key component
The state’s response
was brutal,
epitomised by the
police killing of 111
prisoners during a
disturbance in the
House of Detention
in Carandiru.
5. Dias, C. N. and Salla, F. (2013) ‘Organized crime in Brazilian prisons: The example of the PCC’ International Journal of Criminology and
Sociology (2): 397-408. p 400.
6. Dias and Salla, this volume.
7. Biderman, C., Lima, R., Mello, J. M., Schneider, A. (2014) Pax monopolista and crime: the case of the emergence of the Primeiro
Comando da Capital in São Paulo, Brasília: CAF Working Paper N° 2014/03 07/15/2014.
8. Carter, this volume.
9. Denyer Willis, G. (2009) ‘Deadly symbiosis? the PCC, the state and the institutionalization of violence in São Paulo’. In: D. Rodgers and
G. A. Jones (eds) Youth Violence in Latin America (pp. 167-181), New York: Palgrave.
10. Dias, C. N. (2013). PCC: Hegemonia nas prisões e monopólio da violência, São Paulo: Editora Saraiva.
11. Van der Borgh, C. and Savenije, W. (2015) ‘Desecuritising and re-securitising gang policies: the Funes government and gangs in El
Salvador’ Journal of Latin American Studies 47 (1): 149-176.
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of the rule of law. It is perhaps this paradox that often
paralyses what might be sensible policies for reducing
the need for survival-oriented prisoner self-governance,
and thus the opportunities for rent-seeking prisoner
syndicates. 
Policy responses to date have largely consisted of
denial and co-existence because the periodic outbreaks
of violence within the jails with competing prisoner
groups, or outside the jails, where monopolistic groups
project their coercive and economic muscle, invite
media attention and engender public insecurity. Two
key policy areas that would address the more negative
aspects of ‘prisoner capture’ of the carceral space are
(1) the ratio of state resources to inmates, which
involves both the supply side — how many prisoners
are coming into the system — and the allocation of
state resources, how much and to
what purpose? (2) control and
security issues, which include
items such as the size of prisons,
their architecture and regime.
These in combination produce a
high or low level of governance,
and thus of legitimacy, for the
state in relation to the prison
system. 
The PCC slogan ‘peace,
justice, liberty and equality’
summarises the intangible rule-of-
law goods denied to the carceral
mass by the state, and which lead
to prisoner self-rule. Therefore, the
obvious policy approach to reduce
rent-seeking prisoner organisations
is for the state to provide these and
survival goods so that prisoners do not have to turn to
inmate groups. However, logical that may seem, Latin
American penal policy is underpinned at local and
national levels by a variety of overarching, and often
political, not criminological, goals and underlying ethos.
Modern prison systems claim to meet four objectives:
incapacitation of the offender, deterrence of potential
future offenders, legally-based punishment of a proven
offence through the deprivation of liberty, and prevention
of reoffending through education, job training, and
psychological and family support. But in reality political,
ideological and financial considerations prioritise some
over others. These tensions are evident in the mixed
successes of the key policies discussed below.
Decarceration, diversion and dejudicialisation
Informal prisoner governance results from extreme
overcrowding and overstretched administrative capacity
due to incarceration as a default penal response.
Criminal laws are often inflexible and externally
influenced: the United States, the major bilateral donor
in the region, made mandatory remand and custodial
sentences one of the conditions of its funding to
countries such as Colombia, Bolivia and Mexico in its
‘Wars’ on drugs and organised crime.12 One in five
prisoners in Latin America is currently held on a drugs
charge. This has partly sustained the excessive — and
often illegal and unjustifiable — use of remand which is
causally correlated with prison corruption, the use of
torture, the spread of disease, poverty for detainees’
families, and an undermining of
the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system, all of which lead
ordinary inmates to place their
trust and reliance in one another
or in informal prisoner
organisations.13 Therefore, a key
strategic response should be a
determined reduction in the
prison population, thereby
draining the pool of new recruits
or taxable inmates available to
coercive rent-seeking prisoner
organisations and freeing up
resources to improve prison
governance and enable inmate
to thrive, not just survive. 
By the end of 2014 Brazil had
over 622,000 prisoners, some 40
per cent of whom were on remand and waiting on
average three months to see a trial judge. Many will be
acquitted, or receive a non-custodial sentence in the end.
Whilst there is no straightforward correlation between
levels of pretrial detention and informal prisoner
governance, as the quality of governance and the sheer
size of overloaded detention facilities are also determining
factors,14 the revolving door of arrest, detention and
release sends around one million individuals through the
Brazilian prison system every year and into the arms of
predatory prisoner groups.15 Slashing pretrial detention
would free up resources (prison places, budgets for
guards and services) for better governance of smaller
prisons dedicated to serious offenders (convicted and
By the end of 2014
Brazil had over
622,000 prisoners,
some 40 per cent of
whom were on
remand and waiting
on average three
months to see a
trial judge.
12. Transnational Institute and Washington Office on Latin America (2011) Systems Overload: Drug laws and prisons in Latin America,
Amsterdam, TNI, and Washington DC, WOLA.
13. Open Society Foundations (2014) Presumption of guilt: the global overuse of pre-trial detention, New York: Open Society Foundations. 
14. Skarbek, D. (forthcoming) ‘Covenants without the sword? Comparing prison self-governance globally’ American Political Science
Review.
15. DEPEN (2016) Levantamento de informações penitenciárias InfoPen 2014, Brasília, Departamento Penitenciária Nacional, Brazilian
Ministry of Justice.
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remand), and avoid these harms.16 International
organisations such as the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Open Society Justice Initiative have
thus urged countries to implement custody hearings
requiring suspects to be brought quickly before a judge
(typically between 24 hours and a week) to determine the
necessity of pretrial detention. 
If prison authorities generally welcome a reduced
flow of new inmates into the system (assuming they are
not extracting rents from them), they are frequently
hindered by other branches of government: the
legislature and judiciary.17 Decarceration policies also
founder on governance deficits, popular discourses on
crime and in the discretionary sentencing practices and
attitudes of judges, which end up denying the due
‘liberty’, ‘equality’ before the law,
access to ‘justice’ and ‘peace’
(security) that the PCC promises
to its members in substitution of
the state. States in the region
have introduced alternatives to
remand such as electronic
tagging, house arrest, regular
reporting to a police station, and
a home-based curfew, as well as
diversionary programmes, such
as drug courts that would send
small-time users to therapy rather
than to prison. Non-custodial
sentences such as community
services and fines have been
introduced for less serious crimes.
But their effectiveness depends
on governance capacity. Lack of
adequate infrastructure and
funding for penal alternatives, and ambiguities in the
wording of laws that leave them open to interpretation
(for example, as to what a ‘serious’ crime is, whether an
individual poses a ‘risk’, or what quantity of narcotics
would be for ‘personal use’), mean that judges default
to the higher, rather than lower, levels of control. They
are also influenced by both moral panics and penal
punitivism in regards to socially marginalised
populations — young, poor black men, or indigenous
people — and a professional culture that neglects
prisoners’ rights. Between 2008-2016 volunteer
lawyers from Brazil’s National Justice Council, which
oversees the country’s judges, reviewed 400,000
prisoner case files across Brazil, granting 80,000
benefits to which the prisoners were already entitled
and freeing 45,000 detainees with spent sentences still
in custody.18 These rights should have been guaranteed
by local circuit judges tasked with overseeing prisoners’
sentences. With increasing criticism of the
judicialisation of social relations and politics in the
region, perhaps some aspects of the penal system,
specifically post-sentencing, should be de-judicialised,
a controversial proposal in a civil law system.
Security, securitisation and super-max
A second policy challenge is how the state regains
control of carceral spaces governed informally by
substitutive, monopolistic groups. The Ecuadorian
experience suggests a combination of transferring
inmates to new prisons,
removing all the sources of the
group’s rents, supplying basic
survival goods and maintaining a
differentiated control unit
elsewhere to isolate ringleaders.19
But again, it faltered on
governance problems, viz. the
state’s commitment to its own
plan and an entrenched culture
corruption among guards and
police. 
A more serious challenge is
containment, especially of the
ringleaders of predatory prisoner
groups that project power
throughout and outside the
prison system. In Latin America,
despite the porosity of the system
and clear lack of state control in
many units, prisons are still often seen as part of the
state’s security apparatus, and thus fall under the aegis
of the ministries of internal affairs, public security,
police or government. But securitisation of prisons is
not new: super-maximum security regimes or facilities
(geographically isolated fortress prisons, individual cells
and very little association) existed since the nineteenth
century. Indeed, another motive in the formation of the
PCC was the torture and illtreatment experienced by
‘disruptive’ prisoners who were transferred to the rigid
and abusive Taubaté disciplinary unit. Yet the state had
no other tools with which to contain PCC leaders other
than the regime that had fuelled the original grievance
and collective action. When the PCC flexed its muscle
by coordinating rioting in 29 prison units in 2001, the
A more serious
challenge is
containment,
especially of the
ringleaders of
predatory prisoner
groups that project
power throughout
and outside the
prison system.
16. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2013) Report on the Use of Pretrial Detention in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
46/13.
17. Detainees held long term in police lockups are more susceptible to extortion and unlikely to resist collectively, due to the very limited
space and resources.
18. http://www.cnj.jus.br/sistema-carcerario-e-execucao-penal/pj-mutirao-carcerario
19. Nunes and Fleetwood, this volume; Tritton with Fleetwood, this volume.
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prison authorities in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and then
at federal level created a Differentiated Disciplinary
Regime.20 The PCC made it clear in its second ‘mega-
riot’ in 2006 that it would resist transfer either to the
federal units, or any other super-max facility.
Conversely, transfers of leaders within the state prison
system, or across state boundaries, seem to have
facilitated the rhizomic spread of the PCC to other
states in Brazil.21 The more horizontal and co-operative
the structure and culture of the inmate organisation,
the more multipliers it has. Fluid positions within the
group, a broad base of shared identity and norms
among a large social class, combined with frequent
prisoner release and re-imprisonment, will propagate
rent-seeking inmate groups and prison-based gangs.22
However, prisons have to provide security not just
for state and society in relation to violent offenders, but
for all inmates under their
purview. Again, policies have
contradictory outcomes.
Segregating competitive gangs in
their own units, as in El Salvador,
Honduras and Rio de Janeiro, will
reduce immediate prison violence
for the detainees swept up in that
logic, but it does not remove the
underlying threat of violence
implied in the gangs’ control of
the unit. It also strengthens the
groups’ cohesion, providing them
with a territorial base for power
projection. Countries across the
region are now reaching for
imported control solutions. The US ‘super-max’ model
has been vigorously promoted both by private sector
security providers that have moved into prison
management, and by the US government, particularly
where it has leverage over countries through large-scale
security sector financing (Plan Colombia, and Plan
Mérida in Mexico).23 New  ‘everyday’ maximum security
prisons are also now incorporating as a matter of
course recognisable super-max architectural features
such as remote surveillance and electronic control. They
tend not to have riots and disturbances, although this is
not because they are run by the private sector or in
public-private-partnerships, but rather because the
contracts preclude any level of overcrowding, and often
require a level of governance and service provision far
beyond that required of state-run prisons. But they are
criticised for being dehumanising, and focussing on
control rather than on rehabilitation. Whilst they may
reduce disruptive prison association, they also
effectively preclude more positive prisoner association.
In the absence of dialogue with the authorities,
collective co-governance is impossible and prisoners are
reduced to deploying everyday forms of resistance
through a myriad micro-transgressions.24
Co-production and co-governance
The biggest challenge for any inmate, anywhere,
is how to survive prison. For those in well-ordered
and controlled prisons, this
consists in ‘doing time,’
dealing with mind-numbing
routines, maintaining one’s
sense of self, and navigating
the institutional rules, whether
consistently applied, or
capriciously set aside by staff.
However, in many of Latin
America’s prisons prisoners and
staff are mutually dependent
for physical, not just
psychological, survival.25
Encouraging a structured form
of co-governance would be a
pragmatic response that
recognises the complex and dense human relations
that characterise most prisons, and which form the
bedrock of successful management, order
maintenance and rehabilitative approaches.
Formalised forms of co-operation between prisoners
and prison authorities are not new, and in Latin America
existed in the mid-twentieth century heyday of large,
model, high security prisons. In Brazil the system of
‘trustee’ prisoners and block and cell committees was
overturned in the 1990s by a more repressive view of
prison management.26 A return to structured co-
governance seems a better guarantee for the core aims
However, prisons
have to provide
security not just for
state and society in
relation to violent
offenders, but for
all inmates under
their purview.
20. Dias and Salla, this volume.
21. Lessing, B. (2010) ‘The dangers of dungeons: prison gangs and incarcerated militant groups.’ In: Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs,
Groups and Guns (pp. 157-183), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Biondi, this volume, and Lessing, B. (2016) Inside Out: the Challenge of Prison-based Criminal Organizations. Washington DC:
Brookings Local Orders Paper Series, No.3.
23. de Dardel, J. and Söderström, O. (2015) The Rise and Fall of Supermax: how the US Prison Model and Ultra Punitive Penal Policy
Travelled to Colombia. Geneva: University of Neuchâtel, Working Paper 3-2015/E.
24. de Dardel, J. (2013) ‘Resisting ‘bare life’: prisoners’ agency in the New Prison Culture era in Colombia’ In: D. Moran, N. Gill and D.
Conlan (eds.) Carceral Spaces: Mobility and Agency in Imprisonment and Migrant Detention, London: Routledge.
25. King, R. and Valensia, B. (2014) ‘Power, control, and symbiosis in Brazilian prisons’, South Atlantic Quarterly 113 (3): 503-528.
26. Alvarez, M. C, Salla, F., and Dias, C.N. (2013) ‘Das Comissões de Solidariedade ao Primeiro Comando da Capital em São Paulo,’ Tempo
Social 25 (1): 61-82.
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of the prison system, as well as for fundamental human
rights protection, and in some of the carceral spaces
abandoned by the state, non-governmental and religious
groups have experimented with more democratic
relations with prisoners. In the so-called APAC units
(generally run by Catholic voluntary groups on their own
or in partnership with the state) and the Resocialisation
Centres (run by a variety of NGOs and the state in São
Paulo), inmates were collectively and individually made
co-producers of their own personal transformation.27
These small, local prisons are successful by many
measures: cheaper to run than state and privatised
prisons, human rights compliant, devoid of violence and
disturbance, and embedded positively in the local
community. Yet they have remained marginal because
often the higher echelons of prison management are
dominated by a militarised view of the prison-as-
barracks, in which obedience to rules and repressive
responses to infractions are seen as key to order. As
noted above, this tends to backfire and result in prisoner
resistance and self-rule. 
Both prison management and offender re-
integration can be achieved, but the state must both
relinquish its fantasies of complete control of the
prison environment, and fulfil its constitutional and
international legal responsibilities to those it
incarcerates. If the state is to successfully prevent
rent-seeking by coercive inmate groups or corrupt
staff, and gain the trust and collaboration of survival-
oriented prisoner governing groups, it also needs to
re-establish legitimacy. This would include reduction
of the prison population to manageable levels to
avoid destabilising co-governance through
overcrowding pressures, proper separation of
categories of prisoners (whether by seriousness of
crime, propensity for rehabilitation, stage or sentence
or other criteria), meeting prisoners’ survival and rule-
of-law needs, and ensuring effective external
oversight of prison management. These conditions
should make it feasible for prison staff to engage
with detainees in some form of sustainable co-
operative co-governance, albeit a necessarily
asymmetrical one, that would humanise and protect
the human rights of both, reduce fear and insecurity,
and make the carceral space more than just
survivable. 
27. Darke, S. (2014) ‘Recoverers helping recoverers: discipline and peer-facilitated reform in Brazilian faith-based prisons’. In: Miller, V. and
Campbell, J. (eds.) Transnational Penal Cultures: New Perspectives on Discipline, Punishment and Desistance (pp. 217-229), London:
Routledge; and Macaulay, F. (2014) ‘Whose prisoners are these anyway?’ Church, state and society partnerships and co-production of
offender ‘resocialisation’ in Brazil’. Also in: Miller and Campbell (pp. 202-16). 
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The abysmal situation in Latin America prisons has
been widely documented by international human rights
mechanisms, scholars, and civil society organisations.1
Persistent overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, violence
by authorities and other prisoners, and corruption are
prevalent. Riots, hostage crises and fires have claimed
the lives of hundreds in recurring incidents of mass
death from Chile to Mexico.2 The prison crisis in the
Americas has intensified over the past two decades as
rates of incarceration have risen steadily (and well
beyond capacity) throughout the Americas. While in
2000, there were 648,523 people incarcerated in
Central and South America, by 2014, this number had
more than doubled, to 1,338,042.3
In practice, prison governance in the Americas
has been characterised by two extremes. On the one
hand are detention centres that operate as de facto
systems of uncontrolled and abusive self-governance,
in which frequently abusive prisoners exert effective
control over delimited spaces, whether they be
cellblocks, units or entire detention centres.
Authorities are content to ensure external security. In
this model, prison guards and higher authorities are
frequently complicit in a wide range of corrupt
schemes — in which virtually all aspects of ordinary
life must be ‘purchased’ in the illicit market run by
some prisoners in collusion with corrupt guards.4 At
the other extreme, a number of institutions follow a
model of incarceration based on the United States’
model of exerting full (depersonalised, dehumanising)
control over inmates. Neither of these models is in
accord with international human rights norms, which
require that the deprivation of liberty not imply other,
unnecessary restrictions on rights. Worse, these
extreme solutions fail to provide the minimum
conditions necessary for the rehabilitation and
resocialisation of prisoners. 
Drastic changes in prison management are both
necessary and possible. This article argues that a new
paradigm in prison management, based on the
controlled organisation of inmates, holds the potential
to revolutionise prisons in the Americas, rendering them
rights-respecting, rehabilitative and cost-effective. To do
so, we begin by considering existing taxonomies of
prison systems — hierarchical, differentiated, and
autonomous5 — and prison management models —
the control model, the responsibility model, and the
consensual model.6 We then briefly summarise relevant
international human rights norms on the deprivation of
liberty, which establish that inmates be subjected to the
least restrictive regime necessary in order to guarantee
safety, as well as provisions on respectful detention
contained in the Third Geneva Convention. The article
then turns to several successful examples of the model
that we propose. We consider its written regulation in
Costa Rica and Panama, as well as its practical
functioning in a prison in Peru visited by the authors.
We conclude with the identification of common
elements in the controlled organisation of inmates. 
A conceptual framework: theories of prison
systems and prison management
In 1975, Eric Steele and James Jacobs provided a
taxonomy of prison systems that remains relevant to
understanding the underlying logic of the most prevalent
penitentiary regimes. Steele and Jacobs categorised
prison systems according to the purpose and logic of
their institutions,7 which were the result of contrasting
assumptions about ‘the etiology of crime, the treatment
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1. For an overview, see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), (2011) Report on the Human Rights of Persons Deprived
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3. International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief, http://www.prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief.
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5. Steele, E. H., and Jacobs, J. B., (April 1975) ‘A Theory of Prison Systems’, Crime and Delinquency, 21, 2: 149-162.
6. DiIulio, Jr., J. J. (1987) Governing Prisons: A Comparative Study of Correctional Management, New York: The Free Press.
7. Steele and Jacobs, 1975, p. 149 (see n. 5).
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of criminals, and the maintenance of order.’8 Steele and
Jacobs differentiated between a hierarchical, a
differentiated, and an autonomous model.
For Steele and Jacobs, the hierarchical prison system
is based on an assumption that criminality is untreatable.
As a result, it does not provide for rehabilitation of
offenders, but instead, maximises order and control
through a highly coercive punishment-and-reward
incentive structure. It places obedient inmates in lower
security settings, and transfers disruptive ones to higher
security prisons.9 In contrast to this model, Steele and
Jacobs identified a differentiated system, founded on the
notion that criminality can be diagnosed and treated.10
The placement of inmates in these institutions is thus
guided by their treatment needs instead of by disciplinary
considerations.11 The third model Steele and Jacobs
described is the autonomous system, which is based on
a premise of ‘benign neglect’12 and holds inmates for ‘a
relatively long period at low cost’ at remote locations.13 It
does not provide for the treatment of inmates, for a
variety of reasons that range from the impossibility or
undesirability of forcing prisoners to change, to
budgetary considerations. 
A second categorisation considers governance
practices. In 1987, political scientist John DiIulio described
three distinct managerial approaches based on his
observations of U.S. state prisons: the control model, the
responsibility model, and the consensual model.14 The
control model is based on a logic of coercion, and follows
a punishment-and-reward incentive structure in which
even minor offenses are subject to harsh sanctions.15 In
contrast, institutions run according to the responsibility
model aim to place inmates in the least restrictive setting
possible, maximising a sense of responsibility for their
actions.16 These instil responsibility by providing inmates
with ‘a greater voice in prison affairs’17 — and by
minimising symbols of authority.18 The consensual model
fuses elements of the previous two models. Like the
responsibility model, it is based on a power-balance
between correctional officers and inmates and gives
inmates a voice in prison affairs, as well as limited
autonomy with respect to personal decisions, such as
grooming.19 However, its stronger emphasis on
organisational hierarchy is more consistent with the
control model.20
International standards on the deprivation of
liberty: only strictly necessary restrictions
The human rights norms relevant to prisons that are
applicable throughout Central and South America are
found in the United Nations’ International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)21 and the Organization of
American States’ principal rights treaty, the American
Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).22
These norms have striking similarities. 
Both conventions hold that the rights they establish
apply, without distinction, to all people within each
State’s jurisdiction,23 and that these rights must not be
restricted more than is strictly necessary.24 Moreover, they
explicitly require that States apply the legal provision
(whether by treaty, national constitution or ordinary law)
that provides the greatest protection of human rights.25 In
practice, this means that international human rights law
requires that these rights are applicable to imprisoned
and free people alike, and that inmates be subjected to
the least restrictive regime necessary to guarantee safety.
The conventions include other important norms,
too. In addition to the absolute ban on torture and
cruel treatment,26 they establish that inmates be
treated ‘with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person,’27 and explicitly state that the aim of
the deprivation of liberty as a punishment is the
‘reform and social rehabilitation of the prisoners.’28
8. Id., p. 154. 
9. Id., pp. 151-2. 
10. Id., p. 154. 
11. Id., p. 156.
12. Id., p. 158.
13. Id., p. 160. 
14. DiIulio, 1987 (see n. 6).
15. Id., pp. 105-8. 
16. Id., p. 118.
17. Id., p. 120.
18. Id., p. 118.
19. Id., p. 131.
20. Id., p. 128.
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), ratifications:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.
22. American Convention on Human Rights (1969), ratifications:
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm.
23. Art. 2 ICCPR; art. 1 American Convention.
24. Art. 5 ICCPR; art. 29 American Convention.
25. Art. 5(2) ICCPR; art. 29(b) American Convention. 
26. Art. 4(2) and 7 ICCPR; art. 5(2) American Convention
27. Art. 10(1) ICCPR (which also adds ‘humanity’); art. 5(2) American Convention.
28. Art. 5(6) CADH; art. 10(3) ICCPR.
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The ICCPR adds the treatment of inmates to this
purpose.29
From this, we can conclude that of the models
outlined above, only Jacobs and Steele’s
differentiated prison system, centred on the
treatment of inmates, complies with international
human rights norms. In terms of prison management
systems, DiIulio’s responsibility model, which places
inmates in the least restrictive setting possible and
gives them a voice in internal affairs — and possibly
even the consensual model, with its greater emphasis
on order — are most consistent with these norms. It
would be much harder to justify the application of a
hierarchical or control model under international
human rights law, save in exceptional circumstances.
Third Geneva Convention: an interesting
framework for respectful detention
Another valuable set of standards on humane
detention can be found in the Third Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War.30 The Geneva Conventions, designed to regulate
war, include detailed norms on the treatment of those
captured during battle. While these provisions do not
apply to prisoners in the ordinary penitentiary system,31
they provide carefully deliberated32 and widely
respected33 norms that provide an interesting
framework for rights-based detention regimes.
These norms are based on the respect for
prisoners ‘and their honour.’34 The Third Geneva
Convention establishes, for instance, that liberty of
movement should be restricted only insofar as
necessary,35 and that the ‘practice of intellectual,
educational, and recreational pursuits’ should be
encouraged.36 It also contemplates allowing prisoners
to freely and periodically elect representatives, who
must be approved by authorities.37 These
representatives, who may be assisted by advisors,38
are tasked with liaising with authorities, furthering
prisoners’ ‘physical, spiritual and intellectual well-
being,’39 and may coordinate a ‘system of mutual
assistance’40 to the extent that such a system is
developed by prisoners. Authorities must facilitate
such activities.41
Although these norms are not binding outside the
context of armed conflict, they provide useful guidelines
to orient the principles for the governance of detention
centres more generally. In this regard, the core principle
that animates the Third Geneva Convention — respect
for prisoners — would be transformative if applied to
ordinary detention centres. Below, we consider prison
experiences in which this guiding principle appears to
have been implemented, if not perfectly, at least to a
significant degree.
Experiences with controlled organisation of
inmates: communication and respect lead to
pacification
There are several interesting experiences with the
controlled organisation of inmates in Latin America. Some
countries, like Costa Rica and Panama, have established
normative frameworks for the facilitation of these
activities, while in at least one prison in Peru, there is a
well-established but officially unregulated practice of
controlled prisoner organisation.
Costa Rica
The Costa Rican penitentiary system held some
17,440 prisoners, divided over 33 detention facilities,
in September 2014. Its prisons have an occupancy rate
of 139.4 per cent. Out of every 100,000 inhabitants of
Costa Rica, 352 are imprisoned. Since 2000, the prison
population has almost doubled.42
In 1996, the Costa Rican Ministry of Justice
issued a directive to regulate inmate organisations,43
acknowledging the existence of such organisations
exist and recognising the positive contributions these
can make to inmates’ well-being44 and
29. Art. 10(3) ICCPR.
30. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), entered into force in 1950.
31. The 1960 Commentary to the Convention indicated that ‘the internment of prisoners of war in penitentiaries is in principle prohibited
because of the painful psychological impressions which such places might create.’
32. The 1949 Convention replaced an earlier comprehensive document from 1929. Before then, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907 contained provisions regulating the treatment of prisoners of war.
33. The Third Geneva Convention has 196 States parties.
34. Art. 14 GC III. 
35. Art. 21 GC III.
36. Art. 38 GC III.
37. In case of refusal, authorities must communicate their reasons. Art. 79 GC III. 
38. Art. 81 GC III.
39. Art. 80 GC III. 
40. Id.
41. Art. 81 GC III.
42. World Prison Brief (see n.3). 
43. Dirección General de Adaptación Social, ‘Instructivo para regular las organizaciones de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con
la administración penitenciaria,’ (27 Nov. 1996), published in La Gaceta No. 88, 9 May 1997.
44. Id, preamble, art. 4.
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development.45 The regulation allows for two types of
inmate organisation: assemblies,46 in which a large
number of inmates participate, and committees,47
consisting of three to five delegates chosen by the
assembly to carry out specific activities.
The regulation enables the provision of institutional
support to inmate organisations48 while establishing
considerable control by the prison’s Technical Council (TC),
an interdisciplinary body composed of the prison director,
the director of security, and representatives of each area
of expertise (such as psychologists) in the institution.49
Organisations are required to send the TC quarterly
communications about their planned activities.50 A prison
official designated as permanent
liaison to inmate organisations is
present during all meetings and
ensures that all applicable rules are
respected.51 Organisations are also
allowed to organise fundraising
activities, under the strict
supervision of prison authorities.52
By means of such activities,
inmates for example financed a
new gym in San Sebastián prison.53
Importantly, the regulation
establishes a democratic,
participative framework for the
operation of inmate organisations, which limits the
possibility of abuse of power. It establishes, for instance,
that those elected to the committees serve a one-year
term and cannot immediately be re-elected,54 that there
will be no hierarchy within the committees, and that all
members are allowed to speak and vote.55 Moreover, it
requires a written registry of decisions (taken by simple
majority).56
Although, strictly, the TC cannot prevent the
establishment of organisations, it can prevent them
from operating: organisations require TC approval for
all meetings and activities they wish to organise.57 The
extent to which inmate organisations are active, is
thus highly dependent on prison authorities’
willingness to facilitate their operation. During a
February 2016 visit, we observed active inmate
organisations in San Sebastián prison. By contrast, in
the La Reforma complex, these groups were much
less active and successful. For example, inmates at La
Reforma complained about embezzlement by
members of the committee.58 An in-depth study of
how these organisations operate in different
establishments would be highly recommended. 
Panama
In January of 2015, Panama
held some 15,508 prisoners in 24
establishments. Like Costa Rica, it
has a high prison population rate:
352 per 100,000 inhabitants. Its
general occupancy level is 111.1
per cent.59
In February of 2016, the
national prison director circulated
a regulation among prison
directors.60 Although more limited
and less detailed than the Costa
Rican norm, it allows for the
establishment of committees in prisons to propose actions
and present petitions to prison authorities, and to serve as
a link between authorities and inmates.61 These
committees will consist of a maximum of three
representatives (with two substitutes each) per prison unit
represented and are to be elected for a period of one year
by means of a secret vote.62 Committees will meet bi-
weekly.63
The regulation emphasises that these
committees can only ‘propose and inform;’64 the
development of lucrative activities, as in Costa Rica,
Organisations are
also allowed to
organise fundraising
activities, under the
strict supervision of
prison authorities.
45. Id, arts. 16, 22. 
46. Id, arts. 5-9.
47. Id, arts. 10-29.
48. Id, arts. 8, 13, 16, 23-25, 30-38.
49. Reglamento Técnico del Sistema Penitenciario, No. 33876-J.
50. Instructivo (see n. 43), art. 351 Id, arts. 13, 23-25.
52. Id, arts. 31-34, 39.
53. Interviews, 16 Feb. 2016.
54. Instructivo (see n. 43), art. 18.
55. Id, art. 17.
56. Id, art. 21. 
57. Id, art. 3.
58. Interviews, 18 Feb. 2016.
59. Word Prison Brief (see n.3). However, this January 2015 number reflects the system’s official capacity. It included 5504 places in new
prison complex La Gran Joya, which had not been populated yet. Without counting the then-empty La Gran Joya, Panama’s prison
occupancy level was 184%.
60. Reglamento general sobre formas de participación de las personas privadas de libertad,
http://www.sistemapenitenciario.gob.pa/sites/default/files/REGLAMENTO%20DE%20PARTICIPACI%C3%93N%20DE%20LOS%20PRI
VADOS%20DE%20LIBERTAD.pdf. 
61. Id, arts. 1-3
62. Id, art. 9. 
63. Id, art. 5. 
64. Id, art. 7.
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does not seem to be allowed, nor is it clear how
much participation authorities have in committees’
activities. However, as this is a new regulation, it will
be interesting to monitor its effective application.
Peru
Another example of the controlled organisation
of inmates is one functioning in practice, without
official regulation, in the all-male prison of San Pedro
de Lurigancho (Lurigancho) in Peru. The prison is
severely overcrowded: in November 2015, it held
9,885 inmates65 in a centre with stated capacity for
3,204.
66
At any given time, there are about 30 guards
and 120 police officers working in the complex — or
one official per 66 inmates.67
Lurigancho has a long
history of violence and conflict.68
In 1986, it was the stage of one
of Peru’s most violent prison
revolts, which cost the lives of
126 people69 — more than 100
of whom were killed extra-
judicially by Peruvian armed
forces.70 The State virtually
abandoned Lurigancho between
1987 and 1992, securing only
the perimeters of the prison.
During those years, no guards
were present inside the
compound and the State did not provide food nor
medicine.71 Although a certain form of inmate
organisation with elected leaders existed,72 the
absence of the State likely spurred a more
sophisticated organisation. This situation was initially
uncontrolled by authorities. As a result, the strongest,
most respected criminals, taitas (who moreover
controlled the drug trade) were the real leaders, and
Lurigancho remained rife with violence and abuse.73
This situation has changed considerably over the
past decade: Lurigancho has been transformed from
an institution characterised by rampant violence in a
setting of unhygienic anarchy, to a controlled system
in which authorities and inmates communicate and
foster non-violent coexistence within the prison. This
situation of calm enables inmates to move freely
within the common areas of the prison compound,
where they can work, study, socialise, and buy food
and household items in the market area. All this
further reduces tensions.
Both authorities and inmates assert that the
current peaceful coexistence in Lurigancho is the
result of its governance structure, which more closely
resembles that of a town or neighbourhood than
most detention centres. Lurigancho’s inmates are
housed in 24 pavilions, which generally hold between
400 and 700 inmates. Each pavilion elects a team of
representatives or deputies (delegados), led by a
single, general delegate
(delegado general) who ensures
that the pavilion operates
smoothly.74 Each representative
or deputy (generally, nine in all)
is responsible for a specific
aspect of community life: food,
budget, discipline and order,
cleaning and infrastructure,
sports, health, education, legal
affairs, and culture. These
deputies, in turn, work with a
small team of aides. Since the
State provides only some basic
supplies, inmates pay a weekly
quota to fund these activities. As a result, living
conditions have improved markedly: the buildings are
tiled and freshly painted, the structures are clean and
orderly, and meals are varied.75
The prison director and the pavilion representatives
currently meet regularly (typically once a week) to
discuss issues such as discipline, visiting policies, and
ordering building supplies. Additionally, the pavilion
representatives regularly meet amongst themselves.
Every year, they elect a leadership committee for the
entire prison, consisting of four people: a general
representative, a representative for issues related to
food, one for the budget, and one for order and
discipline. This leadership committee liaises directly with
The State virtually
abandoned
Lurigancho
between 1987 and
1992, securing only
the perimeters of
the prison.
65. Information from prison authorities.
66. Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, (Aug. 2015) Informe Estadístico Penitenciario, Lima: Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, p. 11,
http://www.inpe.gob.pe/pdf/agosto_15.pdf.
67. Information from prison authorities.
68. See José Luis Pérez Guadalupe, (2000) La construcción social de la realidad carcelaria, Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú,
pp. 170-224.
69. See Alan Riding, (Sep. 16, 1986) ‘Peru’s Prison Massacres: Can the Truth Come Out?’, New York Times. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/16/world/peru-s-prison-massacres-can-the-facts-come-out.html?pagewanted=all.
70. Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliacion, p. 766; description of occurrences on pp. 737-768. Available at
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.67.FRONTON%20Y%20LURIGANCHO.pdf.
71. Pérez Guadalupe (2000), p. 36 (see n. 68). 
72. Id., p. 38; interviews, Nov. 2014 and 2015.
73. Pérez Guadalupe (2000), pp. 170-224 (see n. 68).
74. Some pavilions hold annual elections by secret ballot, supervised by prison authorities. Others elect their leaders, who stay on until they
lose legitimacy or leave Lurigancho, by consensus. 
75. Interviews, Nov. 2014 and 2015. 
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prison authorities. All these regular meetings have had
important results in reducing violence. For example,
according to inmates, pastoral workers and authorities,
physical abuse and rape have been almost eliminated
from Lurigancho.76
Conversations with inmates, authorities, and
NGO workers in the prison lead us to believe there
are a number of essential elements to this
unregulated transformation. First, since the State re-
established its presence in Lurigancho, prison
directors have opted to work with, rather than
against, these structures of inmate organisation —
probably at least partially out of necessity, since the
prison remains severely understaffed. Second,
authorities have regularly transferred out the most
disruptive inmates to protect Lurigancho’s non-violent
coexistence. Third, communication between
authorities and inmates has been made a priority and
the prison director is often present inside the prison,
instead of in his office.77
This is not to say that all problems have been
solved in Lurigancho. It is certainly undesirable that
inmates themselves are required to pay to live and eat
in a State-run prison. Those who are unable to pay have
often been expelled from their pavilions and forced to
stay in the ‘no-frills’ pavilion run by prison authorities.
Corruption has not been eradicated. However, the
enormous improvements that have already been made
suggest that more positive changes are possible.
Preliminary conclusions regarding controlled
organisation of inmates
Although more study is needed, reflection on the
norms and practice as outlined above allows us to
identify several basic, common elements in prison
management systems that incorporate the controlled
organisation of inmates:
1. Prison authorities are committed to creating an
environment that is respectful, safe, and 
rehabilitative for prisoners, with as few 
restrictions to human rights as possible.
2. Either organically, or by legislation or 
regulation, norms and guidelines that set 
parameters for inmate engagement in 
governance are established.
3. The creation of a structure of inmate 
representatives78 facilitates communication 
between inmates and authorities. 
4. Both authorities and inmates value and nurture
the mechanisms for communication and 
constructive collaboration.
5. The organisation of inmates increases 
communication between (groups of) inmates, 
which is likely to aid peaceful coexistence.
6, When internal efforts prove to be insufficient 
to contain disruptive inmates, such inmates 
might be transferred to other centres to 
maintain a peaceful coexistence in the prison.79
7. Inmates’ engagement in educational and 
professional activities is actively encouraged, 
which aids rehabilitation and further reduces 
tensions.
8. The controlled organisation of prisoners helps 
to maintain order and provide services inside 
the prison, such as the cleaning and 
improvement of installations. This significantly
improves detention conditions, which, in turn,
may improve interpersonal relations in the 
detention centre.
9. Constructive activities also help to instil a sense
of responsibility and purpose in inmates. This 
might contribute to rehabilitation.
10. Contacts with the outside world are facilitated 
where possible: visiting policies are expanded 
and outside (religious and social) groups 
are welcomed in, to develop activities. This 
‘normalisation’ is likely a key element in 
prisoners’ resocialisation and rehabilitation. 
It follows from international human rights norms
that the least restrictive setting must be applied in
detention centres. The experiences discussed above
suggest that the prison management systems that have
incorporated the controlled organisation of inmates,
have increased communication between inmates and
between inmates and authorities, which has led to an
improvement in detention conditions in these centres.
The implementation of such systems in other prisons
would be an important, attainable step that has the
potential to transform prisons into institutions that are
less violent, less abusive, and thus more rights-
respecting and rehabilitative. 
76. Interviews, Nov. 2015.
77. Interviews, Nov. 2015.
78. Although the results of inmate elections should in principle be respected, it might be desirable for prison authorities to have effective
veto power over the designation of representatives — for example, where these are demonstrably engaged in illicit activities — or the
possibility to decide to not work with them, like in Costa Rica.
79. It might thus be necessary to maintain a number of prisons with a more restrictive environment for prisoners not willing to follow
(community) rules.
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